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“The Minimisation of the Liquidation of Viable Banking Institutions in Zimbabwe’s Banking 
Sector” 
 
The Zimbabwe banking sector seems to have almost recovered from the banking crisis of 2003/2006, 
in a very difficult social, economic and political environment.    More than 20 banking institutions 
were placed under liquidation during the crisis.  The rapid rehabilitation can be attributed largely to 
the corrective measures under the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s active monetary reforms from 
January 2004, competent top management teams and credible shareholders in most of the banking 
institutions. 
 
The researcher maintains, however, that it is of paramount importance for the banking sector to 
implement a second stage of bank restructuring characterised by a market-based system, the 
application of forward-looking criteria to the system of Regular Banking Restructuring, and, thirdly, 
effective corporate governance structures. 
 
It can be deduced that by the beginning of 2007 the pace of reform had diminished, reflecting the 
effects of the prevailing social, economic and political turbulence.  In addition, other factors, namely, 
under-capitalisation, ineffective corporate governance structures, shortages of cash and foreign 
exchange and a dwindling economy, have continued to threaten the viability of a number of banks.  In 
this situation the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, on behalf of the government, is urged to launch a 
second round of banking reforms. 
 
Two years after the banking crisis, fundamental questions still linger over whether future actions will 
be based on market mechanisms, or whether bank restructuring reforms will continue.  Yet, based on 
its experience of having overcome the banking crisis, in the teeth of an annual rate of inflation of 231 
million per cent (31 July 2008), immeasurably the highest in the world,  Zimbabwe can contribute 
vital practical and up-to-date bank restructuring methodology ideas to countries such as United 





The main objectives of this qualitative research project are as follows: 
o To establish the major causes of liquidation or collapse of banks during 2003/2006. 
o To determine how some banks survived, while others of similar size collapsed during the period 
of study. 
o To make a contribution to the field by providing  practical and effective solutions, in order to 
minimize the effects of past collapses and forestall similar failures of viable institutions in the 
banking sector in the future.  
o To investigate how corporate governance principles and market-based, regular banking 
restructuring could be applied in practice, in order to minimize the liquidation of viable 
institutions. 
o To determine what measures ought to be taken regarding bank insolvencies in Zimbabwe. 
 
In this regard, Chapter One offers an introduction with historical background.  Chapter Two presents 
a survey of relevant literature, focusing on corporate governance and bank restructuring, relating to 
theoretical, practical and methodological issues.  The final part of the literature survey covers 
problems identified by the researcher.  Chapter Three details the conducting of the field work, and the 
strategies and methods of data collection.  The samples fall into three categories: first, banks that 
were placed under liquidation, second, banks that were restructured and third, banks that remained 
financially sound during the crisis.  Chapter Four covers results of field research and qualitative 
analysis of data.  In this chapter the researcher addresses all of the research questions set out in the 
beginning.  Reports are presented with tables of numerical data, graphs or quotes from the interviews 
and other sources to enhance the discussion of results.  Chapter Five covers interpretation and 
discussion of findings.  Early data analysis is applied in order to make preliminary connections 
between different strands of information.  Chapter Six presents the conclusion, with 
recommendations and notes on the contribution of the study to the field under discussion.  
Conclusions are naturally based on the findings of the research, and from these flow the 
recommendations.  The emphasis here is on recommendations that are as practical and achievable as 
possible. Finally, a number of areas that, in the researcher’s opinion, call for further research are 
suggested, in order to expand the body of knowledge in general and to develop the search for further 
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1.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION  
1.1 1980 – 2003        
Southern Rhodesia, later to become Zimbabwe, was founded when the British flag was 
hoisted in what was then called Salisbury, now Harare, on the 12th September 1890. When 
Zimbabwe obtained its independence on 18 April 1980 the yearly rate of inflation was 
seven per cent. It soon rose to eleven per cent (January 1981), and continued to increase to 
twenty-four percent in January 1984. It then decreased to fourteen percent in 1990. 
According to the[Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Inflation Rates 2008], the rate of inflation 
for July 2008 was two hundred and thirty-one million per cent, the highest in the world. 
 
Since attaining independence in April 1980 Zimbabwe has passed through four main 
phases of socio-economic development. These are: 1982-1985 Transitional National 
Development Plan, 1986-1990 First Five Year National Development Plan, Second Five-
Year National Development Plan 1991-1995 and 1996-2000 Zimbabwe Programme For 
Economic and Social Transformation [ZIMPREST]. 
 
1.1.1  According to the [Zimbabwe Transitional National Development Plan 1982], the  
objectives of the government were: 
(a) Removal of the historical distortions and all undesirable characteristics of socio-economic 
dualism, and establishment of an integrated society. 
(b) Establishment of a socialist state that would accept the role of private enterprise. 
(c) Establishment of a democratic socialist society set in the dynamic framework of a 
developing economy. 
(d) Removal of all features of the colonial regime. 
(e) Growth and development of the economy with the following priorities:  
o Rural and agricultural development. 
o Housing and community service. 
o Energy development. 
o Education development for all, with the establishment of vocational schools and technical 
colleges. 
o Establishment of National Health Service for all. 
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In order to attain the aforementioned, entrepreneurs were expected to satisfy the needs of 
their employees.  As a result, enterprises owned by both the government and members of 
the community were established to manufacture goods and provide essential services. 
However, the economy of the country did not improve as anticipated, with negative fiscal 
deficit figures, and some years of negative balance of payments, as depicted in table 1.1: 
 
Table 1.1    General Government Current Account, Zim Million, 1977-1984 
  1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Revenue         
Direct taxes 284 265 281 383 539 707 783 856 
Indirect taxes 224 238 261 316 507 709 956 1 055 
Fees, sales and recoveries 172 196 214 291 272 321 407 451 
Other revenue 85 90 95 116 134 149 189 217 
TOTAL 765 789 851 1 106 1 452 1 886 2 335 2 579 
         
Expenditure         
Salaries, wages and allowances 285 309 386 518 626 829 925 1 033 
Other goods and services 259 326 344 436 396 499 620 728 
Interest 46 55 72 93 125 193 242 305 
Subsidies 100 134 90 100 120 169 82 296 
Pensions 33 48 60 74 71 77 75 79 
Unidentifiable expenditure .. .. .. 33 46 46 18 20 
TOTAL 767 918 1 005 1 338 1 497 2 005 2 257 2 752 











 Source: Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office, Government publication, (1989) p.118 
 
It is apparent that these figures reflect the difference between total revenue collected by the 
government in the form of direct and indirect taxes, fees, and other recoveries, against 
expenditure in the form of salaries for civil servants, defence, education, pensions and 
other, unidentifiable, expenditures. A negative figure implies that the government was 
spending more than it was collecting. All such negative gaps had to be financed either by 






It is, however, important to note that during this period the country’s manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors were viable, as evidenced by a favourable balance of payments 
situation, as depicted in table 1.2 below. The negative figure for the year 1982 could have 
been a result of the drought. 
 
Table 1.2Foreign Trade, US$ million 
Year 1980 1982 1983 1985 1987 1990 
Exports 1446 1321 1154 1120 1452 1760 
Imports 1339 1472 1070 919 1071 150 
Balance of trade 107 -151 84 201 381 260 
 Source: Zimbabwe Second Five-Year National Development Plan (1991), p.1. 
 
It is also important to note that during this period the government partially adopted the 
ideology of socialism, and in the process introduced health and education for all at 
minimal cost to the public. These sectors thus depended heavily on government funding.  
Sustaining these was aided by donor funds, due to the excellent relations that existed in the 
period immediately after independence.  
 
State participation in the economy was achieved through the formation of several 
parastatals. Government policy required the provision of health and education for all.  
However, economic growth during this period was hampered by the 1982/3 droughts, so 
that the government had insufficient resources to continue with subsidized health and 
education for the disadvantaged segment of the society.  
 
The conclusion can therefore be drawn that these factors, directly or indirectly, contributed 
to a rise in the fiscal deficit, which in turn fuelled inflation in the next phase of 








1.1.2   According to the [Zimbabwe First Five-Year National Development Plan 1986], in addition 
to the implementation of political and economic ideas that the means of production, 
distribution, and exchange should be owned by the members of the community, the 
government remained focused on the development and ownership of means of production 
for the benefit of the majority. 
 
It can be inferred that, considering developments in the Socialist Bloc of Eastern Europe, 
the government realised that economic development would never be achieved on the 
principles of socialism. As a result, the government introduced new policies of a mixed 
economy, replacing the old socialist approach. This was demonstrated in the next phase of 
developments.  
 
In the period approaching the 1990s the government phased out the socialist ideology with 
the realization of the importance of economic reforms, resulting in the adoption of the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). According to the Central Statistical 
Office, in 1986 the rate of inflation was eleven per cent, and by December 1990, it was 
eighteen per cent. 
 
1.1.3  In the terms of the [Zimbabwe Second Five-Year National Development Plan 1991]the 
main tasks of the government were: 
(a) Poverty eradication through rural development. 
(b) Equitable distribution of resources. 
(c) Improvement in the country’s export performance through liberalization of foreign trade. 
(d) Domestic deregulation and trade liberalization to stimulate domestic and foreign 
investments. 
(e) Application of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. 
(f) International economic cooperation. 
(g) Changes in the country’s labour laws, with the objective of increasing worker participation 
in corporate organizations in order to make labour more efficient.  
This was the period that preceded the Lancaster House Agreement, which was valid for ten 
years from the attainment of independence, and partial amendments to the country’s 




Fiscal policy:  
According to [Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation 1996] 
indigenous entrepreneurs needed ready access to loans for fixed and working capital, and 
this had been denied them by the macro-economic consequences of the budget deficit.  
The bulk of the population had been hard-hit by the substantial price increases of basic 
commodities over the last five years.  Inflation had been initially exacerbated by the 
removal of subsidies and the effects of the 1991/92 drought, but the size of the budget 
deficit had been the root cause of the continued high levels of inflation. This had severely 
eroded the real incomes of the workers, the self employed and communal farmers. 
 
To achieve meaningful economic growth the government realized the importance of 
investing in education. This would avoid reliance on expatriates who were normally paid 
in foreign exchange.  The opening of another new university in Bulawayo, the second 
largest city in Zimbabwe, and additional vocational training colleges imposed a further 
strain on the budget, which placed yet further demands on the declining revenue base. 
Financing these deficits meant that the inflation control measures could not be 



















The conclusion can be drawn that budgetary control measures were ineffective because of 
the establishment of too many ministries and government departments at the same time, as 
depicted in figure 1.1 below: 
 




















Source: Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST)(1996-
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Banking sector reform 
In the process of trade liberalization, the government realized the need to reform the 
banking sector, which at the time was dominated by five traditional banks, the majority of 
which were foreign-owned.  During this period (1991-1995) interest rates were to be 
determined by market forces, and the removal of barriers in the banking sector resulted in 
the opening of new merchant banks, discount houses and commercial banks. The intention 
was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the banking sector, and to make it an 
agent of development.  
 
The reformation of the banking sector resulted in many new participants, mostly 
indigenous entrepreneurs, coming into the banking industry, as illustrated below (Table 
1.3): 
 
Table 1.3    Banking sector reform 
Banking institution Year of licence 
Universal Merchant Bank 1995 
National Merchant Bank-NMB 01 June 1993 
Trust Merchant Bank 02 January 1996                            *** 
Genesis Investment Bank 20 July 1995 
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe* 11 November 1991 
Agricultural Development Bank** 04 June 1999                                 *** 
Time Bank of Zimbabwe 13 February 2002                          *** 
First Banking Corporation 07 February 1997                          *** 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Bank Licensing & Surveillance (2004) Annual Report, 
 p.71-78. 
*Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe was incorporated out of the Bank of Credit and Commerce.  
**The Agricultural Development Bank was incorporated out of the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation.***During and after the 1996-2000 Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and 
Social Transformation [ZIMPREST]. 
 
Most of these banks, with the likes of United Merchant Bank and Universal Merchant 
Bank, failed due to poor liquidity, management exposure to non-performing lending 
books, and corporate governance shortcomings, during the 1996-2000 period. 
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On the other hand, the [Zimbabwe Development Bank Act [Chapter 24:14] 1984], saw the 
establishment of Zimbabwe Development Bank (ZDB), whose focus was mainly financing 
and resuscitating distressed companies. Some of these include G&W industrial Minerals, 
Zimbabwe Phosphate Industries, Glue & Chemicals, and Surface Investments. 
 
It can be noted that it was an anomaly for the number of banks to multiply within an 
exponentially shrinking economy, as shown by the country’s GDP performance. It can be 
inferred that the collapse of Boka’s United Merchant Bank destroyed all the confidence 
that the business community had in the indigenous banking entrepreneurship. The late 
business tycoon Roger Boka, through his bank, sourced funds in the market using fake 
Cold Storage Commission bills. These funds were then used in the construction of the 
Boka Tobacco Sales floor, putatively the world’s largest. The Universal Merchant Bank 
collapsed as a result of its exposure to Mangura Copper mines, which could not survive the 
worldwide decline in demand for copper.  
 
Most of the new participants in the banking sector diverted from their core banking 
business and went into speculative activities that included locking short-term investments 
into non-liquid assets, such as motor vehicles and immovable property. The situation 
proved to be a time-bomb, and most of the indigenous banks collapsed due to liquidity 
problems.  Those that remained, like Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe, Genesis Investment 
Bank and First Banking Corporation enjoyed government support, enabling them to 
survive the competition.  Kingdom Bank had institutional investors like the Meikles 
Group, who could contribute capital in the event of a liquidity crunch, [Reserve Bank of 












1.1.4 According to the [Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation 1996], 
the fundamental objective of the government was the same as that outlined soon after 
independence in February 1981.  Growth with Equity, which sought to achieve a 
sustainable high rate of economic growth and speedy development, in order to raise 
incomes and standards of living of most Zimbabweans, and expand productive 
employment of rural peasants and urban workers, especially the former was one of the 
main objectives. 
 
According to [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Inflation Rates 2008],in January 1996 the rate 
of inflation was twenty-eight per cent and by December 2000 it had increased to fifty-five 
per cent. The conclusion can therefore be drawn that, the potential long-term benefits of 
ESAP and ZIMPREST were all distorted by the land invasions and the alleged human 
rights abuses, which resulted in European nations imposing targeted sanctions against 
Zimbabwe in 1999. Agricultural production was brought to a virtual standstill, and 
investor confidence totally destroyed. The obligation to compensate the liberation war 
veterans and war collaborators added a huge negative impact on attempts to control fiscal 
deficits.  
 
Moreover, on 14 November 1998, popularly known as “Black Friday”, the Zimbabwean 
dollar crashed against the US dollar to 37.5 to 1. This was the period when war veterans 
were each awarded Zim$50,000 gratuities, and to this day the source of this funding 
remains unknown.  In an effort to control “parallel market” activity, the Minister of 
Finance, Dr Hebert Murerwa, in his fiscal policy statement in November 2002, banned all 
bureaux de changes in the country, [Zimbabwe, Mid-Term Fiscal Policy Review Statement, 
2004]. 
 
It can be inferred that the measures intended to secure the benefits of liberalizing the 
banking sector brought much suffering to many people who had invested their funds in the 
collapsed indigenous banks. Inflation continued to rise in the period after ESAP and 
ZIMPREST, and in December 2002 it stood at one hundred and twelve per cent. It rose to 
five hundred and ninety-eight per cent in December 2003, when the new Governor of the 




In an effort to reduce inflation the Governor unveiled his first monetary policy statement 
on 18 December 2003. The major thrust was inflation control to two-digit levels, as well as 
stabilizing the Zimbabwean dollar against other currencies. The Governor identified 
liquidity support as one of the main factors behind the money supply growth rate, and 
therefore stimulating inflation. Liquidity support was meant to provide temporary relief to 
banking institutions that would have experienced a liquidity crisis, but the facility was 
abused as some funds were channelled towards non-core banking business, [Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe, Monetary Policy Statement, 2003]. 
 
Having declared inflation as the country’s number one enemy, the Governor temporarily 
removed liquidity support to banking institutions and abruptly limited the Reserve Bank’s 
lender of the last resort function. Banks that had locked short term investments in non-
liquid assets suddenly could not access cheap borrowing from Reserve Bank as before. 
Instead, they were supposed to borrow from other banks in the event of liquidity problems. 
Other deposit takers, like asset management companies were all required to be licenced, 
and to stick to the core business of asset management. [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 



















1.1.5 Banking institutions placed under curatorship and liquidation, (2003-2006) 
Against this background the country’s banking sector was shaken, and a number of banks 
were closed, and placed under the management of curators, while some were placed under 
liquidation. Table 1.5  lists the casualties between January 2003and December 2006: 
 
Table 1.5   Curatorship and Liquidation of Banks 
Banking institution Curatorship Date Liquidation  Date 
Genesis Investment Bank Limited 01 July 2002 Reopened 02 January 2003 
Platinum Asset Management (Private) 
Limited 
 7 April 2004 
Rapid Discount House Limited 26 March 2004 25 August 2004 
Barbican Bank of Zimbabwe Limited 15 March 2004 (Incorporated into ZABG January 2005) 
Royal Bank Zimbabwe Limited 04 August 2004 (Incorporated into ZABG January 2005) 
ENG Asset Management (Private) 
Limited 
 31 December 2003 
Century Discount House Limited  20 January 2004 
Intermarket Building Society 12 March 2003 (Curatorship lifted 31 July 2005.  
Incorporated into ZB Bank November 2006) 
CFX Bank Zimbabwe Limited 17December 2004 Resumed operations 1 March 2006 
First National Building Society 2 March 2003 13 April 2005 
Intermarket Banking Corporation  
Limited 
12 March 2003 (Curatorship lifted 31  December 2005 
Incorporated into ZB Bank November 2006) 
Trust Banking Corporation Limited 23September 
2004 
(Incorporated into ZABG January 2005) 
Time Bank of Zimbabwe Limited 27 October 2004 Under curatorship 
Sagit Asset Management (Private) 
Limited 
Licence cancelled 
on 15 August 
2005 
 
Sagit Finance House Limited 02 March 2003 07 June 2006 
CFX Merchant Bank 17December 2004 Merged with CFX Bank February 2006 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Troubled Banking Institutions (2006), p. 10-28. 
 
It is pertinent to mention that Intermarket Banking Corporation, Genesis Investment Bank 
Limited, CFX Bank Zimbabwe Limited, CFX Merchant Bank and Intermarket Building 




1.1.6   Public governance 
According to the [Southern African Development Community (SADC), 2008] the period 
leading up to the run-off election was characterized by politically motivated violence 
resulting in loss of lives, damage to property and serious injuries sustained, hindering 
political activities. Speaking from London at Buckingham Palace on 25 June 2008 in 
honour of his 90th birthday, Nelson Mandela described these political and socio-economic 
situations in Zimbabwe as a “tragic failure of leadership”. 
 
It may therefore be asserted that unless the government undertakes effective fundamental 
political and economic reforms, such as: 
o A substantial reduction of the size of the government (in terms of the number of 
departments, ministries and labour);  
o Observing the rule of law, presenting a new constitution in line with international 
constitutional standards; 
o Introducing an independent electoral system; 
o Introducing an internationally recognized human rights charter; 
o Promote a complete independent judicial system and strict observance of the rules of law; 
o Improving international relations with most developed and developing countries; 
o Obtaining foreign exchange support from the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund; 
o A complete reform of the agricultural, mining, tourism, manufacturing and transport 
sectors; 
o Facilitate the return of specialized farmers and most skilled professionals to Zimbabwe. 
The recovery of the economy of Zimbabwe can be long and unsustainable, as this may not 
attract meaningful capital investment into the country. In addition, the economic and 
political isolation of Zimbabwe by the UK, EU, USA and other sections of the 
international community should also be addressed without further delay, in order to 








1.2   Introduction  
The term ‘liquidation’ is a dreaded one in the global market because of its dire 
consequences. The most common form of liquidation in Zimbabwe is the winding up of 
business operations by a court. Although the company does not immediately cease to exist 
as a legal entity, the entire board of directors forfeit control over the company and pass it 
to, firstly the Master of the High Court, then to the provisional liquidator and finally, to the 
final liquidator. 
The existence of a company as a separate legal entity, which commences upon its 
incorporation, is terminated by dissolution of the company. In the course of its existence, 
the company may have acquired assets and incurred liabilities, which have to be dealt with 
before the company can be dissolved.  
The liquidation, or winding up, of a company involves administering a company’s affairs 
prior to its dissolution. This, in turn, involves ascertaining and realising its assets and 
applying them, in the payment of liquidation costs, then creditors of the company 
(according to their order of preference), finally, distributing the residue (if any) among the 
shareholders of the company in accordance with their rights [Cilliers & Benade 2004]. 
 
When the term liquidation is applied to a bank it has more far-reaching consequences. 
According to the [Banks and Banking Survey 2010], the banks are there to cause financial 
intermediation, essentially linking savers and borrowers through an elaborate and trust-
based money creation system and on the back of a variety of financial instruments, 
structures and models.  The role of the banking sector is even more critical for an 
embattled economy like Zimbabwe – where whole sectors and sub-sectors of the economy 
have been brutalized over the past decade or so! 
 
1.2.1 Motivation 
According to [Hawkins and Turner 1999], authorities are generally not keen to place 
banking institutions under receivership because of the three main reasons namely: the 
systemic threat to the financial system; the disruption of credit relations between a bank 
and specific borrowers; and the danger of a “credit crunch”.  The systemic threat is that a 





According to [Meyerman, 2001] there are several mechanisms of infection. One is through 
the payments system, where one failure may provoke a chain reaction of non-payment by 
other participants. Another mechanism works through the bank deposit market. One failure 
may undermine the public’s confidence in banks generally, provoking a general run on the 
banks.  Other reasons for not closing banks are the fear of disrupting credit relations, 
thereby causing a “credit crunch”, and a market-wide increase in interest rate spreads, as 
well as reduction in the availability of credit. 
 
Meyerman argued that the categories of creditors of the bank are varied, and it is difficult 
for creditors to preserve the economic value of the bank as an ongoing concern under the 
general legislation.  Another important reason appears to be that a bankruptcy court 
application filed by creditors, even if the application proves unjustified, may terminally 
damage confidence in a bank.  
Meyerman noted, further, that liquidation of banks has huge costs.  Guaranteed returns not 
only increase government expenditure and hence the rate of inflation, but may also tempt 
some depositors to place their money in high-risk, high-return banks. In practice, the 
problem is that even when the financial situation does not warrant being considered as a 
general banking crisis, most governments are inclined to guarantee all deposits in any 
problem bank so as to avoid paying the political cost of a different measure.  
 
A number of suppliers of goods and services who had business contracts with banking 
institutions were adversely affected. In addition, some creditors lost money in the sense 
that creditors could not charge interest after the date of liquidation, as provided by the law 
of insolvency in Zimbabwe [Sagit Finance House Limited Liquidator’s Report 2006]. 
 
It can be concluded that the government revenue collection base was affected: tax revenue 
from corporate tax, value-added tax, employees’ tax and other forms of taxes paid by 
banking institutions in the normal course of business were reduced.  
 
A number of depositors and shareholders lost their lifetime investments. Liquidation of 
viable banking institutions reduced the value of their shares to the extent that the majority 
of them failed to realise any value, as some companies were suspended from the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, [Century Discount House Liquidator’s Forensic Report 
2004]. 
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The objective of this study is to address the root causes of the difficulties that resulted in 
the collapse of more than twenty banking institutions in the course of the banking crisis of 
2003/2006, and also to present effective strategies to deal with such insolvencies. A model 
has been formulated which can be used by top management to minimise the liquidation of 
viable institutions in the best interest of all stakeholders.   
 
1.2.2    Statement of the problem 
From December 2003 to December 2006 the Zimbabwe banking services industry 
witnessed the collapse of more than twenty commercial banks, asset managers, finance 
houses, building societies and discount houses.  The causes ranged from ineffective 
corporate governance structures, liquidity challenges, conducting non-core activities, to 
outright fraud and siphoning of depositors’ funds, [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe  Reflections 
on: What Went Wrong at Trust and Royal Banks, 2006]. 
 
The collapse was unprecedented, and seriously affected the confidence of depositors in the 
banking system. It slowed economic growth, and led to the collapse of other businesses. 
That the collapse of banking institutions is undesirable, and that it must be avoided is self-
evident.  The key to any solution lies in understanding the causes of the collapse and thus 
how they can be managed and prevented in future [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Troubled 
Banking Institutions Monetary Policy Review Statement 2005]. 
 
Many recent collapses in Zimbabwe’s banking sector have, as their root cause, a conflict 
between the objectives of the institution and those of the custodians of the institution’s 
assets and financial resources, undercapitalisation, which adds up to ineffective corporate 
governance structures. The liquidation of such institutions occurs, in the majority of cases, 
at the expense of all stakeholders as listed above. 
 
While bankers usually blame their failures on external factors such as inappropriate 
government monetary and fiscal policies, central banks like the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe attribute bank failures to corporate governance shortcomings. However, the 
identification of the principal factors in banking institution failures and steps to minimise 
the liquidation of viable institutions in Zimbabwe banking sector is an empirical issue, 
which requires qualitative research approaches.  
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On 30 September 2004 the Bank Licencing, Supervision and Surveillance Division of The 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe responded to the collapse of several banking institutions by 
issuing Guideline Number 01-2004/BSD on Corporate Governance.   
 
According to Guideline, corporate governance refers to the processes and structures used 
to direct and manage the business and affairs of an institution with the objective of 
ensuring its safety, and enhancing shareholder value. The process and structure define the 
division of power and establish mechanisms for achieving accountability between the 
board of directors, management and shareholders, while protecting the interests of 
depositors.  
 
1.2.3   Objectives 
 Primary Research Objectives: 
(a) To establish the major causes of liquidation or failure of banks during the period under 
review. 
(b) To find out how corporate governance, business strategies, business ethics and internal 
control systems can be applied to minimise the liquidation of viable banking institutions. 
(c) To provide effective and practical solutions, in order to minimise the current and future 
collapse of viable institutions in the banking sector. 
 
Secondary Research Objectives: 
(d) To determine how some banks of similar sizes have survived during the period of study. 
(e) To assess the government’s reform policies, especially in the banking sector. 
(f) To determine how to deal with bank insolvency generally in Zimbabwe. 
 
1.2.4    Research Design 
In carrying out research work the researcher chose a qualitative research approach. This 
was based on the grounded theory method combined with narrative, qualitative and 
archival data analysis. 
 
(a) The qualitative research approach was not strictly formalised, while the scope was defined, 
and a philosophical mode of operation adopted. The researcher gained a first-hand, holistic 
understanding of the phenomena of interest by means of a flexible strategy of data 
collection. 
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(b) This was shaped as the investigation proceeded. Methods of data collection were used to 
acquire detailed knowledge to guide further study. This rested on the assumption that valid 
understanding was gained through accumulated knowledge acquired by the researcher 
through first-hand interactions. 
 
(c) The purpose of the grounded theory design was to derive theory that links the participants’ 
perspective to general Social Science theories. This design studied the process and focused 
on the interaction of the phenomena. The data was collected from historical records, 
interviews and observations.  
 
Theoretical sampling was also used. This term describes the choice of cases through which 
to gather data and refine concepts [Lancaster, 2005].Theoretical sampling continued until 
theoretical saturation was reached. This is when data collection ceases to reveal new data 
that is relevant to a category, where categories become well developed, and relationships 
between categories is verified [Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003]. 
 
(d) Narrative analysis was applied. A narrative is broadly defined as an account of an 
experience presented in a sequenced way, indicating a flow of related events that, taken 
together, are significant for the narrator, and which convey meaning to the researcher 
[Coffey and Atkinson, 1996]. It follows that understanding and meaning was supported 
through analysing narrative accounts in their originally-told form rather than by seeking to 
fragment them through a process of coding and categorisation. 
 
(e) This theoretical method was combined with archival analysis. Documentary secondary 
data was analysed. Research based almost exclusively on documentary secondary data is 
termed archival research and, although this term has historical connotations, it can refer to 








In this research documentary secondary data included written documents, such as notices, 
correspondence, minutes of meetings, financial statements, statutory reports (prepared by 
liquidators/curators), government policy documents, transcripts of speeches and 
administrative and public records. Written documents also included textbooks, 
business/financial journals, magazine articles and newspapers. These were important as 
raw data sources, and also as a storage medium for compiled data. These sources of data 
were analyzed using archival data analysis. 
 
Qualitative research methods assisted the researcher to do the following: 
(a) To carry out an investigation where other methods, such as experiments, are neither 
practical nor ethically justifiable. 
(b) To investigate situations where little detail is known.  
(c) To explore complexities beyond the scope of more ‘controlled’ approaches. 
(d) To ‘get under the skin’ of banking institutions in order to find out what really happens 
with regard to corporate governance, internal control systems, business strategies and 
business ethics in practice, the informal reality which can only be perceived by those 
involved. 
(e) To view the case “from the inside out”, and to see it from the perspective of those 
involved. 
(f) To find out how corporate governance, recapitalisation and corporate restructuring 
strategies can be applied in practice to minimise the liquidation of viable banking 
institutions. 
 
It is apparent that the effective application of corporate governance, business strategies, 
business ethics and internal control systems, through controlled participation of all 
interested parties, can help in minimising the collapse of viable banking institutions. The 
variables included external factors, which a particular institution is unable to control, such 
as government fiscal and monetary policies, global inflation and interest rates, and political 
turbulence within the country.  However, notwithstanding these variables, it is envisaged 
that corporate governance can be applied effectively to achieve stakeholder satisfaction. 
The qualitative research method in this regard was a mixture of rational, explorative and 
intuitive, where the skills and experience of the researcher played an important role in the 
analysis of data.  
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According to [Bryman & Bell, 2003] the trustworthiness of the interpretation of results as 
the basis of the researcher’s findings should be checked and assessed by the following six 
criteria: 
(a) Credibility. The technique for ensuring that interpretation is credible includes looking for 
negative cases in regard to the emerging hypothesis, testing rival explanations and testing 
explanations for inconsistencies arising from triangulation of respondents, methods and 
theories of previous researchers. 
(b) Conformability.  Qualitative researchers do not generally claim to be detached and 
neutral scientists. Instead, this researcher holds that by being conscious of his own 
subjectivity, he should be in a position to understand its effects on his work, thereby 
allowing participants to express their experiences, values and expectations. 
(c) Dependability. An important test of reliability is to replicate findings. In order to increase 
the dependability of qualitative findings, the researcher should incorporate a temporary 
team and use multiple independent codes or analysis to code the data. 
(d) Transferability. First, the researcher should draw conclusions carefully, ensuring that 
they are supported by data. Second, he should provide enough description of the research 
context, the characteristics of the study participants, the nature of their interactions with 
the researcher and the physical environment for others to be able to decide how 
transferable the findings are to other contexts.  
(e) Time. This is a major factor influencing the acquisition of trustworthy data. Time spent at 
the research sites, interviewing and building sound relationships with participants 
contribute to trustworthy data. When a large amount of time is spent with participant; they 
tend to be more eager to take part. In addition, they are more likely to be frank and 
comprehensive about what they contribute to the research work. 
(f) Trustworthiness of observations, interviews and interview schedules’ questionnaire data 
should confirm the trustworthiness or validity of results. Continual alertness to 
researcher’s own biases and subjectivity should assist in producing more trustworthy 
interpretations. During the process of planning, collecting and analysing data and writing 







According to [Hendrike and Hendrike 2004], corporate governance can be viewed as the 
control mechanism that ensures that the right checks and balances are in place to prevent 
the risk of mismanagement from conflicting priorities, misallocation of resources, conflict 
of interest, misaligned incentives and some of the business weaknesses associated with 
excessive power.  
 
The objective was to develop a corporate governance-based theoretical model suitable for 
use by all stakeholders to minimise the liquidation of viable companies in the banking 
sector.  One of the objectives was to make a contribution by developing such a model.  
The researcher developed “The Tudor House Consultants (THC) BICEPS Model”. The 
researcher is a director of Tudor House Consultants (Private) Limited, and the company 
sponsored the research.  The model is depicted in the Figure 1.2.  It represents corporate 
governance as the seed, stakeholder involvement as the fruit tree and stakeholder 
satisfaction as the fruit. 









 Corporate  Governance 
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This model is based on the practice of corporate governance, stakeholder involvement and 
stakeholder satisfaction. It is envisaged that all stakeholders -shareholders, management, 
directors, employees, customers (depositors), creditors, the government and the public at 
large - can be represented by an independent regulatory body for the banking sector. This 
can be, for instance, the Zimbabwe Stakeholders’ Supervisory Banking Commission 
(ZSSBC) which is appointed from time to time by Act of Parliament, e.g.,  the Zimbabwe 
Banking Act (Chapter 24:20).   This model can also be used to measure the effectiveness 
of the corporate governance structures of a particular organization through empirical 
qualitative research. 
It also envisaged that the ZSSBC be empowered to carry out the following statutory 
functions: 
(a) Review all appointments and discharge of non-executive directors and independent 
auditors, and take any necessary corrective action. 
(b) Evaluation and analysis of all current and potential majority shareholders. 
(c) Financial analysis of management accounts and financial statements.  
(d) Review all appointments and discharge of non-executive members and chairpersons of 
various relevant committees of the banking institution, and take any corrective action 
deemed necessary. 
(e) Participate in the formulation of national monetary policy. 
(f) Provide information to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe on matters of supervision and 
investigation in the best interests of the banking institution. 
(g) Formulation and implementation of corporate governance policies and procedures for 
particular banking institutions. 
(h) Formulate strategies to manage insolvency. 
(i) To promote effective communication between all stakeholders including the Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe. 
(j) To institute forensic audits to detect possible fraud or irregularities. 
(k) To promote regular banking restructuring. 
(l) To promote stakeholder involvement, and to guarantee stakeholder satisfaction in the 
banking sector. 




The rationale behind the model is, firstly, to make corporate governance practical and 
effective, secondly, to ensure effective application of the fundamental principles of 
internal control systems, business strategies and business ethics, and, thirdly, to guarantee 
stakeholder satisfaction. These must be measured by the increase in value of the business 
in the best interest of all stakeholders. Shareholder activism is the intervention by 
individual and institutional shareholders in seeking to influence management behaviour.  
In order to improve performance, they can make decisions on matters such as dividend 
policy; growth policy; appointment of auditors; appointment of the board of directors and 
governance audit [Hendrike and Hendrike, 2004]. 
 
Naturally, non-shareholders who might have a direct economic interest in the actions of 
the business, such as management, employees, creditors, customers or depositors and the 
government, are not currently represented. 
 
In addition, non-shareholders with an indirect interest in the banking institution, such as 
social and environmental issues, for example, include the public at large and the 
community that forms part of an institution. These also require full representation.  The 
concept of stakeholder involvement, as opposed to the current shareholder activism, was 
developed by the researcher to ensure that the direct and indirect interests of non-
shareholders are protected before, and also after, the liquidation of a viable banking 
institution.  
 
The researcher also developed the concept of stakeholder satisfaction to ensure the 
fulfilment of the direct and indirect interests of all stakeholders, subject to the best 










1.2.5 Preview of thesis 
Chapter One: This covers the introduction, statement of the problem and research design. 
This chapter consists mainly of a brief description of the motivation for the research work, 
a statement of the problems, objectives, a future strategic research design, the envisaged 
contribution to the body of knowledge of corporate governance. It also adumbrates internal 
control systems, business ethics and business strategies by the introduction of new 
concepts of stakeholder involvement and satisfaction. Finally, it outlines the concept of 
chapters one to six. 
Chapter Two – This covers the literature survey, which focused on banking restructuring, 
corporate governance, internal control systems, business ethics and business strategy, 
regarding theoretical, practical and methodological issues. The final part of the literature 
review covers problems that were identified and which other researchers have attempted to 
solve. The literature review develops from general to specific issues, and this assisted in 
identifying and developing a theoretical model for the interpretation of the findings and to 
determine the most effective research methodology.   
Chapter Three – This details completion of the field work, strategies and methods of data 
collection used. In carrying out field work the researcher chose to use a qualitative 
research approach. Within the Zimbabwe banking sector the researcher identified four 
commercial banks, two building societies, two finance houses and two discount houses, 
which collapsed between January 2004 and June 2006, as sources of data and information. 
In contrast, he also identified four commercial banks, one building society and two 
merchant banks which performed comparatively well in the same period.  
 
Valuable data was collected from curators and liquidators in respect of collapsed banking 
institutions, and also from company secretaries in respect of comparatively stable and 
high-performing banking institutions. The researcher also interviewed and collected data 
from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, and all stakeholders of the banking institutions 








The research strategy was supported by flexible data-collecting methods as follows: 
(a) Interviews: Asking executive and other stakeholders of banking institutions about their 
opinions and attitudes to matters of corporate governance, internal control systems, 
business strategies and business ethics as they related to their institutions. Some questions 
were structured and some were left open-ended. Additional questions were also asked 
personally using interview schedules (questionnaires). 
(b) Reports: Reviewing data was obtained from sources such as statutory reports, annual 
financial statements, management accounts, business strategies (plans), minutes of 
meetings and evaluation reports. 
(c) Observation: This was achieved by direct observation of the behaviour of all interviewees. 
(d) Discussion: Focus groups This was achieved by bringing together group of relevant people 
like customers, depositors, management, non-executive directors, creditors, government 
officials and the public to gather information. 
 
Chapter Four – This covers qualitative analysis of the data and results. This involved 
organising what the researcher saw, heard, and read to enable any reader to make sense of 
the data. To do so, he categorised, synthesised and searched for patterns in the material. He 
also ensured that all research questions set out in the beginning were answered. Tables of 
numerical data, graphs, charts, diagrams or quotes from interviews and other sources were 
used to enhance the discussion of results, but not to replace the discussion. 
 
Chapter Five – This covers interpretation and findings.  Early data analysis was done at 
the time of collection. This enabled the researcher to remain focused, and to shape the 
study as it proceeded. Later data analysis was also applied in order to make connections 
between different pieces of information. This was achieved through coding, a progressive 
process of sorting and defining the bits of data (observation, field documents) and notes 








The researcher interpreted the results by identifying emerging themes or patterns. In this 
regard the information covered in the Theoretical and Conceptual Model was used to 
explain the findings. The research aims and questions were addressed in this chapter. This 
was intended to connect all aspects of research by showing the links between the patterns 
emerging in the findings with the discussion from the Theoretical and Conceptual Model 
and research questions. The trustworthiness of the researcher’s interpretation was assessed 
by four criteria, namely credibility, dependability, conformability and transferability, 
[Bryman & Bell,2003]. 
 
Chapter Six –This chapter covers conclusion, recommendations and contribution. It drew 
conclusions based on the findings. For example, after establishing what caused the 
collapse of particular viable banking institutions, and, conversely, how certain institutions 
managed to grow during the same period, conclusions were drawn and articulated. This 
chapter also covers limitations faced during research, such as failing to obtain particular 
documents, or to fix an appointment with a critical participant, and restrictions placed on 
important documents and information. In this chapter answers are put forward to important 
questions such as ‘How to minimise the liquidation of viable institutions in the banking 
sector, and what to do with bank insolvency in Zimbabwe’. In this chapter the researcher 
postulates plausible recommendations for guiding principles and procedures which can be 
used by current and future stakeholders. 
 
The recommendations were linked directly to the findings and conclusions. They 
addressed the root causes of the problems, and not just the symptoms. They were also 
made as realistic and achievable as possible. One of the objectives of this empirical 
qualitative research was to make a contribution to the body of knowledge by giving 
practical solutions to current and future shortcomings in the Zimbabwe banking sector, 









1.2.6 Concluding Comments 
In conclusion to this chapter, the main objective of the research study was to develop 
practical solutions to current and future problems, and to make a significant contribution 
to the body of knowledge by the introduction of new strategies. These included 
stakeholder involvement in the strategic decision-making process, measuring levels of 
stakeholder satisfaction through empirical research, and, most importantly, the 
establishment of effective corporate governance structures, regular banking restructuring 




























CHAPTER TWO  
 
2.0 LITERATURE SURVEY AND REVIEWS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Banking the world over, the establishment and development of viable banking institutions 
on sustainable basis, plays a critical role for the socio-economic growth of every nation.  
The strategic economic turnaround of a nation is directly linked to the business 
performance of its corporate sector whether mining, agriculture, manufacturing or service 
industry.  The success of any economy therefore is dependent upon the level of stability 
and viability of the banking sector as medium of access to capital for viable projects. 
According to [Rajandram, 2000], besides the strengthening of the banking system, the 
restoration of corporate health is deemed to be an equally important task in steering the 
economy back to its long-term sustainable growth path. 
 
 The researcher maintain that a sound and viable banking sector requires a vibrant 
corporate sector, to ensure significant deposits from the public on sustainable basis. The 
literature review covered banking restructuring and recapitalization. It indicated how the 
literature of various authors in this field relates to one another, and how the present project 
fitted in. The final part of the literature review is focused on corporate governance and its 
significance to the banking sector in Zimbabwe and the global financial markets. This also 
covered the problems that the researcher identified and also those that other researchers 
and authors have attempted to solve. The review also demonstrated how the proposal 
relates to the work that other authors have done in the same field. 
 
According to [Zoli 2001], the 11 countries studied faced repeated banking sector problems 
over the period 1991-98, adversely affecting the solvency and liquidity of both state-
owned and private banks.  Zoli noted this as the origin of banking sector problems.  The 
banking difficulties included ineffective monetary and fiscal government policies, lack of 
satisfactory supervision and outdated legal framework, and corporate governance 
shortcomings, in most countries in Europe and Central Asia. 
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In Nigeria, in respect of the 36 banks that closed between 1994 and 2003, their past 
examination and closing reports revealed that their failures arose from a number of 
interrelated factors, such as bad loans and advances, fraudulent practices, 
undercapitalization, rapid changes in government policies, bad management, lack of 
adequate supervision, and undue reliance on forex  [Ogunleye, 2005].   
 
2.2 Bank Restructuring 
According to the [World Bank, Financial Sector 2000] bank restructuring  can be defined 
as the package of macroeconomic, microeconomic, institutional, and regulatory measures 
taken in order to correct incentives and to restore problem banking systems to sustainable 
financial solvency and profitability. 
 
There are three main different strategies that can be used in banking restructuring.  The 
market based solutions (mergers and takeovers), government-based solutions (interim 
intervention) and the mixed – based solutions (combination of the above), [World Bank, 














In mid-1998, the Government of Malaysia initiated financial restructuring of both the 
banking and corporate sectors, as depicted in the following diagram “Co-ordination Flow’ 
[Rajandram, 2000]: 












Note: (1) MOF – Ministry of Finance Malaysia 
        (2) NEAC – National Economic Action Council 
          (3) BNM – Bank Negara Malaysia [Central Bank of Malaysia] 
Source: Rajandram, C. (2000) Workouts and Restructurings in Malaysia, p4. 
 
Rajandram (2000) maintain that an asset management company “Danamodal” was 
established by way of legislation in June 1998 to remove non-performing loans “NPL” 
with size of above RM 5 million from the banking sector. 
 
A special purpose company “Danamodal”, was set up in August 1998 to recapitalise and 
strengthen banking institutions to promote stability.  The role of Danamodal was important 
in so far as to ensure that the banking sector continued to play its role of being a lending 
conduit to corporations and individuals. 
Co-ordination Flow 
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During the same time, (mid 1998) a Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee “CDRC” 
was established essentially as a steering committee where debts were restructured on an 
informal basis between the distressed companies and the creditors.  The CDRC’s role was 
to help restructure large corporate debts in excess of RM 50 million.  All applications to 
the CDRC were made on a voluntary basis.  The CDRC did not have any legal powers of 
its own as in the case of Danaharta which obtain its powers from legislation [Rajandram, 
2000]. 
 
It can be concluded that just like what happened in Malaysia, the challenge to the 
Zimbabwean Government of National Unity [ZGNU] established in 2009 was to initiate 
recapitalisation of both the banking and corporate sectors by at least US$22 000 000 
000.00.  About US$10 000 000 000.00 was required to pay government foreign and 
domestic debts, in order to assist the banking sector in attracting new international credit 
lines[Zimbabwe Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review 2011].  While at least US$12 000 000 
000.00 was necessary for the recapitalisation of both banking and corporate sectors, 
[Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Monetary Policy Statement 2011]. Regrettably, nothing 
fundamental had been achieved by 30 June 2011. 
 
In Zimbabwe the collapse of banking institutions between January 2003 and December 
2006 was largely caused by corporate governance shortcomings [Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, 2006]. One of the objectives of this research is to determine how corporate 
governance, corporate restructuring and re-capitalization can be applied in practice to 
minimise the liquidation of viable banking institutions. Another objective is to arrive at 
possible measures to deal with bank insolvency in Zimbabwe. 
 
The researcher developed a model which allows all stakeholders to participate in the 
strategic decision-making process. The aim is to satisfy the interests of all stakeholders in 
the best interests of a particular institution. It is common cause that a business cannot 
survive by satisfying the interests of major creditors alone. Without support from 
customers, credible shareholders, employees and management, the government, the public 
and business associates, a viable institution will experience a financial crisis, which may 
force it into liquidation.  
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It can be concluded that bank or corporate restructuring strategies must be applied in such 
a manner, so as to minimise liquidation of viable banking institutions.  This is also 
important to enable all stakeholders to satisfy their divergent interests. 
 
The 2003/2006 banking crisis experienced in Zimbabwe required market-based solutions 
such as re-capitalization of banking operations by the existing shareholders, mergers and 
acquisitions, conversion of debt to equity, as well as government corrective measures such 
as restoring viability of ailing banking institutions, intervention on caretaker basis, 
purchase of toxic assets from insolvent banks, appointment of a curator and the placement 
of non-viable and insolvent banks into liquidation.  The researcher maintains that under 
government-based solutions, an insolvent but viable company can also be resuscitated by 
allowing a credible investor to buy critical assets of the company “lock, stock and barrel”, 
and trade as an on-going concern without taking over liabilities. 
 
Whatever amount is raised from the sale of assets can be applied to pay liquidation or 
transaction costs and all creditors including employees in terms of the laws of insolvency.  
However, it would be necessary to re-brand to enable the new company to gain market 
share and improve corporate image.  All stakeholders would certainly benefit in the 
medium and long term from the re-capitalization and establishment of effective corporate 
governance structures.  
 
Unlike Zimbabwe, during the first stage of corporate restructuring in Korea the Financial 
Supervisory Commission [FSC] was established by the end of 1997 to manage the 
financial crisis within the banking sector. The FSC went further to appoint independent 







During this period insolvent institutions were liquidated or rehabilitated through these two 
main mechanisms of court-based insolvency and out-of-court workout, as shown in figure 
2.2. 
Figure 2.2      The Management Procedure for Insolvent Corporations in Korea 
 
Source: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (2002), p.10 
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The researcher maintain that in most corporate restructuring processes, credible 
shareholders or investors should be allowed to take majority of shares - at least 51%. This 
can ensure adequate recapitalisation of the business, and can also introduce effective 
corporate governance structures. 
 
By the beginning of 2000 during the second stage of corporate restructuring, the reforms in 
this stage were distinguishable from those of the first stage, with reduced government 
intervention in restructuring the market, depending instead on market mechanisms, as 
shown in figure 2.3: 
Figure 2.3 Systems for Regular Corporate Restructuring  
 

















































In Zimbabwe the government and the private sector should also give special attention to 
the effect of reform on the corporate sector instead of focusing exclusively on the banking 
sector.  For example, the Korean government made great efforts to introduce new systems 
to reform the structural problems of corporations – the weak financial situation and 
corporate governance structures [Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 2002]. 
 
In Zimbabwe, four years having passed since the 2003/2006 banking crisis, the 
fundamental question is whether the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s policies were a real 
process of corporate restructuring based on market economy principles. Above all, a focus 
of criticism from stakeholders was the government’s delayed reform, and its excessive 
support for some insolvent banks, non-performing parastatals and farming operations.  
 
The independence within the banking sector is important, particularly to facilitate regular 
banking restructuring. An effective supervisory framework, internal control and risk 
management systems should be developed regularly in the best interest of all stakeholders, 




















According to the [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Monetary Policy Statement July 2011] as at 
30 June 2011, 19 out of 25 operational banking institutions were in compliance with the 
prescribed minimum capital requirements. The table below shows the capitalisation status 
of the banking sector as at 30 June 2011. 
 
Table 2.1 Capitalisation Status of the Zimbabwe Banking Sector as at 30 June 2011 
 Institution Declared Core 





Commercial Banks   
1.  CBZ BANK  51,606,168.49 12,500,000.00 
2.  STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 44,311,083.33 12,500,000.00 
3.  BARCLAYS BANK  31,984,463.00 12,500,000.00 
4.  STANBIC BANK 31,040,475.28 12,500,000.00 
5.  BANCABC 30,090,587.02 12,500,000.00 
6.  ZB BANK  21,841,502.31 12,500,000.00 
7.  FBC BANK 18,532,629.62 12,500,000.00 
8.  NMB BANK 18,489,414.66 12,500,000.00 
9.  INTERFIN BANK 18,253,127.77 12,500,000.00 
10.  METROPOLITAN BANK 18,210,304.00 12,500,000.00 
11.  MBCA BANK 16,648,731.90 12,500,000.00 
12.  TN BANK 13,676,775.81 12,500,000.00 
13.  AGRIBANK  13,578,959.86 12,500,000.00 
14.  TRUST BANK 13,407,981.91 12,500,000.00 
15.  KINGDOM BANK 2,789,515.53 12,500,000.00 
16.  ROYAL BANK  1,006,460.48 12,500,000.00 
17.  ZABG BANK (14,391,244.49) 12,500,000.00 
Merchant Banks   
18.  TETRAD INVESTMENT BANK  10,812,345.74 10,000,000.00 
19.  ECOBANK (formerly Premier) 8,716,234.79 10,000,000.00 
20.  GENESIS INVESTMENT BANK  (525,537.11) 10,000,000.00 
21.  RENAISSANCE MERCHANT Under Curatorship 
Building Societies   
22.  CBZ BUILDING SOCIETY  19,273,878.50 10,000,000.00 
23.  CABS 18,805,685.73 10,000,000.00 
24.  FBC BUILDING SOCIETY  11,636,674.82 10,000,000.00 
25.  ZB BUILDING SOCIETY  12,621,770.81 10,000,000.00 
Savings Bank   
26.  POSB 9,585,552.71 - 
 







As at 30 June 2011, 15 out of 16 asset management institutions were compliant with the 
minimum paid-up equity capital requirement of US$500 000.00 [Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, Monetary Policy Statement July 2011].  It can be concluded that as at 30 June 
2011 the banking sector had more than 76% compliant.  However, the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe noted that “some banking institutions were bringing in fictitious equity partners 
to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, to buy time”.  The researcher maintains that this calls 
for efficient banking supervision on the part of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in 2010, “adopted a gradual approach to Basel II and III 
implementation to allow for a smooth transition and to enable banking institutions to build 
the requisite capacity to operate in a Basel environment”.  A global regulatory framework 
for more resilient banks and banking systems [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Monetary 
Policy Statement 2011]. 
 
According to Gift Chirozva, (2011) the Chief Bank Examiner, Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe banking sector in comparison to the rest of Africa is such that 
“it is generally considered to be well developed and second only to South Africa in 
Southern Africa.  The banking sector was not directly affected by the 2008 Global 
Financial Crises”. 
 
The main difference with other African banking system is the use of the multi-currency 
system, wherein Zimbabwe does not have a local currency.  The country’s banking 
supervisory regime as at 30 June 2011 was benchmarked to international best practice and 
has been endorsed by international standards setting institutions such the International 
Monetary Fund, said G. Chirozva. 
 
However, according to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2011) Monetary Policy Statement, 
the banking sector liquidity remains a challenge due to the short-term nature of deposits, 
the absence of an active inter-bank market and lender of last resort facility at the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe.  It can be concluded that fundamental socio-economic and political 
reforms are required in order to facilitate a speedy and effective economic recovery, in 




In 2005, the Central Bank of Nigeria introduced a programme of reforms which created a 
new minimum paid up capital for all banks, from two billion Naira to 25 billion Naira, 
with a compliance deadline of 31 December 2005.  This reduced the number of banks 
operating in Nigeria from 89 to 25 “mega” banks [Ojukwu-Ogba, 2009].   
 
Ojukwu-Ogba, 2009 argue that the basic essence of the programme of consolidation was 
the creation of viable and stable banks with very solid asset bases that could function and 
compete effectively while still maintaining a safe financial environment for the customers’ 
deposits. 
 
It can be concluded that in Zimbabwe, considering the size of the economy, level of 
business activity and the size of the population compared to Nigeria or South Africa, 
banking institutions can be reduced from 25  (June 2011) to about 12.  It is not in the 
interest of the investing public to give further extensions to banking institutions such as 
ZABG, Kingdom, Royal, Genesis and POSB.  The minimum capital requirements should 
be raised from US$12 500 000.00 (31 December 2010) to about US$25 000 000.00 by 31 
December 2012. 
 
2.4    Corporate Governance            
Since the turn of the millennium a confluence of events has served to focus the public eye 
on the prominent topic of corporate governance and its crucial importance to the world of 
economics.  A nervous public grew anxious about the prospect of business failures, job 
losses and the severe decline of its savings invested in corporate stocks.  Questions were 
raised as to whether the transgressions were confined to the ranks of a few renegades, or 
whether the wrongdoing was systemic [Colley, 2004]. 
 
According to [Mallin 2009], there have been a number of high-profile corporate collapses 
that have arisen despite the fact that the annual report and accounts appeared to be in 
order.  In essence, corporate collapses affect us all.  Why have such collapses occurred?  
What might be done to prevent them from happening again?  How can investor confidence 
be restored?  The answers to these questions are all linked to corporate governance: a lack 
of effective corporate governance on one hand meant that such collapses could occur; 
while on the other, good corporate governance can help prevent such collapses happening 
again, and restore investor confidence.   
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[Mallin 2009] noted some of the important features of corporate governance: 
(a) It helps to ensure that an adequate and appropriate system of controls operates within a 
company, and hence that assets may be safeguarded; 
(b) It prevents any single individual having too powerful an influence; and 
(c) It is concerned with the relationship between a company’s management, the board of 
directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. 
According to [Wixley, 2002] corporate governance is concerned with the structures and 
processes associated with management, decision-making and control in organizations. He 
also noted that the board is the focal point of the corporate governance system.  It is 
ultimately accountable and responsible for the performance and affairs of the company.  
Delegating authority to board committees or management does not in any way mitigate or 
dissipate the discharge by the board and its directors of their duties and responsibilities.  
Companies should be headed by an effective board that can both lead and control the 
company.   
 
The board should comprise a balance of executive and non-executive directors, preferably 
with a majority of non-executive directors, of whom sufficient a number should be 
independent of management so that shareowner interests (including minority interests) can 
be protected. 
 
According to [Prasad 2009] corporate governance refers to the relationship that exists 
between the different participants, defining the direction and performance of a corporate 
firm.  The following bodies are the main actors in corporate governance: 
(a) The CEO, i.e. the management; 
(b) The board of directors; and 
(c) The shareholders. 
Other actors who influence governance in corporations/firms are the staff, suppliers, 
customers, creditors and the community. 
 
Prasad noted that the word “independent” is meant to guarantee accountability, and to 




According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2006): Troubled Banking Institutions, the 
2003/2006 banking crisis in Zimbabwe was caused mainly by more than 20 banking 
institutions with deep-rooted structural anomalies, inadequate risk-management systems, 
poor corporate practices, liquidity and solvency difficulties. They failed to adjust to the 
difficult macroeconomic environment obtaining in 2003 and 2004. 
 
Based on this it is clear that the focus of corporate governance should not be restricted to 
ineffective corporate governance structures, such as inadequate risk-management systems, 
lack of independent non-executive directors or lack of independent governance 
committees. Corporate governance, through the establishment of relevant committees 
comprised largely of independent members, should also give special attention to factors 
which can easily cause corporate failure, such under-capitalization of business activities 
and lack of regular corporate restructuring.  Under-capitalization can be addressed by 
verifying with the major shareholders or existing shareholders before issuing or renewing 
banking licenses, to measure whether they have capacity to re-capitalize as and when 
required.   
 
Second, banking institutions should be directed by law to accumulate statutory capital 
reserves, and balance this with the payment of dividends to shareholders, bonuses, 
executive remuneration and advance of loans.  The issues of strategic partners or 
introduction of new shareholders should also be given special consideration by corporate 
governance as a way of re-capitalizing ailing banking institutions.  Accordingly, banking 
licenses should be renewed regularly, say, every five years, to give the opportunity to the 
‘statutory supervisors’ or central banks to assess every banking institution administering 
depositors’ funds. This must be done regularly.  Regular corporate or banking restructuring 
can be used to address any sign of financial distress, such as poor quality of critical assets, 
a state of insolvency, a dwindling market share, incompetent management and the business 
operations being too sensitive to a challenging of a harsh macroeconomic environment.    
 
For example, on 16 September 2010 The Financial Gazette in Zimbabwe published 
abridged financial statements of Premier Banking Corporation Limited.  “The last on-site 
examination by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe was conducted from 15 to 31 August 
2007.  The overall condition of the Bank was assessed and found to be weak”. 
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The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe used the CAMELS rating system. CAMELS is an 
acronym for Capital, Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Earnings, Liquidity and 
Sensitivity to market risk. This rating evaluates capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk.  This rating uses a scale of 
1 to 5 where 1 is strong, 2 is satisfactory, 3 is fair, 4 is weak and 5 is critical. 
 
The CAMELS ratings for Premier Banking Corporation Limited were as follows on 31 
August 2007: 
 
Table 2.2:  PBCL CAMELS Ratings  
CAMELS Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity Composite 
Component adequacy quality       Rating 
Latest risk             
based 
supervision 5 4 4 5 4 4 
rating             
Source: The Financial Gazette, Zimbabwe, 16 September 2010, www.fingaz.co.zw 
 
However, according to [The Financial Gazette 2010] the director’s statement disclosed 
under- capitalisation that “in its monetary policy the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe extended 
the capitalisation deadline for banks from 31 March 2010 to 31 December 2010.   
 
According to [The Financial Gazette 2010],subject to the receipt of all regulatory 
approvals, the Premier Group has successfully concluded a transaction with Ecobank 
Transnational Incorporated (“Ecobank”) which will result in a $10 million capital 
injection, and final shareholding structures will be announced once a regulatory 
requirement has been met.  The investment by Ecobank will significantly enhance the 
Bank’s capabilities, and will bring the following benefits to the Bank: 
o Becoming part of a strong pan-African financial services group; 
o Injection of US$10 million capital to support growth and achieve regulatory compliance 
within the deadline of 31 December 2010; 
o Introduction of new products and enhancement of the technology platform; and  
o Further strengthening of corporate governance structures and processes. 
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The researcher is convinced that the introduction of Ecobank as new shareholder of the 
Premier Group and specifically of Premier Banking Corporation Limited can minimise 
liquidation by improving the capital base in the best interest of all its stakeholders.  But it 
must be asked why it was necessary for Premier Banking to wait for the on-site 
examination by the Reserve Bank.  Corporate governance structures of every banking 
institution should always address the issues of under-capitalisation and lack of regular 
banking restructuring. 
 
It can be concluded that, while effective corporate governance structures can satisfy the 
divergent interests of all stakeholders of an institution through sustainable business 
growth, this must be galvanised by addressing corporate difficulties of under-capitalisation 
of the business and a lack of regular banking or corporate restructuring. 
 
2.4.1   Business Success and Failure 
According to [Hendrikse and Hendrikse 2004] failure is not a crime – it is a part of the 
free market system, which rewards successful business performance and punishes poor 
business results.  However, to fail because of negligence, mis-governance or the 
misconduct of directors due to greed and fraud is an abuse of power, and those responsible 
need to be punished.   
 
Success may be considered a leadership strategy translated into good management.  A 
successful business strategy involves managing the basics of business. There is 
commitment by everyone concerned to succeed and with it the will and ingenuity to devise 












2.4.2     Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Guideline Number 01-2004/BSD on Corporate 
Governance 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe responded to the collapse of several institutions in the 
banking sector by issuing Guideline No. 01-2004/BSD Corporate Governance on 30 
September 2004. According to the [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Corporate Governance 
2004] refers to the processes and structures used to direct and manage the business and 
affairs of an institution, with the objective of ensuring its safety and soundness, and 
enhancing shareholder value. The process and structure define the division of power, and 
establish mechanisms for achieving accountability between boards in the interest of 
depositors, and taking into account the effects on other stakeholders, such as creditors, 
employees, customers and the community. 
 
The Reserve Bank also highlighted sound corporate governance requirements under its 
Guideline No 01-2004/BSDsuch as authority and duties of shareholders, separation of 
owners and managers and board composition. 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Corporate Governance Guideline document was issued in 
terms of [Section 45 of the Zimbabwe Banking Act (Chapter 24:20)]. Its main objective is 
to make sure that banks are run properly, with integrity and a high level of 
professionalism, as they are custodians of public funds.  
 
The conclusion can therefore be drawn that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), as 
monetary authorities, have always been blamed for reacting to problems that could have 
been prevented if their systems had been effective. The need for proper corporate 
governance structures came into the open at the time of the collapse of Roger Boka’s 
United Merchant Bank, resulting in a systematic risk that spread through almost the entire 
spectrum of the banking sector.  
Subsequently other banking institutions, like First National Building Society, Universal 
Merchant Bank, to name just two, faced operational problems, some of which were a result 
of the poor corporate governance, insider loans and non-performing loan books [Reserve 





The need for effective corporate governance structures goes back to the period when 
companies were registered as separate legal entities. The liberalisation of the country’s 
banking sector that came with the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
saw new players with minimal experience coming into the industry. Though this was a 
noble idea, proper structures were supposed to have been put in place to make sure public 
confidence in the industry was not eroded.  
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), as the monetary authority, fully armed with 
powers to ensure proper corporate governance structures, characteristically reacts to 
problems. The corporate governance guideline is not enough on its own without effective 
implementation, relevant legislation and independent supervision. This is amply borne out 
by the frequent casualties in the banking sector.   
The researcher maintain that most banks were involved in so-called speculative activities 
because they could abuse the RBZ window of overnight accommodation, which later 
assumed the function of lender of last resort. Had this function been introduced in good 
time no banking institutions would have been able to lock depositor’s funds in non-liquid 
assets, the major cause of the liquidity crunch that occurred in early 2004. 
 
In terms of this guideline the RBZ has the authority to object to the appointment of a 
director whom they consider to be unfit to run the affairs of a banking institution. 
However, the fact that the guideline has been violated with no meaningful action being 
taken against the alleged culprits, means that it is not yet a legislative instrument that is 
enforceable in terms of the laws of the country. Nevertheless, the Guideline has assisted in 
improving levels of corporate governance within the banking sector - but there is still room 
for improvement. 
 
2.4.3     Benefits of Corporate Governance 
 Corporate and business governance should not be seen as an added burden for businesses, 
but as a catalyst for improved compliance that leads to improved performance.  Benefits of 
business governance increases the value of the institution; nurtures a sprit of enterprise; 
gives confidence to the market; enhances the reputation of the business; enhances 
empowerment of all stakeholders; improves efficiency; encourages innovation; enhances 
competitive advantages; and meets financial, legal and statutory obligations [Hendrikse 
and Hendrikse 2004]. 
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2.4.4 The Role and Benefits of Board Committees 
According to [Hendrikse, and Hendrikse 2004], the role of the board is to govern and, in 
particular, to make decisions and to delegate decision-making authority.  To do so, it needs 
to appoint board committees to provide the detailed research, investigation, analysis and 
recommendations on some or all of its main functional areas.  Boards should delegate 
duties to committees, but never responsibility and authority. 
 
According to [Dube 2008], recruitment onto the boards of listed institutions involves the 
search, selection, nomination, appointment and election processes. There is often 
confusion in distinguishing between these processes.  The recruitment process is often 
initiated, and perhaps completed, at the instigation of either the Chairman or members of 
the Board, or the Chief Executive of the company or a material or significant shareholder. 
 
Dube noted further that appointments of the boards of listed institutions via the nomination 
committees of the board or the search institutions only begin to address issues of board 
independence and the independence of non-executive directors.  How far does this go 
when, ultimately, the shareholders have the majority voting power to appoint, elect or 
remove any director at any time?  It is argued that an independent non-executive director 
cannot afford to be independent and go against the wishes and expectations of the majority 
shareholders and hope to remain on the board.  Equally, he or she cannot be independent 
of the colleagues in the committee which recommends his/her appointment. 
 
Thus, for as long as the appointment of the board or committee members is not 
independent of certain institutional investors, individuals or groups with personal interests 
(such as the Executive Chairman, Managing Director, Executive Management Team, 
major shareholder(s) and Executive Committee Members), the independence and 
effectiveness of non-executive members is no more than empty semantics, and counter to 







It is envisaged that the establishment of a Stakeholders’ Supervisory Banking Commission 
[SSBC], suggested by the researcher (Chapter 1, p. 21) can make a significant contribution 
in addressing corporate governance shortcomings connected to lack of independence, by 
reviewing all appointments and discharges of non-executive members, the chairperson of 
governance or board committees, and take appropriate corrective measures in the best 
interest of all stakeholders. 
 
2.5 Business Strategy 
Strategic management can be defined as the process whereby all the organizational 
functions and resources are integrated and coordinated to implement formulated strategies 
which are aligned with the environment, in order to achieve the long-term objectives of the 
institution, and therefore gain a competitive advantage through adding value for the 
stakeholders.  Competitive advantage is the edge that an institution has over others.  This 
could be achieved through strategies like lower costs, a wider range of products/services 
(differentiation) or a focus on a specific niche market segment [Cronje and Maritz, 2010].         
 
Cronje and Maritz argue that the competitive advantage should elevate the organization 
above its competition.  This competitive advantage should fulfil certain criteria.  It must 
relate to an attribute with value and relevance to the targeted customers’ segment, be 
perceived by the customer as a competitive advantage and be sustainable, i.e., not easily 
imitated by competitors.   
 
According to [Mintzberg, Lampel, Quinn and Ghoshal2003], a strategy is a set of 
objectives, policies, and plans that, taken together, define the scope of the institution and 
its approach to survival and success.  
 
According to [Grant 2010], business strategy is concerned with how the institution 
competes within a particular industry or market.  If the institution is to prosper within an 
industry, it must establish a competitive advantage over its rivals.  Hence, this area of 






In its broadest sense, strategy is the means by which individuals or organizations achieve 
their objectives.  Common to definitions of business strategy is the notion that strategy is 
focused on achieving certain goals; and that strategy implies some consistency, 
integration, or cohesiveness of decisions and actions. 
 
According to [Pearce ll and Robinson 2009], strategic management is defined as the set of 
decisions and actions that result in the formulation and implementation of plans designed 
to achieve a company’s objectives.  It comprises critical tasks such as: 
(a) Formulate the company’s mission, including broad statements of purpose, philosophy, and 
goals. 
(b) Conduct an analysis that reflects the company’s internal conditions and capabilities. 
(c) Assess the company’s external environment, including both competitive and general 
contextual factors. 
 
According to [Wheelen and Hunger 2004], strategic management is that set of managerial 
decisions and actions that determines the long-term performance of an institution.  It 
includes environmental scanning (both external and internal), strategy formulation 
(strategic or long- range planning), strategy implementation, and evaluation and control.  
The study of strategic management, therefore, emphasizes the monitoring and evaluation 
of external opportunities and threats in the light of a corporation’s strengths and 
weaknesses.  
 
Based on this literature survey it is clear that an effective business strategy should be able 
to assist an organization in increasing its market share, level of profitability and value of 
business by gaining a sustainable competitive advantage through unique (but ethical) 
business activities.  The allocation of material, financial and human resources must be 
directed towards attaining organizational goals within the law, and satisfying customers’ 







According to the [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: Troubled Banking Institutions 2006], most 
banking institutions placed under curatorship during the 2003/2006 banking crisis, such as 
Trust Bank Corporation Limited, operated without effective business strategies.  Most of 
the activities, such as purchase of bricks, vehicles and immovable property for re-sale, 
were outside banking core business, and not sustainable.  As a result, they failed to 
increase market share within the banking sector and incurred losses, while other 
institutions, such as African Banking Corporation Limited (ABC) performed 
comparatively well.  ABC, for example, opened divisional branches within the region of 
Southern Africa in order to gain a sustainable competitive advantage, considering foreign 
exchange difficulties in Zimbabwe at the time. 
 
2.5.1The Sources of Superior Profitability 
According to [Grant 2010], the purpose of strategy is basically the achievement of certain 
goals.  For the institution, the basic goal is to survive and prosper.  Survival over the long 
term requires that the institution earns a rate of return on its capital that exceeds its cost of 
capital.  There are two possible ways of achieving this.  First, it may locate within an 
industry where overall rates of return are attractive. Second, it may attain a position of 
advantage vis-a-vis its competitors within an industry, allowing it to earn a return in excess 
of the industry average, as depicted in figure 2.4 below: 
 












Source: Grant Contemporary Strategy Analysis, (2010), p.19 
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2.5.2 Linking Profit to Enterprise Value 
Profit maximization translates into maximizing the value of the firm.  The value of the 
institution is calculated in the same way as any other asset: it is the net present value 
[NPV] of the returns that the asset generates.  The relevant returns are the cash flows to the 
firm.  Hence, institutions are valued using the same discounted cash flow (DCF) 
methodology that is applied to the valuation of investment projects.  Thus, the value of an 
enterprise (V) is the sum of the free cash flows (C) in each year t, discounted at the 
institution’s cost of capital (r).  The relevant cost of capital is the weighted average cost of 
capital (re+d) that averages the cost of equity (re) and the cost of debt (rd):   
                    Ct 
                 ( 1 + re+d  )t 
 
Where free cash flow (C) is measured as: net operating profit + depreciation – taxes – 
investment in fixed and working capital [Grant, 2010]. 
 
2.5.3 Identifying Key Success Factors 
 To survive and prosper in an industry, an institution must meet two criteria: first, it must 
supply what customers want to buy; second, it must survive competition.  Hence, two 
questions can be asked: 
(a) What do customers want? 
(b) What does the firm need to do to survive competition? 
 
To answer the first question an institution need to look more closely at customers of the 
industry and to view them, not as a threat to profitability because of their buying power but 
as the raison dềtre of the industry and as its underlying source of profit.  This, in turn, 
requires that an institution inquire: who its customers are?  What are their needs?  How do 
they choose between competing offerings?  Once the basics of customers’ preferences are 
recognised an institution can then identify the factors that confer success upon the 
individual. The second question requires that the nature of competition in the industry be 





V =  
t 
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Figure 2.5 below depicts a diagram indicating key success factors: 
 

































Prerequisites for success 
What do customers 
want? 




Analysis of competition 
 What drives competition? 
 What are the main dimensions of 
competition? 
 How intense is competition? 
 How can we obtain a superior 
competition position? 
Analysis of demand 
 Who are our customer? 
 What do they want? 
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Based on an interview carried out by the researcher at Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Limited: 
Nelson Mandela Branch, with the Branch Manager, Mr I. Hunda (September 2010) and 
other interviews at other banks, these key success factors suggested by Grant (2010) were 
adopted and applied to identify success factors in retail banking, as depicted in table 2.3 
below: 
 
Table 2.3: Identifying Key Success Factors: Retail Banking in Zimbabwe 
    Source: Grant Contemporary Strategy Analysis, (2010), p.89 
 
 
What do customers want?   (Analysis of 
demand) 
How do banks survive 
competition? (Analysis 
of competition)  
Key Success Factors 
 Customers prefer to deal with a stable 
bank. 
 Low interest rates and bank charges. 
Easy access to information. 
 Security of deposits and confidential 
documents. 
 Customers want to feel safe and 
comfortable during banking. 
 Customers prefer to deal with a bank 
with a wide spread branch networking 
around the country, region and the 
world. 
 Customers have different needs with 
regard to facilities such as loans, 
overdraft facilities, financial advice 
etc. 
 The majority of customers expect 
convenient, high-quality, world-class 
and fast service. 
 Banking environment must be neat, 
with sufficient space for parking. 
 Flexibility, uniqueness 
and innovation. 
 Cost-effectiveness and 
strong capital base. 
 Price differentiation 
can be used to earn a 
premium. 
 High barriers to entry 
and low exit. 
 Re-branding and 
improving on 
corporate image. 
 Unique services over 
and above generic 
ones. 




 Satisfying all stakeholders’ 
needs. 
 Credible institutional investors 
or shareholders with capacity 
to re-capitalize the banking 
operations, and fixed assets 
requirements. 
 “State-of-the-art” information 
technology with effective risk-
management systems. 
 Effective corporate governance 
structures and staff of high 
integrity. 
 Price differentiation requires a 
wide range of services and 
convenient banking location. 
 Customer-oriented research 
and development programmes. 
 Cost efficiency requires a 
comparatively large pool of 
depositors, compared to 
borrowers. 
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2.5.4   Types of Competitive Advantage 
 According to [Grant, 2010]an institution can achieve a higher rate of profit over a rival in 
one of two ways: either it can supply an identical product or service at a lower cost, or it can 
supply a product or service that is differentiated in such a way that the customer is willing to 
pay a price premium that exceeds the additional cost of the differentiation.  In the former 
case, the institution possesses a cost advantage, in the latter, a differentiation advantage.  In 
pursuing cost advantages the goal of the institution is to become the cost leader in its 
industry or industry segment.  The following diagram (figure 2.6) depicts these two sources 
of competitive advantage: 
 
 Figure 2.6: Sources of competitive advantage 
 
  
Source: Grant (2010) Contemporary Strategy Analysis, p.223 
 
2.5.5 Benefits of Strategic Management 
 According to Pearce II, (2009) in using the strategic management approach, managers at all 
levels of the firm interact in planning and implementing.  As a result, the behavioural 
consequences of strategic management are similar to those of participative decision-making. 
For example, strategy formulation activities enhance the institution’s ability to prevent 
problems.  Managers who encourage subordinates’ attention to planning are aided in their 





 According to Wheelen and Hunger, (2004) research has shown that organizations that 
engage in strategic management generally outperform those that do not.  The attainment of 
an appropriate match, or “fit”, between an organization’s environment and its strategy, 
structure and processes has positive effects on the organization’s performance. 
 
2.5.6 Turnaround Strategy 
According to Channon (2000), turnaround strategies can be applied when a business is in 
decline, but worth saving.  It is important to recognize the conditions under which an 
otherwise successful business may go into decline.  Such recognition can suggest 
appropriate solutions which might aid recovery. Thus, qualitative Business Strategy 
Analysis can satisfy the divergent interests of all stakeholders of a banking institution by 
identifying sources of superior profitability, key success factors and sustainable competitive 
advantages.  Effective implementation of a business strategy, based on these factors, can 
sustainably increase market share, profitability, business value and return on capital of an 
institution.  Based on the literature review on business strategy, it can also be deduced that 
formulation of an effective business strategy should be based on the marketing principle of 
satisfying customers’ needs, better than the competition. 
 
According to Palepu, Healy and Bernard (2002), strategy analysis is an important starting 
point for the analysis of financial statements.   Strategy analysis allows the analyst to probe 
the economics of the firm at a qualitative level so that the subsequent accounting and 
financial analysis is grounded in business reality.  
 
Palepu, Healy and Bernard argue that strategy analysis allows the identification of the 
firm’s profit-drivers and key risks.  This, in turn, enables the analyst to assess the 
sustainability of the institution’s current performance, and make realistic forecasts of future 
performance.  While an institution’s cost of capital is determined by the capital markets, its 
profit potential is determined by its own strategic choices: (1) the choice of an industry or a 
set of industries in which the institutions operates (industry choice), (2) the manner in which 
the institution intends to compete with other institutions, and expects to create and exploit 
synergies across the range of businesses in which it operates (corporate strategy).  Strategy 




2.6 Business Ethics 
2.6.1 Business ethics has two aspects.  The first involves the specific situations in which ethical 
controversy arises; the second concerns the principles of behaviour by which it is 
appropriate to abide [Chryssides and Kaler, 1996]. 
 
According to Rossouw (2004), ethics is concerned with what is good, or right, in human 
interaction.  It revolves around three central concepts: ‘self’, ‘good’ and ‘other’, as depicted 
in the figure 2.7 below: 
 










Source: Rossouw Business Ethics, (2004), p.3 
 
Ethical behaviour results when one does not merely consider what is good for oneself, but 
also what is good for others.   
 
Rossouw argue that ethical behaviour is self-interested, but not selfish.  When one knows 
that her behaviour may have negative consequences for others, but care only about what is 
good for herself, such action is selfish and unethical.  If, on the contrary, one seeks to serve 
her own interests, whilst simultaneously caring about the interests of others, then her 













 self     others 
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He suggested that in applying ethics to business the implications of economic activity on the 
interests of all who are affected by such activity must be considered.  Business ethics is 
concerned with identifying and implementing standards of conduct that will ensure that, at a 
minimum level, business does not detrimentally impact on the interests of its stakeholders.  
At an optimum level, business ethics is holds standards of behaviour that will enhance the 
interests of all. 
 
According to Ghillyer (2010), the field of ethics is the study of how people try to live their 
lives according to a standard of “right” or “wrong” behaviour in both how people think and 
behave towards others, and how they would like them to think and behave towards others. 
 
He notes that moral standards are principles based on religions, cultural, or philosophical 
beliefs, by which judgements are made about good or bad behaviour.  These beliefs can 
come from many different sources: friends, family, ethnic background, religion, school, the 
media (television, radio, newspapers, magazines, the internet and personal role 
models/mentors). 
 
According to Crane and Matten (2009), business ethics is the study of business situations, 
activities, and decisions where issues of right and wrong are addressed.  It is worth stressing 
that by ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ it is meant morally right and wrong as opposed to, for example, 
commercially, strategically, or financially right or wrong.  Moreover, by ‘business’ ethics, it 
does not mean only commercial business, but also government organizations, pressure 
groups, not-for-profit business, charities and other organizations. 
 
They argue that having defined business ethics in terms of issues of right and wrong, one 
might quite naturally question whether this is in any way distinct from the law.  Surely, the 
law is also about issues of right and wrong?  This is true, and there is indeed considerable 
overlap between ethics and the law.  In fact, the law is essentially an institutionalization or 





Perhaps the best way of thinking about ethics and the law is in terms of two intersecting 
domains (Figure 2.8): 
 
       Figure 2.8 The Relationship between Ethics and the Law 
 
 Source: Crane and Matten (2009) Business Ethics, p.7 
 
Crane and Matten maintain that in one sense then, business ethics can be said to begin 
where the law ends.  Business ethics is primarily concerned with those issues not covered by 
the law, or where there is no definite consensus on whether something is right or wrong. 
 
It can be concluded that effective application of business ethics principles by protecting the 
interests of all stakeholders, establishment of codes of ethics, whistle-blowing and 












2.6.2  The importance of business ethics     
 
 Strengthening the resolve to prevent fraud 
According to Rossouw (2004), an organizational anti-fraud strategy normally commences 
with the resolve to eliminate fraud.  Ethics can play a role in building this resolve.  This 
happens when the need to stamp out fraud is not merely motivated on financial, but also on 
ethical grounds; staff members may easily dismiss it as something that merely affects the 
company, but not themselves.   
 
Ultimately fraud can, and indeed has, bankrupted many organizations.  The consequences to 
all stakeholders of the company where this happens is devastating.  Thus, by emphasizing 
the unethical nature of fraud and its consequences for all stakeholders of the organization, 
the resolve to stamp out fraud can be reinforced. 
 
According to Crane and Matten (2009) the following are some of the reasons why business 
ethics are important:    
(a) The power and influence of business in society is greater than ever before.  “Evidence 
suggests that many members of the public are uneasy with such developments”.   Business 
ethics helps people to understand why this is happening, what its implications might be, and 
how people might address the matter. 
(b) The demands being placed on business to be ethical by its various stakeholders are 
constantly becoming more complex and more challenging.  Business ethics provides the 
means to appreciate and understand these challenges more clearly, in order that institutions 
can meet these ethical expectations more effectively. 
(c) Business ethics can provide people with the ability to asses the benefits and problems 










Figure 2.9: Understanding Business Ethics 
Type of misconduct of co-workers Percentage of employees 
  observing misconduct 
Abusive or intimidating behaviour towards employees 21 
Lying to employees, customers, vendors, or the public 19 
Situations that  places employee interests over those of 
the organization 18 
Violations of safety regulations 16 
Misreporting of actual time worked 16 
Discrimination on the basis of race, colour, gender,   
age or similar categories 12 
Theft 11 
Sexual harassment 9 
    
Types of misconduct observed by employees among their co-workers 
 Source: Crane and Matten (2009) Business Ethics, p.14 
 
2.6.3  Code of ethics 
Numerous businesses and professions now make a point of enshrining in a written code of 
practice those ethical obligations (and also professional standards) which go beyond their 
strict legal requirements [Chryssides and Kaler, 1996]. 
 
According to Ghillyer (2010) in order for everyone to begin from the same starting-point, 
the organization’s commitment to ethical behaviour must be documented in a code of ethics.  
A well-written code of ethics can do several things: 
(a) It can capture what the organization understands as ethical behaviour. 
(b) It can establish a detailed guide to acceptable behaviour; 
(c) It can state policies for behaviour in specific situations; and 
(d) It can document punishments for violations of those policies.     
 
Rossouw (2004) noted that codes of ethics can serve various purposes in an organization.  




A code of ethics for internal purposes 
 A code of ethics can be used to achieve a number of internal organizational goals. 
(a) It can raise ethical awareness and expectations by establishing standards of morally 
acceptable behaviour; 
(b) It can prevent unethical behaviour by stipulating that specific conduct will not be tolerated; 
and 
(c) It can promote ethical behaviour by articulating the ethical values that should guide 
members of the organization in their actions and decisions. 
 
 A code of ethics for external purposes    
A code of ethics can also be adopted to satisfy external stakeholders. This sends a message 
to external stakeholders that will increase their trust in the organization.  
(a) To promote the reputation of the organization among its external stakeholders; 
(b) To pacify external stakeholders, like special interest groups, who might have expressed 
concern about specific aspects of an organization’s actions; and 
(c) To deflect state interference in the internal affairs of a business, or even an industry. 
 
A code of ethics for cultural purposes 
Organizations must constantly adapt to changes in national and international culture.  This is 
reflected in management theories.  Rigidity has been replaced by an emphasis on 
adaptability and individual initiative.   
 
According to Ghillyer (2010) if one is involved in drawing up a code of ethics from scratch, 
the following advice from the Institute of Business Ethics needs to be considered: 
(a) Find a champion.  Unless a senior person – hopefully the CEO- is prepared to drive the 
introduction of a business ethics policy, the chances of it being a useful tool are minimal. 
(b) Get endorsement from the chairman and the board.  Corporate values and ethics are matters 
of governance.  The board must be enthusiastic, not only about having such a policy, but 
also about receiving regular reports on its operation. 
(c) Find out what bothers people.  Merely endorsing a standard code, or copying that of another, 




(d) Pick a well-tested model.  Use a framework that addresses issues as they affect different 
constituents or shareholders of the company.  The usual ones are: shareholders, employees, 
customers, suppliers, and local/national community. Some might even include 
competitors. 
(e) Produce a company code of conduct.  This should be distributed in booklet form or via a 
company intranet.  Existing policies, for example on giving and receiving gifts, or private 
use of company software, can be incorporated.  Guidance on how the code works should 
also be included. 
(f) Try it out first. The code needs piloting - perhaps with a sample of employees drawn from 
all levels and different locations.  An external party, such as the Institute of Business 
Ethics, may comment on drafts 
(g) Issue the code, and make it known.  Publish and send the code to all employees, suppliers, 
and others.  State publicly that the company has a code and implementation programme 
that covers the whole company.  Put it on the institution’s website and send it to joint 
venture and other partners. 
(h) Make it work.  Practical examples of the code in action should be introduced into all 
company internal (and external) training programmes, and also induction courses.  
Managers should sign off on the code regularly, and a review mechanism should be 
established.  A code “master” needs to be appointed.           
 
According to Crane and Matten, (2009) codes of ethics are voluntary statements that 
commit organizations, industries or professions to specific beliefs, values, and/or actions, 
and that set out appropriate ethical behaviours for employees.   There are four main types 
of ethical codes: organization or corporate; professional; industry; and programme or 
group codes of ethics. 
 
Crane and Matten suggest that, in terms of effectiveness, it is perhaps less important what 
a code says than how it is developed, implemented and followed up.  A code imposed on 
employees without clear communication about what it is trying to achieve and why, might 
simply raise resentment.  Similarly, a code that is written, launched, and then promptly 
forgotten is unlikely to enhance ethical decision-making.  Perhaps worst of all, a code that 
is introduced, and then seen to be breached with impunity by senior managers or other 
members of staff, is probably never going to achieve anything apart from raising employee 
cynicism. 
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During the 2003/2006 banking crisis in Zimbabwe more than 20 banking institutions 
collapsed because some of their activities were both illegal and unethical [Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe: Troubled Banking Institutions, 2006].  For example, at Royal Bank, Zimbabwe 
Limited, the directors re-capitalized the bank using depositors’ funds, in violation of both 
the Banking Act and the Companies Act.  While at Barbican Bank Limited, the group 
mixed banking and non-banking business, despite an earlier undertaking by management 
to desist from the practice, after being warned of the dangers of such practices by the 
Zimbabwe Reserve Bank.   
 
It can be concluded that establishing and implementing effectively codes of ethics within 
the banking sector in Zimbabwe and other developing as well as developed nations can 
minimize liquidation of viable institutions by assisting top management and other 
stakeholders to analyze business situations and activities, and then make decisions in the 
best interests of all stakeholders where issues of right and wrong need to be addressed. 
 
The majority of the troubled banking institutions in Zimbabwe operated without codes of 
ethics, and this doubtless contributed to the liquidation of some of the banks, such as 
Rapid Discount House Limited (RDH).  In RDH the capital shortfall emanated from a high 
volume of imprudent, unauthorised and non-performing insider loans.          
 
2.7 Internal Control Systems 
2.7.1 An internal control system - the whole system of controls, financial and otherwise, is 
established by management in order to carry on the business of the enterprise in an orderly 
and efficient manner, ensure adherence to management policies, safeguard the assets and 
secure, as far as possible, the completeness and accuracy of company records.  The 
individual components of an internal control system are known as ‘controls’ or ‘internal 









          Millichamp gave some details of internal control systems as follows: 
(a) Safeguard the assets.  Obviously, allowing assets to be broken, lost or stolen, is 
unacceptable, and procedures are always devised to safeguard them.  Examples are locks 
and keys, the keeping of a plant register, regular reviews of debtor balances etc.  An aspect 
of this which is often overlooked is that of payment where no benefits have been received, 
as payment for work that has not been done, or the setting up of liabilities where no benefit 
has been received, as in the fraudulent purchase and subsequent embezzlement of goods by 
employees. Both are examples of failure to safeguard assets. 
(b) Accuracy of the records.  Again, the converse is unacceptable.  Examples of procedures to 
achieve this include one clerk checking the work by another or the use of control accounts, 
independent comparison of two sets of records, e.g. stock records and stock, or piecework 
payments and good work put into store. 
 
According to Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: Internal Audit Standards In Banking Institutions 
(2004), the core function of an internal audit department is to perform an independent 
appraisal of the financial institutions’ activities as a service to management.  The internal 
audit function plays an important role in helping management to establish and maintain the 
best possible internal control environment within the financial institution. 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe suggested that a sound internal control environment 
would ensure: adequacy and effectiveness of the internal control system; compliance with 
policies, procedures, rules, guidelines, directives, laws and regulations; detection of fraud, 
errors, omissions and any other irregularities; audit of management and information 
systems; and a participative and consultative role in the development of new products and 
systems. 
 
According to Cantrell (2010) many authorities on fraud believe that the most important 
measure an organization can take to deter most types of fraud is to design an internal 
control system that makes it difficult for fraud to be committed and remain undetected - 
and more importantly that the internal control system is diligently enforced.  Internal 





The overall responsibility for a secure and adequately controlled system lies with top 
management.  Managers typically delegate the design of adequate control systems to 
systems analysts, designers, and end users.  The corporate information security officer and 
the operations staff are typically responsible for ensuring that control procedures are 
followed.  The control environment, the accounting system, and control procedures have 
been identified as the three elements of the control structure most effective in preventing 
or detecting and correcting material misstatements [Watne and Turney, 2007]. 
 
Watne and Turney argue that the control environment, the accounting system, and control 
procedures have been identified as the three elements of the control structure most 
amenable for preventing or detecting and correcting material misstatements. They 
maintain that the control environment represents the collective effect of various factors on 
establishing, enhancing, or mitigating the effectiveness of specific policies and procedures.   
 
On 25 September 2007 The Business Herald reported: “Nigeria’s banks urged to apply 
strict internal control systems”, The Business Herald, Zimbabwe, 25 September 2007 
[online] Available at: http://www.herald.co.zw 
 
It is apparent from the article published by The Business Herald that effective internal 
control systems can increase the values of banking institutions thereby minimising 
liquidation of viable companies. 
 
2.7.2    The Importance of Risk Management and Internal Control 
According to Puttick and Van Esch (2007) the importance of risk management, which 
involves the identification of risks faced by business entities and the implementation of 
systems to mitigate them, has long been recognized.  These aspects feature prominently in 
the literature and in reports and recommendations of various commissions (national and 
international) appointed to advise on corporate governance and the prevention of 






Puttick and Van Esch noted that risk management is a process that uses internal control as 
one of the measures to mitigate and control risk.  Some risks cannot be managed through 
traditional internal control systems, for example, political, technological and legislative 
risks, and so these have to be managed with flexibility and forward planning.  While the 
total process of risk management, which includes a related system of internal controls, is 
the responsibility of the board of directors (top management), the execution of the risk 
management process should be the responsibility of every employee. 
 
It can be concluded that establishment of internal control systems by top management of a 
banking institution (or any other organization), and effective implementation of such 
systems by all employees, can minimise liquidation of viable institutions through 
safeguarding assets, detecting fraudulent activities and taking corrective measures.   
 
It is, however, critical that internal control systems, such as the accounting systems, 
control procedures and the control environment as suggested by [Watne and Turney, 2007] 
should be regularly tested and revised.  This can be achieved by carrying out further 
empirical research, qualitative analysis and effective implementation of recommendations 
from them. 
 
Century Discount House Limited [CDH] is a good example of a banking institution which 
was placed under liquidation (20 January 2004) largely because of ineffective internal 
control and risk management systems.  According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 
Troubled Banking Institutions (2006), “the insolvency was a result of imprudent lending to 
ENG Asset Management (Private) Limited, a banking institution which operated without a 
licence for almost two years, and whose holding company had acquired CDH Limited 
from Century Holdings Limited without regulatory approval”. 
 
A report prepared by the Chartered Accountants Ernst & Young (14 May 2004) on 
Investigations Into Allegations of Fraud Perpetrated by senior management of Century 
Discount House Limited, declared that “on several occasions, the directors and officers of 
CDH deposited funds worth Zim$44 653 039 698.25 between March 18th, 2003 and 
December 31st, 2003 with ENG Asset Management.  In the majority of these occasions no 
security was requested or provided.  This was despite the fact that no suitable prior 
arrangement had been made with CDH’s Assets and Liabilities Committee”. 
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2.8 Stakeholder Involvement /Satisfaction 
 One of the biggest mistakes managers can make is to forget about the most important 
factor when it comes to management, namely, the human being.  It does not matter how 
technologically advanced an organization is, how much client value (good-will) the 
organization has, how low the costs are or how high the quality is, the real difference is 
made by the human resources at the organization’s disposal.  Employees are the most 
important catalyst in implementing the strategies of the organization.  The strategic plan 
and top management are not the key drivers of strategy implementation, as is often implied 
– the drivers are the employees [Cronje and Maritz, 2010]. 
 
These authors however noted that “engaging stakeholders is no easy task, and the claims 
and expectations of the various internal and external stakeholders may be conflicting”.  
Figure 2.10 depicts some of these diverse stakeholder claims and expectations: 
 


















 Source: Cronje and Maritz (2010), Strategic Management, p.59 
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 A stakeholder of an institution is an individual or a group which benefits from, or is 
harmed by the institution; whose rights must be respected, or may be violated, by the 
corporations [Crane and Matten, 2009].Crane and Matten maintain that this definition 
makes clear that the range of stakeholders differs from institution to institution, and, even 
for the same company, in different situations, tasks, or projects.  Using this definition, 
then, it is not possible to identify a definitive group of relevant stakeholders for any given 
institution in any given situation. 
 
 In Figure 2.11 below, one can find the stakeholder view of the institution, where the 
shareholders are one group among several others.  The company has obligations, not only 
to one group but also to many other constituencies that are affected by its activities.  The 
institution is thus situated at the centre of a series of interdependent two-way relationships.  
It is important to remember that stakeholder groups might also have duties and obligations 
to their own set of stakeholders, and also to the other stakeholders of the corporation. 
 

















 *By Civil Society, “It means pressure groups, local communities, non-governmental 
organizations, etc”. Source: Crane and Matten (2009) Business Ethics, p.59 





















Suppliers Civil society* 
Firm 
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According to Mallin (2009), stakeholder theory takes account of a wider group of 
constituents rather than focusing on shareholders.  A consequence of focusing on 
shareholders is that the maintenance or enhancement of shareholder value is paramount, 
whereas when a wider stakeholder group, such as employees, providers of credit, 
customers, suppliers, government, and the local community is taken into account, the 
overriding focus on shareholder value becomes less self-evident.  “Enlightened value 
maximization utilizes much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts 
maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite 
trade-offs among its stakeholders … and therefore solves the problems that arise from 
multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory” [Mallin, (2009)]. 
 
The test of effectiveness of governance is the degree to which an organization is achieving 
its purpose.  All business organizations have multiple stakeholders, whose needs must be 
considered to achieve sustainable success.  In the current system, corporate directors are 
legally required to represent the best interests of the company’s shareholders, not those of 
all the various stakeholders.  It is true that shareholders generally invest in a business to 
make money on their investment, but the purpose of the investors should not be confused 
with the purpose of the business.  It is serving the needs of its stakeholders that most 
businesses find their purpose [Colley, Doyle, Logan and Stettinius, 2005]. 
 
 According to Puttick and Van Esch (2007), it is the board’s duty to present a balanced and 
understandable assessment of the company’s position in reporting to stakeholders.  The 
quality of the information must be based on the guidelines of openness and substance over 
form.  Reporting should address material matters of significant interest and concern to all 
stakeholders. 
 
Reports and communications must be in the context that society now demands greater 
transparency and accountability from institutions regarding their non-financial affairs, 






Puttick and Van Esch (2007) maintain that reports should present a balance between the 
positive and negative aspects of the activities of the company, and that the directors’ report 
should include statements that include the following areas: 
(a) Adequate accounting records and an effective system of internal controls have been 
maintained; 
(b) Appropriate accounting policies, supported by reasonable and prudent judgements and 
estimates, have been used in the preparation of the financial statements; 
(c) No reason to believe the business will not be viable in the year ahead, or an explanation if 
it is believed otherwise. 
 
 It can be deduced that the effectiveness of corporate governance structures in an 
organization, can all be measured scientifically through empirical research and qualitative 
analysis.  It is important that all stakeholders in a business environment are given a 
genuine opportunity to participate in strategic decision-making.  For example a teller in a 
banking hall has direct, daily contact with most customers of a banking institution and he 
or she is therefore privileged with vital information from customers, which can be used to 
formulate a business strategy.  An effective business strategy can assist in sustainably 
increasing market share and the value of the business.  As a result, this can minimise 
liquidation of viable institutions. 
 
 Every banking institution has its stakeholders, with a divergence of interests.  The 
scientific measurement, based on empirical evidence of the degree of participation of all 
stakeholders in strategic decision-making processes, and the degree of satisfaction of all 
stakeholders, can be a practical measure of corporate governance effectiveness. 
 
 According to the Reserve Bank: Troubled Banking Institutions (2006), one of the lessons 
from the 2003/2006 banking crisis was that “in order to promote effective market 
discipline, banks must adequately disclose information which will allow members of the 
public to make rational decisions”.  Sagit Finance House Limited was placed under 





 According to the forensic audit report prepared by the liquidator, “the core business of 
Sagit Finance was lease finance.  The lending book was financed largely by depositors’ 
funds.  This was a result of the hyper-inflationary environment, which had affected the 
viability of the lease/finance business.  The company had no proper information 
technology software package to manage their loan book.  This resulted in manual 
computations of the loan, a situation prone to errors and manipulations”. 
 
 It can be concluded that the degree of participation of key stakeholders, such as customers 
and employees in strategic decision-making processes was very low in this case.  The 
banking institution also failed to satisfy the divergent interests of all its stakeholders. 
 
2.9 Concluding Comments 
 In this chapter, the researcher selected by analyses of relevant literature, in order to 
achieve the objectives of this study as outlined on page 16 [Chapter one].  The literature 
survey on corporate governance, regular banking restructuring and re-capitalization 
formed the foundation on which ailing banking institutions can be prevented from sliding 
into a state of bankruptcy.  The banking sector need to be developed on what has been 
achieved after the 2003/2006 banking crisis arguably the most significant corporate event 
which necessitated fundamental reforms in Zimbabwe banking industry after 
independence in 1980.  The minimisation of liquidation of viable banking institutions 
cannot only be achieved through corporate governance, bank restructuring and re-
capitalisation but must be supported by the most efficient and effective monetary and 
fiscal policies initiated by government in order to attract foreign investment.  Effective and 
fundamental political and socio-economic measures are also important in order to promote 
the confidence of the banking in the banking sector to ensure the continued growth of 
deposit base and to keep the banking sector stable, viable and sound. 
 










3.0  FIELD RESEARCH: METHODOLOGY DESIGN AND METHODS  
3.1     Background 
The Research Proposal: “How to Minimise the Liquidation of Viable Companies in 
Zimbabwe’s Financial Sector”, was approved by the Graduate School of Business - 
University of Kwazulu Natal on 8 October 2004.The researcher then proceeded to carry 
out a comprehensive literature survey on the preferred areas of Corporate Governance, 
Banking Restructuring and Recapitalization. This was carried out largely by review of data 
from local, regional and international textbooks, journals, financial/business newspapers, 
financial statements of banking institutions, reports prepared by curators/liquidators in 
Zimbabwe and statutory instruments and guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe from 9 October 2004 to 31 December 2006, as well as monetary and fiscal 
policy documents issued by the Government of Zimbabwe.  The researcher also attended 
business and professional seminars, and used the Internet. 
 
During the month of April 2005 the researcher drafted six sets of interview schedules 
(questionnaire forms) relating to the various topics, and at the end of April 2005 received a 
letter of support from Dr Mark Dent. An ethical clearance approval was received from the 
research office (reference number HSS/06049A, signed by Ms Phumelele Ximba, 23 
February 2006).  
 
This enabled the collection of data from the following banking institutions in Zimbabwe: 
o Central African Building Society 
o Kingdom Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
o Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
o First National Building Society 
o Royal Bank of Zimbabwe Limited 
o Time Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
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o Rapid Discount House Limited 
o Century Discount House Limited 
o Sagit Finance House Limited 
o ENG Asset Investments (Private) Limited 
o First Banking Corporation Zimbabwe Limited  
o African Banking Corporation Limited 
o Merchant Bank of Central Africa Limited 
o Century Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
o Platinum Asset Management (Private) Limited 
o Barbican Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
o Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe  
o CFX Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
o Trust Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
 
Most of the information was collected from 22 April 2005 to 30 June 2006. The data 
collection strategy also covered other stakeholders of the banking institutions, such as 
employees, suppliers of goods and services, shareholders, customers, management, the 
government and members of the public.  
 
Collecting data from Beverly Building Society, Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe Limited and 
Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe was difficult. However, in the end a fair sample was 
obtained of the entire Zimbabwe banking sector covering the period 1 January 2003 to 31 
December 2006.   
 
At the beginning of October 2008, the researcher requested for the research topic to be 
changed from “How to Minimize the Liquidation of Viable Companies in Zimbabwe’s 
Financial Sector” to “How to Minimize the Liquidation of Viable Institutions in 
Zimbabwe’s Banking Sector”, and a second ethical clearance letter was issued on 5 
December 2008. 
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The researcher submitted his dissertation for examination towards end of 2008.  When the 
examination was finally completed by all three examiners in June 2011, the external 
examiner suggested to the researcher to amend his research topic to read “The 
Minimisation of the Liquidation of Viable Banking Institutions in Zimbabwe Banking 
Sector”, and a third ethical clearance letter was issued on the 23rdSeptember 2011, under 
reference number HSS\0049\06D. 
 
3.2   Introduction 
Effective research must be purposeful, with a clearly defined focus and reasonable and 
attainable goals, with defensible, ethical, and repeatable procedures, and with evidence of 
objectivity. The reporting of procedures, with their strengths and weaknesses, should be 
complete and honest. Appropriate analytical techniques should be used, and conclusions 
should be limited to those clearly justified by the findings. Reports of findings should be 
clearly presented and professional in tone, language, and appearance. The research 
objective and its benefits should be weighed against potentially adverse effects [Cooper & 
Schindler, 2003]. 
 
Cooper and Schindler maintain that the relationship between participants and the 
researcher is important. Both share the obligation of making a research proposal 
meaningful. Several factors complicate this relationship, such as ethical considerations. 
Changes in the research environment can also complicate the relationship, and the 
researcher must safeguard against negative changes. 
 
3.3  Research Approach 
The researcher used a qualitative research approach, characterised by procedures which are 
not strictly formalised; a well-defined scope and a more philosophical approach. A flexible 
strategy of data collection provided a first-hand, holistic understanding of the data.  
The research methodology was shaped as the investigation proceeded. Methods of data 
collection were largely chosen for their effectiveness in acquiring in-depth knowledge to 
guide further study. This approach rests on the assumption that a valid understanding can 
be gained through accumulated knowledge acquired first-hand by a single researcher. 
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The ability to explore data or to seek explanations by a qualitatively-based approach gives 
greater scope for ethical and other issues to arise. The resulting personal contact creates 
the possibility of using non-standardised questions, and enables one to observe ‘face-to-
face’. This also creates the opportunity to develop the researcher’s knowledge 
incrementally, thus giving the researcher a greater level of control of the process. 
 
That greater control was exercised with care, in order for the researcher to remain within 
appropriate and acceptable parameters. For example, in face-to-face interviews the 
researcher endeavoured to avoid overzealous questioning and pressing participants for a 
response. Doing so would have made the situation stressful for the participants. The 
researcher also made it clear to all interview participants that they had the right to decline 
to respond to any question. In face–to–face interviews it was, of course, necessary to 
arrange a time mutually convenient for the researcher and participants. 
 
3.4  Methods of Data Collection  
The research approach to data collection is often referred to as the research methodology. 
Although there are several facets to the design and categorisation of research 
methodologies, a common criterion is the various approaches to data collection 
[Lancaster, 2005]. The researcher has used the following qualitative research methods 
with regard to data collection: 
 
Grounded Theory Method. In grounded theory data collection starts without the 
formation of an initial theoretical framework.  Theory is developed from data generated by 
a series of observations. These data lead to the generation of predictions that are then 
tested in further observations which may confirm or contradict the predictions.   Grounded 
theory procedures are designed to build an explanation or to generate a theory around the 
core theme that emerges from the data.  Such an approach may therefore result in the 
analysis being conducted in a less formalised and proceduralised way, while still 
maintaining a systematic and rigorous approach to arrive at a grounded explanation or 
theory [Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2003]. 
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 Two essential features of grounded theory are that it is concerned with the development of 
theory out of data, and that the approach is iterative (or recursive, as it is sometimes called) 
meaning that data collection and analysis proceed in tandem, repeatedly referring back to 
each other [Bryman and Bell, 2003]. The researcher collected qualitative data from the 
relevant sources, such as banking institutions and individuals, in order to identify key 
themes, patterns and categories.  
 
Naturally, the researcher had his own hypotheses and values while looking for and 
explaining patterns and categories in the data. However, the concepts and categories were 
derived from the empirical data, and, as far as possible, the researcher assessed such data 
with an open mind, applying the principles of grounded theory. Grounded theory does not 
set out to test a hypothesis or a preconceived set of ideas. These shape the research process 
and the methods of data collection.  
 
Any framework or recommendations developed by the researcher are instead derived from, 
and grounded in, empirical reality. Grounded theory, and the approach to the analysis of 
qualitative data to which it gives rise, represents an inductive and holistic approach to 
research. Because the researcher was mostly interested in producing results and making 
recommendations aligned to the research problem, rather than the development of grand 
theories, grounded theory with its analysis techniques was extremely useful. 
 
The purpose of the grounded theory design is to derive a theory that links the perspective 
to general social science theories. This design studies the process, focusing on the 
interaction of the phenomena. Data was also collected from historical records, interviews 
and observations. It was analysed by identifying codes and comparing the concepts in 
findings with the relevant theories. The findings were communicated as an analytical story 





The researcher considers that grounded theory and its concomitant analytic approaches can 
be extremely valuable, particularly where the researcher is not certain about the nature of 
the research problem and the information required for assessing and resolving it. It offers 
explanations relevant to a particular set of circumstances and situations, such as the 
statements in this study: “How to minimise liquidation of viable institutions in the 
Zimbabwe banking sector”. Grounded theory procedures are designed to provide 
explanations within the central theme that emerges from the researcher’s data. 
 
Some prominent advocates of grounded theory lay down fairly precise procedures for each 
of the stages of the qualitative analysis outlined below [Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 
2003]: 
(a) Categorisation. The first activity involves classifying data into meaningful categories 
derived from the data or from the researcher’s theoretical framework, which should “fit” 
what the researcher would have revealed. The identification of these categories will be 
guided by the purpose of the research, aligned to the research question and objectives. 
(b) ‘Unitising’ data. The next step in the analytical process will be to attach relevant clusters 
of data, referred to as units of data, to the appropriate categories that have been devised. A 
unit of data may be a number of words, sentences, a complete paragraph, or some other 
discrete package of textual data that fits the category. 
(c) Recognising relationships and developing categories. Generating categories and 
reorganising data according to theme, or designing a suitable matrix and placing the data 
within its cells, engages the researcher in analysing the data. This analysis continues in the 
search for key themes and patterns or relationships in the rearranged data.  This may make 
it necessary to modify the categories and to continue to rearrange the data in the search for 
meaning in the data set. 
(d) Developing and testing hypotheses.  In the course of seeking patterns within the data and 
relationships between categories hypotheses are developed in order to test them.  A 
hypothesis is “testable proposition”.  The appearance of a possible relationship between 




(e) The interactive nature of the process 
This course of events demonstrates that data collection and analysis, and the emergence 
and verification of relationships and conclusions are interrelated and interactive processes.  
Analysis occurs both during and after the collection of data.  This analysis helps to shape 
the direction of data collection, especially where following a more inductive, grounded 
approach.   
 
(f) Analytical aids 
In addition to typing up the recording or notes made of a research session, and assigning 
units of data to appropriate categories, making a record of additional information 
facilitates the process by assisting in recall of the context and content of the interview or 
observation.  Saunders et al suggest summaries of interviews, observations and 
documents, and also interim notes, self-memos, and a diary.  These authors conclude that 
once the notes have been made a summary of the key points that emerge from undertaking 
this activity can be made.  At this point the principal themes that have emerged from the 
interviews or observations will be apparent, and ways to explore these further in 
forthcoming data collection sessions will suggest themselves.  It will be possible to 
identify apparent relationships between themes. These need to be recorded for later 
reference while seeking to establish their validity.   
 
Criticisms of grounded theory 
According to Saunders et al (2003) in spite of the frequency with which it is cited, and the 
universally high regard in which it is held, grounded theory is not without its limitations, 
of which the following can be briefly outlined: 
(a) Several writers take the view that it is desirable that researchers are sensitive to existing 
conceptualisations, as a focus for their investigations, so that they can build upon the work 
of others. 
(b) Related to this is the fact that researchers are often required to spell out the possible 





(c) There are practical difficulties with grounded theory. The time taken to transcribe tape 
recordings of interviews, for example, can make it difficult for researchers, especially 
when they have to meet deadlines, to carry out a genuine grounded theory analysis, with 
its constant interplay of data collection and conceptualisation. 
(d) It is somewhat doubtful whether grounded theory in many instances actually results in 
theory. As previously suggested, it provides a rigorous approach to the generation of 
concepts, but it is often difficult to identify what theory, in the sense of an explanation of 
something, is being put forward. 
 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the researcher considers grounded theory to offer the 
most effective general strategy for conducting qualitative data analysis, though how far the 
method is followed could vary from study to study. Grounded theory was applied by the 
researcher to investigate specific corporate problems in order to solve them. It can be used 
thus to support applied research, which is primarily concerned with operational problems 
that require solutions. The focus in this type of research is on practical matters, for 
example (again) the theme of this research: “What to do with insolvent banking institutions 
in Zimbabwe” and “How to minimise liquidation of viable companies in Zimbabwe’s 
banking sector”  
Applied research has assisted in developing a model. In the course of solving problems, 
practice-oriented business researchers encounter new questions and problems, and find 
ways to solve them. 
 
 In applied business research the questions often stem from a particular institution or bank 
official and are presented to the researcher. Therefore, applied business research often has 
a distinct starting point. For example, researcher and stakeholder(s) have to exchange 
information or reach agreement on the exact nature of the question at the outset. Grounded 
theory, supported by applied research, pays more attention to questions such as: What is 
the value of the study? For whom is this study interesting? Again, the emphasis in applied 
business research is on usability and practical relevance. 
 
It can be concluded that, despite the emphasis on usability, applied business research is 
based on scientific methods. It is fundamental research, and therefore is scientific.  
Whether research can be considered scientific or not depends on the methods rather than 
on the research objective. 
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3.5    Case Study Research Method 
Case studies place more emphasis on a full contextual analysis of fewer events or 
conditions and their interrelations.  Although hypotheses are often used, the reliance on 
qualitative data makes support or rejection more difficult.  An emphasis on detail provides 
valuable insight for problem solving, evaluation, and strategy.  This detail is secured from 
multiple sources of information.  It allows evidence to be verified, and avoids missing data 
[Cooper and Schindler, (2003)]. 
 
According to Vander Velde, Jansen and Anderson (2004) if the aim of the research is to 
conduct an intensive study of a phenomenon within the total, natural surroundings, a case 
study is the appropriate method.  The case study is often used to describe, rank and explore 
data with the aim of generating hypotheses or illustrating an existing theory.  In the latter 
situation, the case study is typically used to illustrate or clarify a theoretical argument.  
Where the case study is used as a basis for theory development; this is referred to as 
grounded theory. 
 
Vander Velde, Jansen and Anderson maintain that an advantage of the case study is that it 
can provide deeper insight into the ways in which people and departments respond to, hold 
mutual expectations of, and accommodate their behaviour to each other. For case study 
research, an a priori theory is preferable; where many individual case studies are 
conducted without the unifying principle of a theory, the research becomes hit-or-miss.  
However, these theoretical concepts must not be distractions while conducting the case 
study. 
 
The researcher developed a model called Tudor House Consultants [THC] Model, 
described in detail above (Chapter 1, p 20-21).  In the following chapter, “Qualitative 
Analysis of Data”, several case studies, highlighted by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 
Troubled Banking Institutions (2006), and also some from reports prepared by 
curators/liquidators in Zimbabwe were analysed.  It is envisaged that the model can be 
useful in minimising liquidation of viable banking institutions in Zimbabwe and other 
developing and developed countries. 
 78
3.6  Archival Research Method 
According to Saunders et al 2003 documentary secondary data are often used in research 
projects that also use primary data collection methods.  They can also be used on their own 
or with other sources of secondary data, in particular for historical research.   
 
In evaluating secondary data sources, Saunders et al suggest that secondary data be viewed 
with the same caution as any primary data collected by the researcher.  They note that it is 
necessary to be sure that they will facilitate the answering of the research question(s) and 
the meeting of objectives. The benefits associated with their use must be greater than the 
costs, and, of course, access to the data must be possible. 
 
The researcher used a combination of primary and secondary data in this study.  
Notwithstanding difficulties faced in using secondary data, qualitative analysis of such 
data can offer rich opportunities, not least because the tendency for qualitative researches 
to generate large and unwieldy sets of data means that much of the material remains under-
explored. 
 
3.7     Narrative Analysis 
For Saunders et al grounded theory involves fragmentation of qualitative data to further 
the process of analysis, while others regard this as inappropriate.  Those advocating more 
interpretative approaches suggest that the researcher should retain the integrity of the 
collected data and commence analysis from the basis of the verbatim transcripts or 
complete sets of notes thus produced. 
 
Saunders et al maintains that the primary method of collecting data in these approaches 
must be the in-depth interview.  As part of this process, it is probable that participants will 
provide accounts in the form of narratives, or stories.  The researcher may also deliberately 
encourage this by asking participants to provide responses in this form.  A narrative is 
broadly defined as an account of an experience that is told in a sequenced way, indicating 
a flow of related events that, taken together, are significant for the narrator and which 
convey meaning to the researcher. 
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Saunders et al argue that understanding and meaning are likely to be promoted through 
analysing narrative accounts in their originally-told form rather than by fragmenting them 
through a process of coding and categorisation.  This is not to say that such accounts 
cannot also be subjected to this categorisation.   
According to Saunders et all (2003) narrative, as a story with a beginning, middle and an 
end will broadly follow a perceptible structure.  The structural elements often present in 
narratives take the following form: 
(a) What is the story about? 
(b) What happened, to whom, whereabouts, and why? 
(c) What consequences arose from this? 
(d) What is the significance of these events? 
(e) What was the final outcome? 
 
Saunders et al concluded that in this way, narrative analysis may be used as a means to 
explore linkages, relationships and socially constructed explanations that naturally occur 
within narrative accounts, where fragmentation of these into categories and themes would 
therefore be rendered unnecessary.  Second, the structural elements present in narratives 
may also help in analysing each narrative account and perhaps to comparing the course of 
events in different narratives where this is considered likely to be beneficial.  The 
researcher largely used narrative analysis on case studies, with regard to banking 
institutions placed under liquidation. 
 
3.8   Qualitative Sampling 
The purpose of taking a sample is to obtain a result representative of the whole population 
being sampled without going to the trouble of examining each individual element.  The 
problem is that no sample can be guaranteed to be representative.  If a large number of 
different samples are taken from the same population, some would overestimate and others 
underestimate the true figure.  The margin, or limit of error, is a measure of this 
uncertainty in the representativeness of the sample [Fisher, 2007]. 
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Sampling is the process or technique of selecting a part of a population for the purpose of 
determining parameters or characteristics representative of the whole population.  There 
are five main reasons for sampling instead of a census; economy, time, the large size of 
many populations, the inaccessibility of some of a particular population and 
accuracy/precision [Gani Guler and Laxton, 2004]. 
 
For all research questions where it would be impracticable for you to survey the whole 
population a sample must be selected.  This is important whether a predominantly 
qualitative or quantitative research strategy is envisaged.  It might be possible, for 
instance, to obtain permission to collect data from only two or three organizations 
[Saunders et al 2003]. 
 
According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Annual Report (2004), during the 2003/2006 
banking crisis, the banking sector in Zimbabwe was mainly composed of 17 commercial 
banks, 6 merchant banks, 6 building societies, 4 finance houses, 6 discount houses and 
about 35 asset management companies.  The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe noted that some 
asset management companies such as ENG Asset Investments (Private) Limited were not 
registered with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 
 
The researcher collected data from 10 commercial banks, 1 finance house, 2 discount 
houses, 2 building societies, 1 merchant bank, 3 asset management companies, as well as 
from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and other stakeholders such as banking institutions 
placed under liquidation and curatorship.  It can therefore be concluded that the sample 
used by the researcher was a fair representative of the banking sector at the time because 







3.9   Ethical Considerations and Limitations 
Researchers often work independently, with significant latitude in designing and executing 
research projects. All research designs should include safeguards against causing mental or 
physical harm to participants, and should make integrity a first priority. Ethical issues in 
research reflect important moral concerns about the practice of responsible behaviour in 
society [Cooper and Schindler, 2003]. 
‘Ethically well-considered’ means that the conduct of research and its findings may not 
cause any harm, directly or indirectly, to any party involved in the research [Vander Velde, 
et al, 2004]. 
 
According to Lancaster (2005), examples of ethical issues which arise, particularly where 
the research forms the basis of a student dissertation, include: 
(a) Whether the researcher will disclose to members of the organisation the existence of the 
research study, and if so, which members will be privy to the information gathered; 
(b) Where the research study is disclosed to members of the organisation, how much 
information regarding, for example, the nature and purpose of the research, will be 
divulged, and to whom; 
(c) How much ‘power’ the researcher will be given, for example, with regard to requiring 
organisational members to participate in the research, provide information. 
 
3.10    Qualitative Data Analysis 
 In qualitative research the results are not directly numerical in nature, but are composed, 
for example, of words (narrations or descriptions of behaviour) which must later be 
categorised and quantified (converted into numerical values).  Generally speaking, 
qualitative research requires more time afterwards, during the data analysis phase, since 
the various answers have to be quantified.  In qualitative research, however, calculations 
still need to be made and the statistics understood.  The only difference is that the data is 
quantified afterwards instead of beforehand [Vander Velde, et al 2004]. 
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As a general rule, information is considered to be qualitative if it cannot be analysed by 
means of mathematical techniques.  Qualitative research allows in-depth analysis of 
problems, opportunities and situations in the business environment, and it has the 
advantage in some instances of being less costly than quantitative research techniques for 
gathering data [Gani, Guler and Laxton 2004]. 
 
Qualitative analysis involves data not amenable to numerical measurement.  This is not to 
suggest that all qualitative data cannot be translated into data that is amenable to 
quantitative techniques.  However, some qualitative data simply cannot be subjected to 
numerical measurement and analysis, even if the researcher should wish to do so.  This 
potential conflict concerning unquantified qualitative data, has led to two broad alternative 
ways of analysing it, namely content analysis and grounded theory [Lancaster, 2005]. 
 
Lancaster noted that with content analysis, essentially, the researcher decides in advance 
what is being looked for and measured through the qualitative research, and then develops 
frameworks of classifications for assessing the content of the data with regard to these 
measures. In grounded theory, therefore, the researcher takes the qualitative data and 
attempts to identify key themes, patterns and categories from the data itself. 
 
According to Saunders, et al, (2003) the features of qualitative data indicate the diverse 
nature of qualitative analysis.  To add to this, or because of it, there is no standardised 
approach to analysis.  These categories indicate a number of broad ways of differentiating 
approaches to qualitative analysis.  In this way, some approaches adopt a much lower level 
of structure.  Related to this, some approaches may be highly formalised and 







 One difference between qualitative and quantitative data analysis is that, with the latter, 
analysis invariably occurs after the data has been collected [Bryman and Bell, 2003].  
General approaches, like grounded theory (analytic induction), are often described as 
iterative i.e., there is a repetitive interplay between the collection and analysis of data. 
Analytic induction is an extremely rigorous method of analysis, because encountering a 
single case that is inconsistent with a hypothesis is sufficient to necessitate further data 
collection or a reformulation of the hypothesis. Furthermore, selection of cases must be 
sufficiently diverse as to have adequately challenged the theory (ibid). This is depicted in 
Figure 3.1 below: 
 


















Source: Bryman and Bell (2003) Business Research Methods p.246 
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2003),analytic induction is an approach to the analysis of 
data in which the researcher seeks universal explanations of phenomena by pursuing the 
collection of data until no cases remain that are inconsistent with a hypothetical 
explanation (deviant or negative cases). 
Rough definition of research question 
Hypothetical explanation  
of research question 
Examination of cases 
Deviant case not confirming 
hypothetical explanation 
No deviant cases 
Hypothesis confirmed 
Reformulate hypothesis 
End of examination of cases 
Data collection ceases 
Hypothetical explanation 
redefined to exclude deviate 
case 
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3.11 CAMELS Rating System 
According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Troubled And Insolvent Banks Policy (2004) 
the RBZ adopted an internationally recognized rating system in the evaluation of the 
performance and condition of the banking institutions in its purview. Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe maintain that this standardised rating system also facilitates the identification of 
those institutions whose financial, operational, managerial or compliance weaknesses 
require special supervisory attention and/or warrant a higher than normal degree of 
supervisory concern.  The Reserve Bank regards the rating system as an important tool in 
promoting financial stability. 
 
The ratings are assigned to each of the six components, and then an overall, or composite, 
rating is assigned.  Ratings are on a scale of 1 to 5 with respect to safety and soundness.   
Under the CAMELS system, each banking institution is assigned a composite rating based 
on an evaluation and rating of six essential components of its financial condition and 
operations.   
 
These component factors assess adequacy of capital, quality of assets, capability of 
management, quality and level of earnings, adequacy of liquidity and sensitivity to market 
risk.  Evaluations of the components take into consideration the institution’s size and 
sophistication, the nature and complexity of its activities and its risk profile. Composite 
and component ratings are assigned based on a 1 to 5 numerical scale.  1 is the highest 
rating, indicating the strongest performance and risk management practices and the lowest 
cause for supervisory concern.  5, the lowest rating, indicates the weakest performance, 
inadequate risk management practices, and the highest cause for supervisory concern. 
 
According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Troubled And Insolvent Banks Policy (2004) 
the CAMELS components are summarized as follows:- 
o Capital Adequacy  
Financial institutions are expected to maintain capital levels commensurate with their risk 
profiles and the strength of management. 
o Asset Quality  
Asset quality is the quantity of existing and potential credit risk associated with the loan 
and investment portfolios, other assets and off-balance sheet transactions. 
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o Management  
Management performance is evaluated against virtually all factors considered necessary to 
operate the bank within accepted banking practices and in a safe and sound manner. 
o Earnings  
Earnings are evaluated in relation to quantity, trend, sustainability and quality of the 
institution’s earnings. 
o Liquidity and Funds Management  
Liquidity and funds management are evaluated in relation to the overall effectiveness of 
asset and liability management, among other things. 
o Sensitivity to Market Risk  
The sensitivity to market risk component reflects the degree to which changes in interest 
and foreign exchange rates, and commodity and equity prices can adversely affect a 
financial institution’s earnings or economic capital. 
 
The researcher applied CAMELS rating system in analysing banking institutions. 
 
3.12 Tudor House Consultants – BICEPS Model  
In addition to the CAMELS rating system, the researcher applied the BICEPS model in 
qualitative analysis.  BICEPS is an acronym for Business Strategy Analysis, Internal 
Control Systems Analysis, Corporate Governance Analysis, Ethics in Business Analysis, 
Participation by All Stakeholders Analysis and Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis.  Under 
the BICEPS model each banking institution is assigned a composite rating based on the 
level of effectiveness of corporate governance and rating in terms of the abovementioned 
six components of corporate governance.   
 
Analysis of these components can be applied to any corporate or banking institution, 
regardless of size, business activities, internal or external factors of the business. 
Once the ratings have been assigned to all six components an overall, or composite, rating 
is assigned.  Ratings are on a scale of 1 to 6 which then reflect the effectiveness of 
corporate governance, stakeholder participation in strategic decision-making, and the 




Composite and component ratings are based on a 1–6 numerical scale, with 1 as the 
highest rating, indicating the most effective practice in the three parameters. The 
achievement of being assigned a numerical scale I would be expected to be reflected in an 
increase in market share, volume of sales, business value and levels of profitability, all on 
a sustainable basis.  A banking institution would also be expected to be financially sound.   
While a numerical scale 6, the lowest rating, naturally, indicates ineffective or insufficient 
application of corporate governance considerations, and would be expected to be reflected 
in financial distress, threatened viability or even liquidation of viable institutions. This 
would come at the expense of all stakeholders. 
 
The components of the BICEPS MODEL are analyzed as follows: 
o Business Strategy Analysis  
A business strategy formulated and implemented by top management should assist an 
organization in increasing its market share, level of profitability and the value of business 
by gaining a sustainable competitive advantage through unique but legal and ethical 
business activities.  The strategy should come up with goals and policies which are 
consistent and achievable.  In formulating a business strategy, management must be guided 
by the marketing principle of satisfying customers’ needs better than competition.   
 
An effective business strategy must also include internal and external environmental 
scanning and then come up with plans to deal with opportunities and threats in the light of 
a company’s strengths and weaknesses.  The main purpose of a business strategy should be 
to survive and prosper in the best interest of all its stakeholders.   
 
It is important that the maximization of profits is directly linked to maximizing the value 
of an organization as measured by its net present value of returns or cash flows generated 
by its assets. Cash flows must also be linked to the institution’s ability to increase its 
market sales and level of profitability. 
 
A banking institution or company can first formulate alternative business strategies, 
second judge the value of cash flows linked to each strategy, third, estimate cost of capital 
for each alternative strategy and then finally, choose the most effective strategy that 
generates the highest possible net present value. 
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An organization and a banking institution in particular can gain a competitive advantage 
by attaining a higher level of profitability over its competitors through service 
differentiation in such a way that a customer will not object to pay a premium price that 
exceeds the extra cost of the differentiation.  This can be achieved by rendering high 
quality unique services that are different from the generic banking services.  BICEPS 
MODEL therefore can be applied to measure the effectiveness of a particular business 
strategy through empirical business research. 
 
o Internal Control Systems Analysis  
It is the function of the board of directors to establish “water tight” internal control 
systems in order to safeguard assets and information systems of an organization from 
fraudulent manipulation of records.  Fraud can reduce the value of a business to the extend 
that it may end up in liquidation at the expense of all stakeholders.  All organization are 
faced with different forms of risks and again it is the function of top management to 
minimize such risks.  The BICEPS Model can therefore be applied to measure the 
effectiveness of internal control systems of a particular organisation through further 
research. 
 
o Corporate Governance Analysis  
The establishment of effective corporate governance structures within an institution is to 
ensure that the main objectives are achieved in the best interest of the company and all its 
stakeholders.  Corporate governance must therefore be linked to the increase in value of 
business and business growth.   
 
The appointment of independent non-executive directors and members of various 
committees is an important attribute of corporate governance.  The level of integrity and 
competence of top management is also important.  Corporate restructuring on a regular 
basis and the ability by the major shareholders to recapitalize the operations and fixed 
assets of the business is critical for the survival of any company and particularly banking 
institutions.  The BICEPS MODEL can therefore be applied to measure the effectiveness 





o Ethics in Business Analysis  
It is incumbent upon the board of directors, management and staff to make the right ethical 
decisions on behalf of an organization and in the best interest of all stakeholders.  
Unethical decisions can tarnish the image of an organization and it can be demonstrated 
that this can result in a decrease in market share, sales, profitability levels and the value of 
business.  Business ethics principle can be applied through ethical codes of conduct to 
reduce fraud and to promote profit maximization. 
 
Business ethics is certainly not about protecting one’s own interests only but the interests 
of others.  The right ethical decisions are therefore sustainable in the long run as compared 
to fraudulent, immediate and short run gains.  Effective application of business ethics by 
protecting the interests of all stakeholders, establishment of codes of ethics, whistle-
blowing and preventing fraud can minimize the liquidation of viable companies.  The 
BICEPS MODEL can therefore be applied to measure the effectiveness of business ethics 
through further empirical research. 
 
o Participation of All Stakeholders Analysis  
The researcher maintains that all stakeholders must be allowed to participate in, or at least 
must be consulted about strategic decision-making.  In order for an institution to improve 
its image it is necessary for all stakeholders to participate in strategic decisions.  For 
example, in a banking hall, bank tellers and security personnel have direct communication 
with valuable customers and they receive important information every day.   
 
These employees should therefore be allowed to participate in the formulation of the 
business strategy of the banking institution.  Contributions by all stakeholders, including 
constructive criticism is therefore critical for the success of every institution.  The degree 









o Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis  
Banking and corporate institutions must be aware that the body of stakeholders have 
different and conflicting interests.  As a way of minimising the liquidation of viable 
institutions the top management should attempt to understand and then at least try to 
satisfy the needs of all stakeholders consistent with the best interest of the institution.  
Analysis of the stakeholder satisfaction component can therefore be applied to measure the 
level of satisfaction by all stakeholders and its link to sustainable business growth.  In 
order to obtain co-operation from, say, customers, employees, shareholders and creditors, 
top management should satisfy the needs of such stakeholders in the best interest of the 
institution.  It is therefore important for management to know whether or not their strategic 
decisions are satisfying the interests of different groups of stakeholders.  Stakeholders 
satisfaction analysis can therefore be applied through empirical research to measure level 
of satisfaction and its effects to the institution. 
 
3.13 Prediction of Financial Distress and Turnaround 
According to Palepu, Healy and Bernard (2000)a number of multi-factor models have 
been designed to predict financial distress.  One such model is the Altman Z-score model.  
The model predicts bankruptcy when Z < 1.20.  Palepu et al argue that the range between 
1.20 and 2.90 is labelled the “gray area” and the Altman Z SCORE MODEL is shown 
below: 
 
Z =  .717 ( X1 )  + .847 ( X2 ) + 3.11 ( X3 ) + .420 ( X4 ) + .998 ( X5 ) 
Where X1 = net working capital/total assets 
  X2 = retained earnings/total assets 
  X3 = EBIT/total assets 
  X4 = shareholders’ equity/total liabilities 
  X5 = sales/total assets       
 
Altman worked with a sample of corporations that filed for bankruptcy.  Starting with 22 
financial ratios, he selected the 5 that did the best combined job of predicting bankruptcy.  
These ratios were used to discriminate between bankruptcy and non bankrupt firms, using 
data from 1 to 5 years prior to bankruptcy.  As expected, the predictive accuracy of the 
multiple discriminant model declined with the increase in years before bankruptcy [Van 
Honrne, 1989].   
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The Z- Score model itself was the following: 













Source: Van Horne, (1989) Financial Management and Policy, p.731 
 
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 +.6X4 + 1.0X5    
Where  X1 = working capital to total assets  
  X2 = cumulative retained earnings to total assets 
  X3 = earnings before interest and taxes to total assets 
  X4 = market value of equity to book value of total liabilities 
  X5 = sales to total assets 
 
Van Horne maintained that the Z ratio is the overall index of the multiple discriminant 
faction.  Altman found that companies with Z scores below 1.81 (including negative 
amounts) always went bankrupt, whereas Z score above 2.99 represented healthy firms.  
Firms with Z scores in between were sometimes misclassified, so this represents a gray 
area.  On the basis of these cut offs, Altman suggests that one can predict whether or not a 






According to Correia, Flynn, Uliana and Wormald, (2010) a statistical technique called 
multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) is used to classify the ratios into one of two 
groups, such as failed or non-failed, based on a set of predesignated ratios.  The technique, 
based on regression analysis, establishes coefficients for the ratios that minimize 
misclassification.  Most of the discriminant analysis has been used to classify companies 
as subject to financial distress or not.  This classification is made on the basis on each 
company’s characteristics as measured by its financial ratios. 
 
Correia et al (2010) maintain that the best known of these models was developed by 
Edward Altman who applied MDA to a sample of companies and developed a 
discriminant function that classified companies either as failed or successful.  Altman 
model is as follows: 
 
z = 0.012x1 + 0.014x2 + 0.033x3 + 0.006x4 + 0.999x5 
Where x1 =   net working capital/total assets 
  x2 =   retained earnings/total assets 
  x3 =   EBIT/total assets 
  x4 =   market value of common and preferred stock/book value of debt 
  x5 =   sales/total assets 
 
It should be noted that the first four variables are expressed as percentages, not as 
decimals.  Altman found that the mid-point of his distribution was 2.675 and that a zone of 
uncertainty existed from 1.81 to 2.99.  This meant that if the model was applied to a 
company and a score of between 1.81 and 2.99 was obtained, a classification could not be 
made with certainly.   
 
However if the score was below 1.81, the company was almost certain to fail while if the 
score was above 2.99 the company was almost certain to succeed.   The researcher also 







3.14  Field Interview Schedules (Questionnaires) 
The interview is probably the most widely-used method in qualitative research. The 
flexibility of the interview is what makes it so attractive. The term ‘qualitative interview’ 
is often used to refer to the different types of interview methods used in qualitative 
research. Such interviews tend to be less structured than the kind associated with survey 
research. A point to note here is that in qualitative research no single interview stands 
alone: “It has meaning to the researcher only in terms of other interviews and 
observations” [Bryman and Bell, 2000]. 
 
In this research semi-structured interviews were used. The interview schedules 
(questionnaires) covered the subjects of Corporate Governance, Internal Control Systems, 
Business Strategies and Business Ethics. Data, including financial records, were obtained 
from corporate secretaries and directors of various banking institutions. In Zimbabwe, like 
many other countries, corporate secretaries and directors act as a link between the board of 
directors and the other stakeholders. Two additional schedules were used to collect data 
from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the rest of the stakeholders: employees, 
shareholders, customers, management, business associates, as well as suppliers of goods 
and services. With regard to banking institutions placed under liquidation or curatorship 
from January 2004 to December 2006, data and financial records were obtained directly 
from liquidators and curators. This also covered data on bank restructuring. 
 
Bryman and Bell maintain that a further point to bear in mind is that the researcher needs 
to be flexible in his/her approach to interviewing in qualitative research. This advice has 
not just to do with needing to be responsive to what participants say, and following up 
interesting points that they make, but also with such matters as varying the order of 
questions, following up leads and clearing up inconsistencies in answers. Flexibility is 
important in other respects too, such as coping with audio-recording equipment 






3.15  Corporate Governance Interview Schedule  
The corporate governance interview schedule was designed to measure the formulation, 
implementation and effectiveness of corporate governance principles and policies in the 
best interests of all stakeholders. The objective was to determine how corporate 
governance principles and policies can be used to minimise liquidation of viable 
institutions. 
 
Question 1 State name of your organisation. The question thus identified a specific 
institution within the banking sector based on the sample. 
 
Question 2 What is your position in your organisation? The topic of Corporate 
Governance must be addressed by a senior executive within an institution.  In the case of 
Central Africa Building Society (CABS), the interview schedule form was completed and 
answered by the Corporate Secretary and the General Manager: Finance & Treasury. 
 
Question 3 For how long have you been with your organisation? A senior executive who 
has worked at an institution for five or more years would be expected to have a complete 
knowledge of all its activities. In this case the General Manager Finance & Treasury at the 
date of the interview had worked there for 35 years. 
 
Question 4 How many directors are there in your organisation? The number of directors 
is usually determined by the volume of the business activity.  In this regard CABS had 12 
directors. 
 
Question 5, How many of these are non-executive directors? Every institution is expected 
to have a majority of independent non-executive directors in order to ‘police’ the executive 
directors. CABS had 10 non-executive directors out of a total of 12. 
 
Question 6Explain how each non-executive director (including the chairman) was 
identified and engaged.  The idea here was to determine whether all stakeholders took part 
in the appointment of independent non-executive directors - considered best practice, 
especially in public institutions. More important, the non-executive directors should be 
completely independent from the executive directors and major shareholders. 
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Question 7 How many governance committees are there in your organisation? Public 
institutions, including private companies, controlling the working lives of thousands of 
people and managing assets worth billions of dollars on behalf of the public, should have 
at least all of the critical governance committees, such as the Finance & Audit, Risk 
Management & Legal, Credit & Liabilities and Business Development. 
 
Question 8 State the name of each committee, with the composition of each, and the 
number of non-executive and executive members.  Also indicate whether the chairperson is 
an executive or non-executive board member. 
The researcher considers that the main governance committees should consist of a majority 
of independent non-executive directors in the interests of objectivity and safeguarding the 
interests of shareholders and others. They should have the knowledge and ability to 
challenge management and expose strategic issues which the board as a whole needs to 
know about. 
 
Question 9 Explain how the board of directors has aligned the goals of the organisation 
with those of all stakeholders, namely equity holders, employees, suppliers of goods and 
services, the government, customers and the public. Stakeholders have various, sometimes 
conflicting, interests, and alignment of the goals to these interests generally can be 
achieved only through the participation of stakeholders in the formulation, implementation 
and control of principles and policies. 
 
Question 10 Briefly describe how the business and corporate strategies of your 
organisation are formulated and implemented. The concern, again, is that this should be 
done through the participation of all stakeholders. 
 
Question 11 How are the board members expected to act where the interests of 
shareholders conflict with the interests of the company? This question seeks to determine 
whether in such cases the board of directors would keep the interests of the company 





Question 12 Briefly explain the fiduciary responsibilities of your board members. The 
question is concerned with whether the board would exercise the outmost good faith, 
honesty and integrity, acting independently of any outside instruction or influence. The 
directors should always act in the best interests of the company, and not those of particular 
sectors.  
 
They are expected to avoid situations of conflict of duties/interests, disclosing potential 
conflicts as early as possible. Based on principles of democratic management, members of 
the board should be prepared to disagree with colleagues on the board, including the 
chairperson and the Chief Executive Officer. 
 
Question 13 Have the directors in your organisation delegated statutory obligations, 
especially sections 140, 176, and 186 of the Companies Act (Chapter 24:03)? While the 
board members may delegate some of its responsibilities to management and governance 
committees, they are not expected to delegate statutory obligations such as these, and 
should be held responsible and accountable in their individual, personal capacities.  
 
Question 14 In your opinion, are all your non-executive directors aware of the economic, 
social and political environment in which the institution operates, and do they really 
understand how the organisation makes money? Non-executive directors are required to 
bring special skills or knowledge to the institution. The appointments should not be based 
on personal relationships with the majority of shareholders, executive directors or other 
parties. 
 
Question 15 Indicate which of the following models best fits your organisation in terms of 
the degree to which the board is engaged in influencing management decisions and the 
company’s direction: 
(a) The Passive Board – a board that functions at the discretion of the Managing Director, and 
limits its activities and participation. 
(b) The Certifying Board – a board that certifies to shareholders that the Managing Director is 
doing what the board expects and that management will take corrective action when 
needed. 
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(c) The Engaged Board – a board that provides insight, advice and support to the Managing 
Director and his/her team.  It also seeks out appropriate industrial and financial expertise 
to add value to decisions. 
(d) The Intervening Board – a board that becomes intensely involved in decision-making on 
key issues and convenes frequent, intense meetings, often at short notice. 
(e) The Operating Board – a board that makes key decisions that management then 
implements, and also fills gaps in management experience [Hendrikse and Hendrikse 
2004]. 
(f) None of the above. 
If your answer is ‘none of the above’, please support your answer, with examples if 
possible. The idea here is not to classify boards too rigidly. These characterisations are, 
after all, essentially models. In practice, boards move back and forth across the scale in 
their level of engagement, changing with issues and circumstances. Thus, a ‘passive’ or 
‘certifying’ board in crisis may temporarily become ‘intervening’ in order to, say, remove 
the Chief Executive Officer, and then become ‘operating’ until a new leader is in place. 
This was the pattern in a number of banking institutions, such as Century Holdings, Trust 
Holdings, Premier Banking Corporation and Metropolitan Zimbabwe Bank. 
 
Selecting a particular level of engagement provides the philosophical framework for 
subsequent operations. Merely having that conversation is a significant first step towards 
improved board performance. The board may find that it disagrees sharply with the 
executive team about its role, or that individual directors hold divergent views, making it 
difficult to act in concert. Having characterised itself and management, the board can 
evaluate each subsequent decision from fidelity to the model [Hendrikse and Hendrikse 
2004]. 
 
Question 16 On 30 September 2004 the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe responded to the 
collapse of more than half a dozen financial institutions by issuing Guideline Number 01-
2004/BSD, entitled Sound Corporate Governance Requirements through its Bank 





a) Explain how shareholders can ensure that the board of directors is constantly held 
accountable for efficient and effective governance of the institution. According to 
Hendrikse and Hendrikse (2004) this can be achieved by the process of shareholder 
activism, an intervention used principally by institutional investors on behalf of individual 
shareholders to engage with companies in which they have shareholdings.  
It is not simply a question of buying and selling shares, but of using their voice to 
influence management behaviour in the pursuit of better performance Hendrikse, (2004).  
Hendrikse noted that activist shareholder activities include direct negotiation with top 
management and trying to coordinate activities with those of other shareholders. This can 
also be achieved by the appointment of independent auditors and participation of all 
stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of strategic policies. 
b) Indicate the number of managers or directors (if any) with direct or indirect shareholding, 
with details of their percentages.  Managers and directors managing public assets or funds, 
whether in public or private institutions, are expected to hold not more than 5% direct or 
indirect shareholding, as more than this is against basic principles of business governance.  
 c)  Explain how your institution has complied with provisions of sections 32, 34, 35, 36, 37 
and 40 of the Zimbabwe Banking Act (Chapter 24:20).These provisions are: 
 
Section 32 provides that “no banking institution shall purchase its own shares, or shares in 
any institution through which it conducts banking business, or make any loan or advance 
on the security of such shares”. 
 
Section 34 provides that “no banking institution shall engage in non-banking business 
without permission from the Registrar of Banking Institutions, in consultation with the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe”. 
 
Section 35 provides that “no banking institution shall knowingly extend credit to, or for 
the benefit of, any of its officers or directors, or any person who holds a significant interest 
in the banking institution, or any close relative”. 
 
Section 36 provides that “every banking institution shall keep proper books of accounts, 
and at the end of each financial year prepare financial statements in accordance with such 
accounting standards, as may be prescribed”. 
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Section 37 provides that “every banking institution shall maintain, within Zimbabwe, such 
records as are necessary to reveal clearly and correctly the state of its business affairs and 
financial condition; and of its transactions, so as to enable the Registrar of Banking 
Institutions and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to determine whether the banking 
institution has complied with the Banking Act”. 
 
Section 40 provides that “the board of every banking institution shall appoint an audit 
committee consisting of a chairman, who shall not be an executive member of the board, 
and at least two other persons, who shall not be members of the board of directors. The 
functions of the audit committee shall be to assist the banking institution’s board to 
evaluate the adequacy and efficiency of the internal control systems, accounting practices, 
information systems and auditing processes applied in the day-to-day management of the 
institution’s banking business”. 
 
It can be concluded that most of the banking institutions which collapsed during the 
banking crisis of 2003/2006 failed to varying degrees to comply with these statutory 
requirements, besides other infringements. 
 
d) Explain how your organisation can ensure that every board member, and especially non-
executive directors, attends at least 75% of the board meetings of your institution. Non-
executive members should be paid a fair remuneration based on market trends, coupled to 
their performance and effectiveness. In the banking sector board attendance should be 
reported to the central bank and the association of bankers for review and analysis. In 
addition, non-attendance for no good reason should also result in instant dismissal of 
irresponsible members.  
 
e) Explain whether Guideline Number 01-2004/BSD (Sound Corporate Governance 
Requirements) has transformed your institution with regard to management systems, 
profitability, business growth, shareholding, good return on investments and stakeholder 
satisfaction. The purpose of the question was to measure the effectiveness of the Reserve 




Question 17 Explain your organisation’s main social and environmental responsibilities.  
Give examples. According to Hendrikse and Hendrikse (2004), the economic performance 
of a business is the foundation of its success. The bedrock of business is sustainable 
profits. On profits also is based the contribution of business to social and sustainable 
development.  Hendrikse argues that these profits are the foundation of the history of 
business success that has stood the test of time.  
 
In addition to these questions the researcher obtained the following authority and 
information, either directly from institutions or via participants, for qualitative analysis: 
(a) Audited Financial Statements covering the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2006; 
(b) Board and Governance Committee minutes (same period); 
(c) Certified Copy of the Trading Banking License; 
(d) Certified Copy of the Certificate of Incorporation; 
(e) Certified Copies of Memorandum/Articles of Association; 
(f) Authority to attend and observe a number of Board/committee Meetings between 1 
September 2005 and 30 September 2007; and 
(g) Authority to interview a number of customers, suppliers of goods and services, employees, 
shareholders, Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and 
independent non-executive directors. 
 
The researcher failed to obtain certain authority, data and information from about 25% of 
the targeted banking institutions, but managed to find alternative sources for the 
information.  Similar research methods were applied in the cases of Internal Control 
Systems, Business Strategies, Business Ethics, Stakeholder Involvement, Stakeholder 
Satisfaction and banking restructuring within the targeted banking sector. 
 
3.16 Concluding Comments 
The determination of the most effective strategy and procedure of business research 
methodology and data collection, is one of the most significant stages of the qualitative 
research.  Both primary and secondary data provides the researcher with the basis for 
quality source of information and at the end problem solving and decision making.  It is 
therefore critical to take note that some types of data and data collection methods are 
similar as well as different from each other. 
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Accordingly, details of the fieldwork, methods of data collection and analytical strategies 
were covered in detail in this chapter.  These included Research Approach, Case Study 
Research Method, Archival Research Method, Narrative Analysis, Qualitative Sampling 
and Qualitative Data Analysis. 
 
In addition to the above, the researcher adopted CAMELS Rating System an 
internationally recognised rating system in the evaluation of the performance and 
conditions of the banking institutions.  CAMELS was adopted by the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe before the 2003/2006 banking crisis in Zimbabwe. 
The Risk Assessment System [RAS] a method used by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to 
identify, evaluate, document and communicate the assessment of the quantity of risk, the 
quality of risk-management, and the direction of risk at each banking institution, was also 
adopted by the researcher[Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Troubled And Insolvent Banks 
Policy 2004]. 
The researcher also adopted the Altman Z-Score Model generally used by business 
analysts to predict bankruptcy of corporate and banking institutions. 
The aforementioned methods techniques and strategies were applied in the next chapter in 
carrying out Qualitative Data Analyses, including Tudor House Consultants – (THC) 












CHAPTER FOUR  
 
4.0 RESULTS OF RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
4.1    Introduction 
 The previous chapter discussed the various data collection strategies and methods.  This 
chapter is concerned with the processes that follow this.  Specific approaches to qualitative 
data analysis were applied, along with coding, which was the main feature of most of these 
approaches.  According to Gani, Guler and Laxon (2004), once the data are collected, 
attention is directed to analysing it.  The purpose of analysis is to generate meaning from 
the collected raw data. 
 
Qualitative analysis involves the analysis of data that is not amenable to numerical 
measurement.  This is not to say that nonqualitative data can be translated into data 
amenable to quantitative techniques.  For example, the measurement of attitudes, 
essentially a qualitative dimension, can be translated into numerical attitudinal scales that 
can then be analysed using quantitative techniques [Lancaster, (2005)]. 
 
Lancaster adopted the following as “the three key steps in analysing any form of 
qualitative data, and therefore common to any of the techniques of qualitative data 
analysis”: 
 
(a)  Data reduction 
This, the first step in analysing qualitative data, is the process of selecting, focusing, 
simplifying, abstracting and transforming qualitative data by identifying and organizing it 
into clear patterns.   
 
(b)    Data display 
The second stage in analysing qualitative data involves presentation in ways which enable 
others to assess, interpret and evaluate the researcher’s interpretations and conclusions.  
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(c) Conclusion drawing and verification 
The third element in developing more systematic techniques of analysing qualitative data 
is drawing definitive conclusions from the data.  Conclusions may emerge much earlier in 
the research process inasmuch as the sorts of data collected and the reasons for this, may 
stem from initial ideas, or ‘early conclusions’, of what the data may reveal.  Final 
conclusions, however, will arise only from the complete analysis of the qualitative data 
after data reduction and data display.   
 
Consonant with the main objectives of the research topic, the researcher applied these 
methods of qualitative analysis to the banking institutions placed under liquidation during 
the 2003/2006 banking crisis, both to those that were restructured and those which 
survived.  The analyses also measured the effectiveness of corporate governance, internal 
control systems, business strategies and business ethics in these institutions.   
The analyses also focused on banking restructuring and re-capitalisation of banking 
institutions. The monetary and fiscal policies of the Reserve Bank and the Ministry of 

















4.2 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS PLACED UNDER 
LIQUIDATION DURING THE JANUARY 2004 - DECEMBER 2006 BANKING 
CRISIS 
The following is a sample of banking institutions placed under liquidation during the 
crisis: 
4.2.1    Century Discount House Limited (CDH) 
A firm of Chartered Accountants, Ernst & Young (Zimbabwe) reported in their Forensic 
Report in May 2004, that between March 2003 and December 2003, the executive 
managers of CDH siphoned depositors’ funds in the amount of Zim$45 billion by failing 
to disclose their transactions with a company that operated without obtaining a banking 
license from Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, ENG Investments (Private) Limited [Century 
Discount House Limited (2004) Ernst & Young Forensic Report]. 
 
In April 2003 the holding company of CDH, Century Holdings (Private) Limited signed an 
Agreement of Sale with ENG and until the placement of CDH under liquidation in January 
2004, no approval had been obtained from RBZ. 
It is apparent that the key stakeholders, such as depositors, creditors, RBZ, management 
and staff, business associates, the public and potential customers, were never consulted 
(through stakeholder analysis) and were not given the opportunity to participate in 
strategic decision-making.  It also took 12 months for RBZ to take corrective measures and 
this was at the expense of the investing public.  It is also astonishing that the credibility 
and integrity of ENG as potential investors were never checked by the management and 
shareholders, as would be expected under conditions of due diligence.[Century Discount 
House Limited (2004) Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
This was, of course, grossly unethical conduct on the part of the top management of CDH.  
All codes of business ethics naturally stipulate morally acceptable behaviour in the 
institution. 
 
In May 2004 the liquidator of CDH instituted both criminal and civil proceedings against 





A few days before the court hearing in May 2006 the respondents offered as settlement to 
pay an amount of Zim$16 billion, in order to discharge the total shortfall outstanding in 
High Court Proceedings – Case Numbers HC3768/2004 and HC5151/2004.   The 
depositors eventually received all their funds, though the money had lost value due to high 
inflation. It also lost value due to the ‘time value of money’.  The depositors were allowed 
to charge interest only up to the date of liquidation (20 January 2004), and it took them a 
full three years to receive what was considered ‘a paltry sum of money’.  
 
Regrettably, it took the RBZ almost a year to take the corrective action of placing CDH 
under liquidation on 20 January 2004, from January 2003, High Court of Zimbabwe, Case 
Number 544/04, in order to minimize further losses. The Zimbabwe Depositors Protection 
Fund made interim relief payments to the depositors at the commencement of liquidation, 
but the amounts were regarded as insignificant and unacceptable. 
 
Qualitative Analysis – Using the CAMELS Rating System 
(a)     Capital Adequacy  
In2003 Century Discount House Limited incurred a loss of Zim$31.9 billion, resulting in a 
negative equity position of Zim$31.7 billion.  There was no capital injection forthcoming 
from the existing shareholders, resulting in the institution’s capital adequacy ratio 
deteriorating from a position of 23% on 31 October 2003 to -65% on 31 December 2003, 
against an average market performance of 29%. Other loans were largely in the form of 
unsecured advances to ENG, as well as ordinary staff loans and housing, vehicle and 













Other assets were made up of motor vehicles, computer equipment, fixtures and fittings, 
prepayments for vehicles and insurance claims. This is depicted in table 4.2.1 below: 
 
Table 4.2.1 CDH –Capital Adequacy 
Asset Amount  Zim$ Units Weighted (per cent) Weighted Units 
 Treasury Bills & 
   Government Bonds    
 








 Mortgage Loans 
 








 Other Loans  
 








 Other Assets 
 

















Total - - - 88 
 
Table 4.2.2 CDH-Equity and Liabilities 










 87 436 599 159 
 
157 
Source: [Century Discount House Limited (2004) Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)  = Equity – Units 
           Asset-Weighted Units 
 
    =-57 
                      88 
 










(b) Asset Quality 
Towards the end of 2003 the institution was technically insolvent because 75% of its asset 
book was made up of Zim$ $44 billion in unsecured advances to the unlicensed institution 
ENG.  In addition, CDH had the following non – liquid assets (Zim$): 
 
o Ordinary staff loans  19 million 
o Housing loans   58 million 
o Vehicle loans  15 million 
o Overnight loans  1 billion 
o Fixed Assets  1.147billion 
 
The asset quality, as a function of the quantity of existing and potential credit risk 
associated with the loan and investment portfolios, other assets and off–balance sheet 




It can be concluded that the top management team lacked technical competence, 
leadership, administrative ability and integrity.  In many instances they failed to comply 
with banking laws, regulations and supervisory guidelines and directives, and also failed to 
maintain business ethical standards and international banking best practice. The ineffective 
corporate governance structures culminating in corporate governance shortcomings 
[Century Discount House Limited (2004) Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
(d) Earnings 
In terms of the Zimbabwe Banking Act (Chapter 20:20) and peer group comparisons, the 
core business of a discount house is the discounting of bills, including the buying and 
selling of financial instruments on behalf of customers and itself. The institution made a 
loss of Zim$31.9 billion for the year ended 31 December 2003, which was due mainly to 
the provision for bad and doubtful debts of Zim$33.026 billion.  The provisions were 
largely attributed to the Zim$ 44 billion unsecured exposure to ENG, a non–performing 
loan.   
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Due to poor market confidence, the institution failed to source relatively cheap funds from 
the market, resulting in interest expense of Zim$ 23.7 billion.  Without an injection of 
fresh capital from the existing shareholders, the institution failed to underwrite any 
meaningful business, resulting in the incurred loss of Zim$ 31.9 billion. 
 
(e) Liquidity and Funds Management 
Because of the non–performing loan book of ZW$ 44.4 billion to ENG, the institution had 
a negative liquidity gap of Zim$ 30.8 billion.  There was a mismatch of assets and 
liabilities, with a total liquid assets being Zim$ 7.4 billion against total deposits (liabilities) 
of Zim$37.8 billion.   
 
The institution therefore lacked the capacity to honour its obligations to depositors upon 
maturity of their investments, which were, on average, seven-day investments, resulting in 
a liquidity crisis that led to its collapse.  
 
According to Section 16 of the Zimbabwe Statutory Instrument 205 of 2000Banking 
Regulations, CDH was not allowed to have an exposure with any third party that exceeded 
25% of the institution’s capital base of Zim$ 1.6 billion.  This provision exists in order to 
avoid a high concentration risk. In this case the risk developed into a systematic risk, 
following the collapse of ENG Investments, which had a multiple effect on other banking 
institutions dealing with it, including CDH.  Discount houses in Zimbabwe are required to 
concentrate on their core business of bill discounting.  Depositors’ funds, which 
constituted a large portion of CDH’s liabilities, were diverted to non-banking activities, 
which likewise failed to produce profits.  
 
 If the institution had concentrated on its core business of bill discounting, including 
buying and selling of financial instruments for third parties and itself, the chances of a 








(f) Sensitivity to Market Risk 
Changes in interest and foreign exchange rates, and also in commodity and equity prices 
adversely affected CDH’s earnings, as the institution became too sensitive to the economic 
and political turbulence in Zimbabwe.  This came about because the management lacked 
the ability to identify, measure, monitor and control exposure to market risk.  Interest rate 
risk exposures arising from non-trading positions was great and complex.   
 
Also, the sensitivity of the banking institution’s earnings and the economic value of its 
capital to adverse economic and political changes in market risk was very high. Below is a 
tabulated summary of the position of Century Discount House on 31 December 2003: 
 
Table 4.2.3   CDH Latest CAMELS Ratings- December 2003 
CAMELS Component 31 December 2003 
Capital Adequacy 5  
Asset Quality 5 
Management 5 
Earnings & Provisions 5 
Liquidity & Funds Management 5 
Sensitivity to Market Risk 5 
Composite Rating 5 
 
Qualitative Analysis  Using BICEPS Model 
(a) Business Strategy Analysis 
The core business of most successful discount houses in Zimbabwe is the discounting of 
bills, including the buying and selling of financial instruments on behalf of customers and 
itself.  CDH raised most of its revenue from the public (depositors).   
 
Depositors’ funds, which constituted a large portion of the institution’s income, were 






The institution operated without an effective business strategy, which ought to have 
identified key profit drivers and business risks.  Competitive business strategy involves 
being different, and hence deliberately choosing different but legal and ethical sets of 
activities in order to deliver a unique mix of value. CDH lacked the ability to create a 
unique and valuable position involving a different set of activities.  As a result the 
company failed to gain a competitive advantage on sustainable basis. 
 
(b) Internal Control Systems Analysis 
The top management of CDH frequently advanced funds, worth a total of ZW$ 44,6 
billion, to the unlicensed asset management institution ENG, mostly without security being 
requested or provided.    This was despite the fact that no suitable prior arrangement had 
been made with CDH’s Assets and Liabilities Committee (ALCO).  
This was also in direct contravention of Zimbabwe banking regulations, under which 
maximum exposure to ENG at any given time should have been Zim$ 400 million, which 
represents 25% of the CDH capital of Zim$ 1,6 billion. Any amounts in excess of Zim$ 
400 million advanced to ENG were in direct contravention of the Zimbabwe Banking Act 
Regulations Statutory Instrument 205 of 2000, and were clearly not in the interests of the 
investing public.  
 
The top management of CDH failed completely to establish watertight internal control 
systems to safeguard assets of the company, detect fraudulent activities and take corrective 
measures where required. 
 
(c) Corporate Governance Analysis 
CDH failed to establish effective corporate governance structures.  The majority of non-
executive directors and members of various committees were not independent of the 
executive directors and major shareholders.  For example, the directors and officers of 
CDH were aware from 29 July 2003 that trading with ENG was risky [Century Discount 
House Limited (2004) Ernst & Young Forensic Report]. 
 
It is astonishing that they continued trading with ENG up to 31 December. The non-
executive directors and key members of the governance committees, such as the 
Assets/Liabilities Committee, were clearly not independent of the executive directors or of 
the majority shareholder Century Holdings Limited. 
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The majority shareholders lacked the capacity to re-capitalize the business operations on a 
when-required basis.  There were no strategies for regular restructuring the company.  All 
this indicates serious short comings in CDH’s corporate governance. 
 
(d) Ethics in Business Analysis 
CDH management failed to apply basic business ethics in the fight against fraud.  The top 
management failed to develop and implement a code of ethics.  For example, the directors 
and officers of CDH concealed from the investing public that CDH had changed 
ownership from CHL to ENG, notwithstanding the fact that the regulatory authorities had 
not sanctioned the change. CDH, on the other hand, continued to use the facilities of CHL, 
thereby confusing the depositors [Century Discount House Limited (2004) Ernst & Young 
Forensic Report]. 
 
The directors and officers continued to advance depositors’ funds to ENG even after the 
latter had started defaulting on repayments due on 18 November - grossly unethical 
conduct on the part of management.  They also continued to accept funds from depositors 
while fully aware that there was a high likelihood that these depositors would probably not 
be paid back. Deposits continued to be accepted right up to the closing of the institution by 
the Reserve Bank (2 January 2004). 
 
(e) Participation of All Stakeholders Analysis 
The majority of employees of CDH were opposed to its being sold to ENG.  About 75% of 
CDH’s total revenue was raised from the depositors.  But these depositors (customers) or 
their representatives were never consulted. Surely no institution could hope to increase 
market share, profitability and business growth on a sustainable basis without support from 
its existing and potential customers.  The Reserve Bank Zimbabwe, as the monetary 
authority representing the government, was informed about detailed transactions which 
took place between CDH and ENG from January 2003 only at the end of December 2003  






The chief Operating Officer of CHL, Nyamazana, the most qualified banker within the 
group, was also opposed to the strategy of selling CDH to ENG.  His recommendations on 
behalf of employees and management were dismissed by the majority shareholders in what 
was later described as “autocratic fashion”.  The researcher insists that in order for an 
institution to gain a sustainable competitive advantage, all stakeholders must participate in 
strategic decision-making, or at least be consulted, either directly or through their 
representatives.  In this case, stakeholders were not consulted until CDH was placed under 
provisional liquidation [Century Discount House Limited (2004) Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
(f) Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis 
CDH top management failed completely to safeguard the deposits of the investing public.  
Instead, these funds were used to finance non-banking activities, such as unsecured loans 
to ENG and other persons linked to the majority shareholders.  The Zimbabwe Revenue 
Authority was deprived of a source of revenue following the liquidation of CDH on 20 
January 2004.  The interests the employees, in terms of job security and other benefits, 
were treated with disrespect. Although CDH’s Credit committee established dealing limits 
for individual officials of Zim$ 400 million, they were ignored. 
 
The researcher believes that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe could, at least, have 
minimized losses to the depositors by implementation of efficient, effective supervisory 
mechanisms and guidelines, such as those mentioned in the recommendations at the end of 
this research paper. Banking and corporate institutions therefore must be mindful of the 
fact that all stakeholders have, different interests that may, and often do conflict with one 
another. As a way of minimizing the liquidation of viable institutions, top management 
should make an effort to understand, and then, at least, attempt to satisfy the needs of all 









Below is a tabulated summary of the position of Century Discount House on 31 December 
2003, using the BICEPS Model: 
 
Table 4.2.4Summary of the Position of CDH on 31 December 2003,  Using BICEPS 
Model 
BICEPS Component 31 December 2003 
 Business Strategy Analysis F ‘6’ 
 Internal Control Systems Analysis F  ‘6’ 
 Corporate Governance Analysis F  ‘6’ 
 Ethics In Business Analysis F  ‘6’ 
 Participation of All Stakeholders Analysis F  ‘6’ 
 Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis F  ‘6’ 
 Composite Rating F  ‘6’ 
  
 
Based on the financial statements of CDH as at 31 December 2007, the Altman Z – Score 
Model for CDH on 31 December 2007 was as follows: 
Z = 1.2 x1 +1.4 x2 + 3.3x3 +0.6 x4 + 1.0 x5 
Z = -1.61 
Where: 
X1 = 0.68 being the percentage of working capital / total assets. 
X2 = - 0.57 being the percentage of retained earnings / total assets. 
X3 = -0.56 being the percentage of earnings before interest plus taxes /total assets. 
X4 = - 0.36 being the percentage of equity / total liabilities. 
X5 = 0.44 being the percentage of sales / total assets. 
 
A score above 3.0 indicates financial soundness, whereas a score below 1.81 indicates 
significant credit and viability difficulties, and points to financial distress and probable 
bankruptcy. A score between 1.81 and 3.0 indicates question marks, suggesting 
immediate curatorship or bank restructuring. The CDH score of –1.61, below 1.81, caused 





4.2.2    Sagit Finance House Limited 
 
Background 
Sagit Finance House came into being with the incorporation of Sunpol Finance House 
Limited in 2002.  The new institution was issued with a licence to operate as a finance 
house on 18 August 2003.  
 
Its main function was to conduct the business of financiers, investors, and a finance house. 
It was to invest funds at interest on the security of freehold land, shares securities and any 
other properties, whether movable or immovable.  In July 2004 the name Sunpol Finance 
was changed to Sagit Finance House Limited (SFH) following the acquisition of 51% of 
the financially-distressed Sunpol Finance Company Limited  by Sagit Financial Holdings 
(Private) Limited [Sagit Finance House Limited (2005) Liquidator’s Forensic Report].  
The structure of the holding company is shown below in figure 4.2.1: 
 















      Source: Sagit Finance House Limited Liquidator’s Forensic Report (2005), Office of 




Holdings (Private) Limited 
Sagit Finance 
House Limited  
(51%) 
Sagit Stockbrokers (Private) 
Limited 
(65%) 
Sagit Advisory Services(Private) 
Limited 
(100%) 
SFG Holdings Limited 
(63%) 
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The shareholding structure of Sagit Financial Holding, which had a 51% equity stake in 
the finance house, was as follows: 
 
Table 4.2.5 SFHL Shareholding Structure 




Anderson Executors 9.7% 
Rinashe 8.8% 
Management and staff 5.7% 
Maramba 4.0% 
Ascona 3.2% 
C&F Investments 3.2% 
Polyoak Investments 3.2% 






Source: SFH Liquidator’s Forensic Report (2005), Office of Master of High Court, 
Zimbabwe, p. 7 
 
        Table 4.2.6SFHL Board Members  
 
Name of Director Designation 
Nyagura Non-Executive Chairman 
Mupotsa Non-Executive Deputy Chairman 
Rinashe CEO of SAGIT Financial Holdings 
Nyamambi Managing Director (executive) 
Kainga Non-Executive  
Muronda Treasury Director (executive) 
Source: SFH Liquidator’s Forensic Report (2005), Office of Master of High Court, 
Zimbabwe, p.7 
 
Table 4.2.7 SFHL Non-Board Members  
 
Name of Director Designation 
Makwamure Chief Finance Officer 
Zvirevo Lending Director 
Source: SFH Liquidator’s Forensic Report (2005Office of Master of High Court, 
Zimbabwe, p.7 
 
All shareholders of SFHL were also direct investors in SFH in their own right. 
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The researcher maintains that the Reserve Bank should have checked and analysed the 
integrity and credibility of the shareholders of both SFHL and SFH before the acquisition 
of Sunpol, since it was an institution administering depositor’s funds. From the outset 
there were clear corporate governance deficiencies, and unfortunately the monetary 
authorities failed to detect them [Sagit Finance House Limited (2005) Liquidator’s 
Forensic Report].  Table 4.2.8 below shows the effective shareholding structure of the 
finance house, after taking into account the direct and indirect equity holdings of all 
shareholders: 
 









Sagit Financial Holdings (Pvt) 
Ltd 
51.0% -  
Kainga 7.92% 8.16% 16.08% 
Gwena 7.92% 8.16% 16.08% 
Nhodza 4.90% 14.10% 19.00% 
Anderson Executor & Trust 4.85% 4.90% 9.75% 
Rinashe 4.44%  4.48% 8.93% 
Gope Investments P/L (Nhodza) 4.41% - - 
Trust Nominees (Holdings staff & 
Management)  
2.86% 2.89% 5.75% 
Ascona Holdings  
(foreign company in BVI) 
1.63% 1.64% 3.27% 
Maramba  1.59% 2.04% 3.63% 
Nare 1.59% 1.60% 3.19% 
C&F Investments  
(Mutyambizi) 
1.56% 1.62% 3.18% 
Polyoak Investments  
(Mutangadura) 
1.56% 1.62% 3.18% 
Goredema 1.27% 1.62% 2.89% 
Zvirevo 1.27% 1.29% 2.56% 
Wallbridge 1.13% 1.14% 2.27% 
Goredema 0.10% 0.14% 0.24% 
Total 100%  100% 
Source: SFH Liquidator’s Forensic Report (2005), Office of Master of High Court, 





On 2 March 2006 the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe officially closed the business operations 
of SFH with a view to minimizing financial losses to the depositors.  On 21 March the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe filed a court application to place it under provisional 
liquidation. The provisional order was granted on 12 April, and confirmed as final on 7 
June [Sagit Finance House Limited (2005) Liquidator’s Forensic Report]. 
 
Key Findings 
In September 2004 the group CEO, Gwena (also a 16% shareholder), issued a financial 
guarantee to Guardian Asset Management (Private) Limited (GAM) for a ZW$11.8billion 
loan that was advanced to Wedzera Petroleum Company, without adhering to the dictates 
of prudent corporate governance principles [Sagit Finance House Limited (2005) 
Liquidator’s Forensic Report].  There was no apparent benefit to Sagit Finance Limited 
(SFin). In May 2005 the former group CEO, Maramba coerced SFH top management to 
novate the Zim$11.8billion Wedzera debt into money market placement with SFin, 
thereby exposing it to a liquidity and solvency risk, given the amount involved in 
comparison to the capital base. 
 
Between October 2005 and January 2006 the group acting CEO of SFH, Rinashe, by 
means of numerous violations of statutory and banking regulations, caused irreparable 
damage to SFin in the form of a loss of ZW$66.6 billion, especially through the following 
prejudicial banking transactions in table 4.2.9: 
 
Table 4.2.9 Prejudicial Banking Transactions 
 
Prejudicial transactions Zim$ Parties 
Liquidations of part of TBs 2 900 000 000 Maramba 
Novation of GAM debt 14 120 000 000 Maramba 
Transfers to admin account 8 000 000 000  Rinashe & Mufudze 
Payment to PBC 16 600 000 000 Rinashe & CFO 
Transfer from Sfin trading account 5 592 842 612 Rinashe & Mufudze 
Transfer from Sfin trading account 6 400 000 000 Rinashe & Mufudze 
Liquidations of TBs 30 000 000 000 Rinashe 
Transfers of assets/ liabilities 12 482 528 772 Masenda & Maramba 
GAM Interest  36 720 000 000 Marimba & Rinashe 
Total Zim$ 132 815 371 384   
 
 Source: SFH Liquidator’s Forensic Report (2005),Office of Master of High Court, 
Zimbabwe, p.19. 
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The Zimbabwe Banking Act (Chapter 24:20), which regulates banking institutions, does 
not regulate holding institutions that are parent to financial institutions.  In this case the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe regulated SFin, but not SFH.  The top management of SFH 
therefore violated ethical codes of conduct, knowing very well that they were not under the 
supervision of the monetary authorities. 
 
In June 2006 the liquidator of SFin instituted both criminal and civil proceedings against 
SFH and its top management.  Some months before the court hearings in February2007 the 
respondents offered settlement to pay an amount of Zim$132.8billion, in order to 
discharge the total shortfall outstanding in High Court of Zimbabwe proceedings (case 
number HC/249/07).While most depositors eventually received all their funds, the money 
had lost value due to high inflationary pressures and the ‘time value of money’. 
 
The researcher believes that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe should have carried out a 
detailed examination of the relationships, reputation and credibility of shareholders of 
Sagit Finance House Limited before issuing a banking licence.  From this qualitative 
analysis it is clear that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe should focus not only on the 
management team, but also on shareholders’ credibility and reputation.   
 In addition, none of the shareholders of SFin possessed the financial resources to 
recapitalise the banking institution at the critical moment of financial distress.  The 
shareholders of SFin, and top management were no more than a group of intertwined and 
unethical speculators. 
 
Analysis of Sagit Finance House Limited Using CAMELS Ratings 
(a) Capital Adequacy  
From the date of incorporation the institution experienced capitalisation difficulties, and 
recorded the lowest capital levels of all the banking institutions.  Apparently SFin was one 
of the two institutions that failed to meet the stipulated Zim$75 billion in new capital.  The 
institution was critically undercapitalized, with a negative capital base of Zim$93.1 billion.  
The capital deficit was attributable to a loss of Zim$106.09 billion, arising from a 




The adjusted capital base for the institution on 31 December 2005 was as depicted in table 
4.2.10 below: 
Table 4.2.10 SFH Capital Adequacy 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY Zim$ million 
Ordinary Paid-Up Share Capital 300 
Share Premium 14,939 
Retained Loss (previous years) (7,483) 
Retained Loss (current year) (106,097) 
Tier 1 Capital (98,341) 
Tier 2 Capital 860 
Tier 3 Capital 4,419* 
Net Capital Base Zim$(93,061) 
 
* This refers to capital allocated to operational risk. 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Report  of Examination, (2006) p.24                                                                
 
For the institution to have achieved a 10% capital adequacy ratio a total capital injection of 
Zim103.56 billion would have been required: Zim$93.01billion to cover the capital deficit 
and Zim$10.5 billion to achieve the minimum capital adequacy ratio of 10%.   
 
In addition, the institution’s shareholders were required to inject a minimum of 
Zim$853.56 billion by 30 September 2006 to comply with the US dollar-linked minimum 
capital requirement of Zim$750 billion for finance houses. 
 
The examination by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe on 13 February 2006 noted that there 
was conflict between the major shareholders, which compromised their ability to inject the 
required capital. An example of this was the protracted legal wrangle between Anderson 
Executors & Trust and Nhodza. 
 
(b) Asset Quality  
Ninety-five per cent of the total loan book of Zim$123.79 billion consisted of adversely 
classified loans with significant risk.  The top management of SFin admitted to the 
officials of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe that contingent liabilities of Zim$108.41 
billion from the holding company (SHL) had been crystallised. 
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Asset quality was therefore very weak, on the basis of high levels of non-performing 
insider loans, poor credit sanctioning and ineffective internal control systems, lack of 
board and senior management oversight, poor risk-management systems, and inadequate 
loan loss provisions. 
 
(c) Management 
Management was very passive, as evidenced by the total collapse of corporate governance 
structures, lack of effective board and senior management oversight, unorthodox insider 
dealings, poor risk-management systems and practices, and poor financial performance of 
the institution. The board was weak, passive and indecisive, and had a tendency to leave 
important policy decisions to senior management, and then absolving itself of 
responsibility and accountability [Sagit Finance House Limited (2005) Liquidator’s 
Report]. 
 
From the date of incorporation the institution experienced a high turnover of both board 
members and senior management.  Furthermore, the institution failed to attract new board 
members. There was no clear business turnaround strategy for improving the financial 
position.  Management relied on disunited shareholders with poor business acumen 
[Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2006), Report of Examination]. 
 
(d) Earnings 
SFin incurred a loss of Zim$106.10 billion for the year ended 31 December 2005, due 
mainly to a provisioning shortfall of Zim$111.85 billion. The losses were mainly attributed 
to a large portfolio of non-performing insider loans and other ill-structured, underhand 
deals initiated by the holding company, SFH. 
 
The top management of SFin actually advised officials from the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe on or about 16 February 2006 that the institution’s profitability had been 
sacrificed for liquidity.  They said: “At the moment there is no meaningful business to 
generate sustainable returns”, according to the forensic report prepared by THC. Earnings 
and provisions were therefore critical.  The loss position resulted in the erosion of the 




Liquidity and Funds Management 
In this situation management of liquidity and funds was critical because of the negative 
liquidity gaps in all the time bands, and the use of depositors’ funds to meet the obligations 
of the holding company.  The institution reported an understated gap of Zim$50.2 billion 
on 6 February 2006.  However, the actual gap on the same date, after taking into account 
the holding company transactions, amounted to Zim$144.77 billion. The overall condition 
of the institution was therefore rated “5” on 31 December 2005, indicating a critical 
condition on the basis of the negative capital base, marginal profitability, non-performing 
loan book, the liquidity crisis and the collapse of corporate governance systems and 
structures. 
 
(f)     Sensitivity to Market Risk 
Rapid changes in interest and foreign exchange rates, commodity and equity prices and 
operational costs adversely affected SFin’s earnings, as the institutions became too 
sensitive to the economic, social and political problems in Zimbabwe.  The major 
shareholders failed to re-capitalize the business at the most critical time.  Management was 
therefore unable to secure material, human or financial resources, or to identify, measure, 
monitor or control exposures to market risk.  
 
The complexity of interest rate risk exposures arising from non-trading positions was very 
high.  In addition, the sensitivity of both earnings and economic value of capital to adverse 
economic and political changes, i.e., to market risk, was also very high. Below is a 
tabulated summary of the position of Sagit Finance House Limited on 31 December 2005: 
 
Table 4.2.11 Summary of the position of Sagit Finance House Limited31 December 
2005. 
Latest CAMELS Ratios 
CAMELS Component On 31 December 2005 
Capital Adequacy 5 
Asset Quality 5 
Management 5 
Earnings & Provisions 5 
Liquidity & Funds Management 5 
Sensitivity to Market Risk 5 
Composite Rating 5 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2006), Report of Examination of Sagit Finance House 
Limited]. 
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 Qualitative Analysis - BICEPS Model    
(a) Business Strategy Analysis  
The key profit driver of a finance house in Zimbabwe is to carry out the business of 
financiers and investors by investing money at interest on the security of freehold land and 
shares, securities and any other properties, whether movable or immovable.  SFH, by 
contrast, offered a broad range of lending facilities, consisting mainly of corporate lending, 
finance leases, operating leases and customised lease structures.  In addition, SFH also 
offered a number of treasury products, which included retail banking and money market 
instruments trading. The adjusted profit position on 31 December 2005 was as shown 
below: 
 
Table 4.2.12 SFH Adjusted Income Statement on 31 December 2005 
Adjusted Income Statement on 31 December 2005 Zim$m 
Interest income 59,641.00 
Interest expenses (35,168.00) 
Net interest income 24,473.00 
Non-interest income 464.00 
Operating expenses (19,184.00) 
Provisioning shortfall* (111,850.00) 
Net Loss for the year (106,097.00) 
  
*Breakdown of shortfall:  
Premier banking  $64.24 
Stanbic/Sagit Financial Holdings $19.00 
Provisioning shortfall arising from promissory notes and 
reclassification of loans 
 
$28.61 
Total shortfall on provisions $111.85 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Report of Examination, (2006) p.21 
 
The provisions shortfall arose from non-performing insider loans initiated at the holding 
company level.  Interest expenses contributed 68% of total expenses, while staff costs 








In view of the excessive reliance on income from non-core business, the quality and 
consistency of earnings was compromised, particularly with the volatility of interest rates.  
The pie chart below (figure 4.2.2) shows the institution’s income mix for the year ended 
31December 2005: 
 














Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Report of Examination, (2006) p.23 
 
The excessive reliance by the institution on income from non-core business, and the 
continued high-level treasury activities in income contributions, reflected the inability of 
SFH to grow a quality loan book for generating sustainable earnings. The top management 
failed completely to formulate a unique and sustainable business strategy, in compliance 
with banking regulations and guidelines.   
 
(b) Internal Control Systems Analysis  
The fraud by SFH shareholders and Group CEO’s in siphoning funds from SFH, Stanbic 
Bank Zimbabwe Limited trading account and money market placements resulted in a drain 
of Zim$66.592 billion from depositors’ funds. In one instance Rinashe, in collaboration 
with Mufudze, circumvented SFin’s other signatories, and between October 2005 and 
January 2006 they defrauded the institution of Zim$66.592 billion [Sagit Finance House 





Income mix for the year ended 31 December 2005 
Loans & Leases    Other   Investments & securities 
35% 
2% 63% 
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Because of the lack of internal control systems, SFHL initiated unsustainable funding 
structures, which later caused the collapse of SFH.  For example, on 16 May 2006, the 
former CEO of SFin, Maramba, novated a Zim$14.12 billion Guardian Asset Management 
debt into money market placement, with no subsequent cash inflows into SFH. 
 
(c)      Corporate Governance Analysis 
Corporate governance structure deficiencies were caused by the incestuous relationship 
between SFH and SFH, which compromised the operational independence of the SFH 
board and management.  SFHL’s interference in SFH exposed it to high liquidity risk, as 
well as risking the security of the depositors’ funds. 
 
There was no clear separation of the managements of the holding company and the finance 
house, and business deals were sealed by the holding company on behalf of the finance 
house. The institution also operated without effective committees such as the Audit and 
Risk Management Committee, Creditors/Liabilities Committee, Management Committee 
and Business Development Committee.  Most non-executive directors were not 
independent of the holding company, other shareholders or the executive directors.  
Consequently, there was total corporate governance collapse and lack of continuity, as 
evidenced by a high turnover of board members and senior management in 2005 [Sagit 
Finance House Limited (2005) Liquidator’s Report]. This is illustrated by the following 
table 4.2.13: 
 
Table 4.2.13Turnover of Board Members and Senior Management in 2005 
Individual  Status Date of Resignation 
Wisper Gwena  Non-Executive Director July 2005 
Paul Nare Finance Director April 2005 
Stanford Maramba Non-Executive Director (Group. CEO) October 2005 
Cleopas Makoni Non-Executive Director December 2005 
Nick Nyamambi Managing Director 28 February 2006 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Report of Examination (2006)p.31 
 






(e) Ethics In Business Analysis  
SFin’s top management failed to formulate and implement basic business ethics principles 
in the fight against fraud.  It also failed to develop (still less implement) a code of ethical 
conduct.  For example, the depositors’ funds, some of them of pensioners, were used to 
pay off obligations of the holding company SFH.  An amount of Zim$19 billion, for 
instance, was debited from the SFin treasury account in December 2005 to pay Stanbic 
Bank [Sagit Finance House Limited (2005) Liquidator’s Report].This necessitated an 
unauthorised overdraft on the account of SFH.  Also, the GAM investment account with 
the finance house indicated that a number of huge withdrawals were made from this 
account.  
These were actually made on the instructions of the CEO of SFH.  Some of the 
withdrawals are shown in the table 4.2.14 below: 
 
Table 4.2.14.  SFH Withdrawal of Funds 
Maturity Date Maturity Value 
Zim $billions 
Type of Withdrawal 
18/07/05 18.23 Transfer to Stanbic 
 
21/10/05 17.35 Transfer to Premier Bank 
Corporation 
21/10/05 15.72 Transfer to J.W. Jaggers 
 
26/10/05 16.35 Transfer to Anderson 
Executors and Trust 
10/11/05 10.67 Early redemption 
 
Total   78  
 Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Report of Examination (2006) p.39 
 
Several other withdrawals, including early redemptions, were made on different dates, 
totalling Zim$29.46 billion.  This was unethical conduct on the part of the major 








(e)     Participation of All Stakeholders Analysis  
All stakeholders were never consulted, if only to hear their views. The management and 
employees of SFH were side-lined.  The depositors or their representatives were never 
involved in strategic decision-making, despite their contribution of about 80% of the 
institutions’ revenue.  The stakeholders were not supplied with accurate information for 
decision-making purposes. 
 
The core business of SFH was lease finance.  The lending book was financed largely by 
depositors’ funds.  The hyper-inflationary environment affected the viability of the lease 
finance business.  The institution had insufficient information technology to manage their 
loan book.  Loans were thus computed manually, a situation susceptible to errors and 
manipulation [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2006), Report of Examination on Sagit Finance 
House Limited]. 
 
Sagit Asset Management, in collusion with SFHL officials, concealed a Zim$30 billion 
gap between its assets and liabilities in a payout plan erroneously approved by the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe on 30 August 2005.  The researcher believes that the RBZ acted 
without correct and detailed information.  The RBZ also lacked the capacity to carry out a 
detailed forensic audit and analysis of documents at that time. 
 
(f) Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis 
SFH top management failed to safeguard the deposits of the investing public.  Ineffective 
internal control systems resulted in outright siphoning of depositors’ funds from the SFH 
trading and administration account to SFHL for the benefit of particular shareholders.  The 
interests of the customers were thus violated.  The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, as the 
monetary authority representing the government, was never consulted or informed about 
questionable transactions that took place between SFH and SFHL [Sagit Finance House 








The Zimbabwe Revenue Authority was deprived of a source of revenue following the 
liquidation of SFin on 12 April 2006.  Employees’ and management’s interests of job 
security and other benefits connected with employment were disregarded.  Lack of 
motivation resulted in the decrease of the revenue base and the value of the business.  
Dissatisfaction resulted in lack of co-operation by all stakeholders, and so the institution 
was placed under liquidation on 12 April 2006 [Sagit Finance House Limited (2006) 
Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
Below is a tabulated summary of the position of SFH on 31 December 2005 using the 
BICEPS model: 
 
Table 4.2.15 Summary of the Position of Sagit Finance House Limited on 31 
December 2005 – using BICEPS Model 
Biceps Component Asset at 31 December 2008 
 Business Strategy Analysis F’6’ 
 Internal Control Systems Analysis F’6’ 
 Corporate Governance Analysis F’6’ 
 Ethics In Business Analysis F’6’ 
 Participation of Stakeholders Analysis F’6’ 
 Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis F’6’ 
Composite Rating F’6’ 
 
ALTMAN Z – Score Model for Sagit Finance House Limited based on 31 December 2005 
financial statement was -13.45 as shown below: 
Z = 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 + 0.6x4 + 1.0x5 
Z = - 13.45 
Where: 
X1 = -0.86 is the percentage of working capital to total assets. 
X2  = -3.00 is the percentage of retained earnings to total asserts. 
X3 = -3.00 is the percentage of earnings before interest plus taxes/total assets. 
X4 = -0.45 is the percentage of equity to total liabilities. 
X5 =1.95 is the percentage of sales to total assets. 
With a score of, -13.45, so far below the cut-off of 1.81, liquidation was inevitable. Sagit was, 
accordingly, placed under liquidation on 12 April 2006. 
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4.2.3  Platinum Asset Managers (Private) Limited 
 
Background 
Platinum Asset Managers (Private) Limited was incorporated on 19 February 2003.  The 
main objective was to carry out the business of asset management, promoting and 
managing unit trusts.  The institution operated without a banking licence, and was placed 
under liquidation on 7April 2004. 
 
It is not clear why the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe failed to stop the institution from 
operating for almost thirteen months without a banking licence.  Members of the public 
who had invested funds with it lost their investments. 
 
According to an affidavit by one of the directors, Magaya, filed with the High Court of 
Zimbabwe (case number HC2878/04) for a provisional order winding up the institution, it 
was no longer viable for it to continue trading as a result of the withdrawal of trading 
limits by some of the institution’s counter parties. This led to the institution ceasing to 
trade in early December 2003.It thus accumulated a substantial overdraft in its trading 
account.  As a result, it was forced to dispose of its trading assets at a loss in order to 
liquidate the overdraft.  This shows that the institution operated without an effective and 
sustainable business strategy. 
 
By 31 December 2003 the institution had incurred a loss of Zim$249 930 839.00.  The 
situation remained unchanged for January 2004.  It did not trade in January as it was 
awaiting the granting of its Asset Management Licence by the Reserve Bank.  During this 
month the institution suffered a loss of Zim$1 350 972 987.00  
 
In February 2004 the institution incurred a further loss of Zim$368 842 270.00.  There was 
a clear mismatch in interest earned in December 2003 and January 2004. The institution 
earned Zim$19 411 305.00 in interest, whereas the interest it paid for the investments 
placed with it amounted to Zim$803 424 986.00. In that respect alone it suffered a loss of 




To show more clearly how the mismatch in interest earned and paid affected the 
profitability of the business, in December 2003itpaid out interest of Zim$1 987 875 
128.00,as against interest received of Zim$ 2 355 441 601. 00 
 
Liquidity had also been seriously affected by the collapse of Century Discount House, with 
which it had placed some investments. As a result of CDH’s collapse, the institution had 
been exposed to the amount of Zim$939 000 000.00 in respect of matured investment 
which could not be paid immediately. 
 
Risk-management policies were thus very poor a substantial amount was placed with a 
single institution without obtaining first-class security to protect the depositors’ funds. 
 
Qualitative Analysis using the BICEPS Model  
(a) Business Strategy Analysis 
Platinum raised most of its revenue from the public (depositors).  Depositors’ funds, which 
constituted about 95% of revenue, were, diverted to non-banking activities, which did not 
result in sustainable profitability.  The company operated without an effective business 
strategy, and as a result failed to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage.  It failed to 
identify key profit drivers and business risks associated with asset management. 
 
Platinum Asset Management failed completely to create a unique and sustainable position 
involving a different but legal set of activities within its market segment.  As a result, it 
could not increase its market share, profitability, and promote business growth.  The 
institution also failed to obtain a banking licence before its liquidation on 7 April 2004. 
 
(b) Internal Control Systems Analysis 
Platinum failed completely to keep proper books of accounts as required by section 140 of 







On 29October 2003, Platinum Financial Holdings (Private) Limited borrowed 
Zim$250million from Platinum Asset Managers.  There was no proof of this having been 
paid back.  On 23 July 2003 a cheque for Zim$100million was issued in favour of 
Forebank Financial Services, supposedly to meet “brokerage fees”.  There was also no 
evidence of transactions to justify such brokerage fees, nor was there any explanation of 
what actually transpired prior to this cheque being issued [Platinum Asset Managers 
(Private) Limited, (2004) Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
The researcher considers that these ‘fees’ were too high for any sort of brokerage, 
especially considering the size of the operations of Platinum Asset Managers. 
 
Platinum Asset Managers also provided a bridging loan of Zim$100million to Oilex 
(Private) Limited in October 2003.  Oilex provided collateral security in foreign currency 
as follows: 
o US $17300 was made available on 1 October 2003. 
o SAR 37 000 (South African Rands) was deposited into the Platinum Financial Holdings’ 
African Banking Corporation account in Botswana instead of Platinum Asset Manager 
account. 
Apparently the Zim$100million advanced to Oilex (Private) Limited was paid in the form 
of a bank-certified cheque issued by First Banking Corporation Limited, under instructions 
from Platinum Asset Managers’ top management. 
 
According to the forensic audit report prepared by Imperial Consultants (Private) Limited 
at the request of the liquidator of Platinum Asset Managers, there was no evidence 
whatsoever to indicate that the Zim$110 191 780.82 (plus interest) due on 31 October 
2003 was paid back on that date or at any time thereafter [Platinum Asset Managers 
(Private) Limited, (2004) Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
The institution failed completely to formulate and implement watertight internal control 
systems, or to safeguard its assets.  By 31 March 2004, Platinum Asset Managers was 





The Liquidator threatened both criminal and civil action against the top management of 
Platinum Asset Managers.  On 14 December 2007 the management paid an amount of 
Zim$555 236 186.65 for the benefit of the depositors. While most of the depositors 
eventually received all their funds, the money had lost value due to high inflation and the 
“time value of money” [Platinum Asset Managers (Private) Limited, (2004) Liquidator’s 
Report]. 
 
(c) Corporate Governance Analysis 
The top management lacked the level of integrity and competence to manage a banking 
institution.  The company operated without independent non-executive directors. Its 
corporate governance structures failed to set up effective governance committees such 
Business Development, Audit and Risk Management, Assets/Liabilities and Recruitment 
and Human Resources Development Committees.  Platinum Asset Managers lacked the 
checks and balances to ensure that directors and managers operated in the best interests of 
all stakeholders by optimising returns and minimising risk, and also abuse of power by 
leaders and the majority shareholders. 
 
The majority shareholders, instead of making sure that the bank obtained a licence or to 
recapitalise the business, decided instead to steal depositors’ funds.  Platinum Asset 
Managers and its holding company shared the same directors and shareholders.  
Independent non-executive, directors and internal and external auditors, were never 
appointed.  This was, of course, an unacceptable situation for a banking institution 
managing public funds. 
 
(d) Ethics In Business Analysis 
Platinum Asset Managers top management failed to apply basic business ethics in the fight 
against fraud.  They failed to develop and implement a code of ethics.  A foreign currency 
account, for example, was opened with African Banking Corporation in Botswana in 
September 2003 in the name of Platinum Financial Holdings, the major shareholder 
(account number BWPALT001CALUSD0001).     Another account was likewise opened 
in the name of Lepound Investments (Private) Limited (account number 
BWPLEP0002CALUSD0009) at the same time.  Again, the resolution and mandate were 
signed by the directors of Platinum Asset Managers (Private) Limited [Platinum Asset 
Managers (Private) Limited, (2004) Liquidator’s Report]. 
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The Platinum Financial Holdings account was closed on 8 March 2004 (the same day a 
special resolution was passed by the directors to liquidate Platinum Asset Managers) and 
the money transferred to the Lepound Investments’ Account.  Later, US$26 000 was 
transferred from the Lepound Investment Account to Topnet Trading Limited’s bank 
account with Lloyd’s TSB in the UK.  There was no evidence of any records from the 
accounting system pertaining to the ultimate fate of this foreign currency held in GB 
Pounds, US Dollars and South African Rands, equivalent to US$ 109 182 in total.  Nor 
was there any sign of material business capital expenditure or purchases to warrant the 
total consumption of this money. 
 
Clearly, externalisation of such foreign currency was in breach of the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe’s exchange control regulations, and hence a motive for concealing these foreign 
currencies and the activities related to them. 
 
The conduct by the top management was unethical and certainly not in the best interests of 
the company. 
 
(e) Participation Of All Stakeholders Analysis 
Most of the key stakeholders, such as the depositors, The Reserve Bank and the employees 
were not consulted in the strategic decision-making process.  For example, the company 
operated for almost 13 months without a banking licence and without informing the 
investing public, employees, business associates and the Reserve Bank of this. Key 
stakeholders were also not involved in the appointment of non-executive and independent 
directors.  Employees and management, for example, talk to customers almost daily.  The 
institution is therefore expected to share information with employees and management, 
and to use such information as a basis of formulating and implementing a business strategy 
[Platinum Asset Managers (Private) Limited, (2004) Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
Stakeholders therefore have the right to participate actively in the business activities of an 
institution. Their interests may be affected, positively or negatively, by good or poor 





(f) Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis 
Funds were used to buy foreign currency for the benefit of management and shareholders.  
The Zimbabwe Revenue Authority was deprived of a source of revenue following the 
liquidation of Platinum Asset Managers.  Employees interests of job security and other 
benefits connected with employment were treated with contempt. 
 
The researcher maintains that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe should have stopped the 
institution from operating without a banking licence.  The RBZ also failed the depositors 
and the public by allowing shareholders without adequate capital to register a financial 
institution.  In addition, the top management lacked the integrity, business acumen and 
competence to manage depositors’ funds.  It follows, therefore, that the interests of most of 
the stakeholders were not satisfied.  
 
Below is a tabulated summary of the position of Platinum Asset Mangers (Private) Limited 
on 31 March 2004 using the BICEPS Model: 
 
Table 4.2.16 Summary of the Position of Platinum Asset Managers (Private) Limited 
on 31 March 2004 using the BICEPS Model 
BICEPS Component on 31 March 2004 
 Business Strategy Analysis F’6’ 
 Internal Control Systems Analysis F’6’ 
 Corporate Governance Analysis F’6’ 
 Ethics In Business Analysis F’6’ 
 Participation of All Stakeholders Analysis F’6’ 
 Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis F’6’ 














4.2.4    Rapid Discount House Limited 
Background 
Rapid Discount House Limited (RDH) was incorporated on 11 September 1997.  The 
institution’s certificate of registration as a discount house was issued by the Registrar of 
Banks and Financial Institutions on 15 October 1997.The main function was to carry out 
the business of discounting bills and purchasing short–term investments. 
 
The institution’s authorised capital was Zim$200 000 000.00, comprising 200 000 000 
ordinary shares of Zim$1.00 each.  All the shares were issued, and the institution was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Rapid Financial Holdings Limited (RFH).  On 31 July 2004 
the shareholders of RFH were as follows: 
 
Shareholder    Number of Shares  % 
Rapid Financial Holdings Limited 200 000 000   100 
 
On 31 July 2004 the shareholders of Rapid Financial Holdings Limited were: 
 
Table 4.2.17Shareholders of Rapid Financial Holdings Limited 
Shareholder No. of shares % Beneficiary 
Highgate Investments P/L 500 000 25  Musuwo 
Rapid Investment P/L 480 000 24 Nhema 
Catchemount Investments P/L 500 000 25  Promoters of  RDH 
Employee Share Option Scheme 200 000 10 Staff 
Sachmore Investment P/L 170 000 8.5 Sachikonye 
Blue Falcon Investments P/L 50 000 2.5 Chiromo 
Mugwara  50 000 2.5 Mugwara 
Estate Late Dambe 50 000 2.5 E/L Dambe 
 2 000 000 100  
 
Source: Rapid Discount House Limited Liquidator’s Report (2004) Master Office of 




The researcher is convinced that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe should have examined 
and analyzed the integrity and credibility of the shareholders of both RDH and RFH before 
issuing its banking licence on 15 October 1997.  It is apparent from the above table that 
RDH was indirectly owned by a group of individuals without the financial or material 
resources to recapitalise the business of a banking institution. 
 
On 26 March 2004 the RBZ placed Rapid Discount Limited under curatorship, having 
established that the company was no longer in a sound financial condition.  It was hoped 
that RDH would recapitalize or overcome its liquidity and solvency difficulties and 
become a successful business.  It was also hoped that recapitalisation would be achieved 
through a combination of factors, such as introducing additional funding from the existing 
and new shareholders, and through a debt-equity swap between the existing shareholders 
and the major creditors. 
 
Rapid Discount House Limited failed to attract new investors while under curatorship, and 
as a result it was placed under liquidation on 25 August 2004. 
 
According to the final report prepared by the curator on 19 July 2004, the prospective 
investors considered the funding requirements of the institution as “too big to make an 
investment in RDH viable”. In other words, it was not worthwhile. At the same time the 
existing shareholders “were unwilling and unable to put up the required capital”.  As a 
result, the curator recommended to the RBZ that the institution be placed under 
liquidation. 
 
Qualitative Analysis – Using BICEPS Model 
 
a) Business Strategy Analysis 
The key profit drivers of a discount house are to carry out the business of discounting bills 
and purchase of short term investments. RDH, in contrast, had the investing public as the 






According to the Liquidator (2004),top management departed from the core business.  
They imprudently invested depositors’ funds in speculative activities and issued non–
performing loans.  Funds were granted to borrowers without signed Acknowledgement of 
Debt Forms.  No follow-ups were made on unserviced loans.  All this created huge 
negative liquidity mismatches, which resulted in the institution failing to meet maturing 
obligations.  Inevitably, this led to the collapse of the institution, as happened on 25 
August 2004. 
 
b) Internal Control Systems Analysis 
Section 140, subsection (1) of the Zimbabwe Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) requires 
institutions to keep proper books of accounts.  Subsection (2) of the Act further requires 
the books to give a true and fair view of the institution’s affairs and explanations of its 
transactions. 
 
According to the Liquidator (2004) of RDH; “the existence of deliberate and misleading 
entries in the institution’s financial records compel us to comment that for the purpose of 
the said section 140 of the Zimbabwe Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) the institution did 
not keep proper books of account and (sic) watertight internal control systems”. 
 
c) Corporate Governance Analysis  
According to the Liquidator (2004), “the institution collapsed mainly as a result of gross 
mismanagement.  The institution’s business was not conducted with a high level of 
integrity and professional diligence”.  At the date of liquidation the institution operated 
with two executive directors, Mwaturura and Mugwara, with no independent non–
executive directors.  Messrs Musuwo (former MD), Chinamasa (former Deputy MD) and 
Dambe were removed from the board and from management of the institution by order of 









The institution failed to establish effective corporate governance structures such as 
Business Development, Audit and Risk Management, Assets/Liabilities or Recruitment 
and Human Resources Development Committees.  These committees should, of course, be 
chaired by competent, qualified and independent professionals.  The majority of members 
in such committees are also required to be completely independent of executive directors 
and majority shareholders. Owing to mis-governance, RDH lacked the checks and 
balances for directors and managers to operate in the best interests of all stakeholders as 
described above.  As a result, the institution was placed under liquidation, at the expense 
of all stakeholders. 
 
d) Ethics in Business Analysis  
RDH failed to apply basic business ethics in the fight against mis-allocation of financial 
resources and fraud.  Top management also failed to develop and implement a code of 
ethics in order to promote business growth; for example, in November 2003, RDH 
participated in the purchase of debentures in Capital Alliance (Private) Limited.  
Depositors’ funds of Zim$4.2 billion were invested.  Fourteen months later (January, 
2005) the liquidator of RDH received onlyZim$2.3 billion in full and final settlement. The 
depositors thus lost both capital and the opportunity to earn open market interests or 
returns. This conduct was grossly unethical, and in flagrant violation of the best interests 
















Table 4.2 18 Schedule of Assets and Liabilities of RDH on 31 August 2004 (Zim$) 
 
Assets Estimated Value 
Motor Vehicles 1 239 371 149.62 
Bank Balances     849 474 100.74 
Treasury Bills 2 918 723 644.45 
Bankers Acceptances 4 700 000 000.00 
NOCZIM Bills   462 000 000.00 
Quoted Shares 992 046 533.00 
Debtors 11 000 000 000.00 
Office Furniture and Equipment                           88 277 757.08 
 Zim$ 22 279 893 184.89 
Liabilities  
Depositors funds 42 192 412 623.00 
Overdraft 3 467 872 792.92 
ZIMRA Potential Claim 424 000 000.00 
Claim by Employees 84 689 941.70 
 168 975 387.62 
Net (Liabilities) (24 000 000 000.00) 
 Zim$  22 279 893 184.89 
  
 Source: RDH Liquidator’s Report (2004)Office of Master of High Court, Zimbabwe,     
pp.1-13 
 
It is clear from the above that the business of RDH was financed mainly from the 
depositors’ funds of Zim$42.1 billion.  The main asset was non–performing debtors of 
Zim$11 billion.  The conduct of business was unethical from the beginning in 1997, and 
by August 2004 it was insolvent, and accordingly placed under liquidation. 
 
e) Participation Of All Stakeholders  Analysis  
Most of the key stakeholders, such as the depositors, the Reserve Bank and employees 
were never consulted in the strategic decision-making process.  For example, public funds 
were used to finance its non-banking activities.  Key stakeholders did not participate in the 
appointment of committee members, non–executive and independent directors.  The 







f) Stakeholders’ Satisfaction Analysis  
The top management failed completely to safeguard the deposits of the investing public.  
Instead, these funds were used to finance non-banking activities at the expense of the 
depositors.  The Zimbabwe Revenue Authority was deprived of a source of revenue 
following the liquidation of RDH in August 2004.  Employees’ interests of job security 
and other fringe benefits connected with employment were treated with disrespect. 
Creditors also failed to recover almost 65% of their funds.  Top management lacked the 
integrity, business acumen or competence to manage the depositors’ funds. As a result, the 
institution failed to increase market share or to promote business growth.  Clearly, the 
interests of most stakeholders were never satisfied.  Below is a tabulated summary of the 
position of RDH on 31 August 2004: 
 
Table 4.2.19 Summary of the Position of RDH on 31 August 2004. 
BICEPS Component 31 August 2004 
 Business Strategy – Analysis F ‘6’ 
 Internal Control Systems  - Analysis F’6’ 
 Corporate Governance -  Analysis F’6’ 
 Ethics In Business – Analysis F’6’ 
 Participation of All Stakeholders - Analysis F’6’ 
 Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis F’6’ 




















4.2.5    ENG Asset Management (Private) Limited 
Background 
ENG Asset Management (Private) Limited (ENG) was incorporated on 12 December 2002 
(Company Number 16302/2002). The main business of the institution was to manage 
investments for third parties, specifically to: buy and sell, underwrite, invest in exchange 
or otherwise acquire, hold, manage, develop, deal with any bonds, stocks, loan, 
obligations, shares, debenture stocks, mortgages, obligations and securities of all kinds, 
including money market instruments and securities issued and guaranteed by government.  
 
In April 2003 ENG acquired the entire shareholding in Century Discount House Limited 
(CDH) from Century Financial Holdings (Private) Limited, the holding company of CDH.  
Because of the requirements set out by statute and the Reserve Bank regarding the 
management of discount houses, ENG could not automatically take over the business of 
CDH before satisfying the regulatory requirements, such as obtaining a banking licence 
[ENG Asset Management  (Private) Limited (2004), Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
From April 2003 ENG traded with CDH.  The transactions were such that monies received 
from CDH customers or depositors would be invested with the unlicenced ENG. This was 
supposedly “for a premium and into higher-yielding investments”, according to the 
forensic auditors’ report. The total amount CDH invested with ENG by 31 December 
2003, was ZW$ 45 billion, none of which was received back by CDH until its liquidation 
on 20 January 2004 [ENG Asset Management (Private) Limited (2004), Liquidator’s 
Report]. 
 
It was clearly not in the best interests of stakeholders of either CDH or ENG to invest 
these huge sums of public funds with an unlicenced institution, especially since no 
effective corporate governance structures had been put in place in either. 
 
Supervision by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in this regard was unsatisfactory, and 
consequently the investing public lost funds to ENG executive directors and shareholders.  
Because of this gross mismanagement by ENG executive directors, the institution was 
technically insolvent by 31 October 2003.  As a result, it was placed under voluntary 
liquidation on 31 December, in terms of a special resolution passed by the directors [ENG 
Asset Management (Private) Limited (2004), Liquidator’s Report]. 
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Qualitative Analysis – Using the BICEPS Model 
(a) Business Strategy Analysis 
ENG raised most of its revenue from CDH depositors.  The company operated without an 
effective business strategy, and as a result failed to achieve a sustainable competitive 
advantage and to increase value of the business.   The institution failed to identify key 
profit drivers or to identify business risks associated with investment management. 
Contrary to the core business of the institution, the top management of ENG invested the 
money in illiquid assets, as opposed to liquid assets such as money market instruments.  
The illiquid assets included vehicles and immovable properties with a total open market 
value in excess of Zim$100 billion by 31 October 2003[ENG Asset Management  (Private) 
Limited (2004), Liquidator’s Report]. 
 
Responsibility rests with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe for failing to stop an institution 
(ENG) from conducting its business activities without a banking licence for almost a year. 
 
(b) Internal Control Systems Analysis 
ENG failed to maintain proper books of account, as required by the provisions of section 
140 of the Zimbabwe Companies Act (Chapter24:03).  Its financial statements were 
largely prepared from incomplete records.  The institution failed to engage independent 
external, or internal, auditors.   
 
The main purpose of internal control systems is to safeguard the assets of the business, 
including funds from the investing public.  ENG failed completely to introduce effective 
watertight internal control systems or to safeguard the depositors’ funds.  As a result, the 
depositors lost more than Zim$163 billion dollars in 2003 [ENG Asset Management 










(c) Corporate Governance Analysis 
The top management lacked the integrity and competence to manage a banking institution 
managing depositors’ funds.  The majority shareholders were also executive directors, 
such as Muponda and Watyoka.  The company’s corporate governance structures were 
flawed, in that it failed to establish effective governance committees as listed previously. 
The majority shareholders lacked the credibility and financial resources to recapitalise the 
business.  ENG also lacked the checks and balances for directors and managers to operate 
in the best interests of all stakeholders, to optimize returns, minimize risk and prevent 
abuse of power by the executive directors and majority shareholders.  
 
(d) Ethics In Business Analysis 
ENG top management failed to formulate and implement basic business ethics principles 
in the fight against fraud.  The management also failed to develop and implement a code of 
ethical conduct.  For example, ENG purchased illiquid and long-term assets from short-
term depositors’ funds.  It also invested heavily in shares on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange, but stock prices collapsed towards end of 2003, and so it was unable to pay 
back depositors.  ENG could not cope with the increased working capital requirements of 
rapidly expanding financial obligations.  It invested in luxury vehicles and in low-yielding 
assets such as Treasury Bills and Bankers Acceptances, which were intended to provide 
security when attracting public depositors.  In most cases, the top management failed to act 
to protect the interests of the stakeholders. Such conduct was manifestly unethical. 
 
(e) Participation of All Stakeholders Analysis 
Most of the stakeholders, such as the depositors, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the 
major creditors and the employees, were not consulted in the strategic decision-making 
process.  For example, the company operated for almost a year without a banking licence 
and without informing the investing public, employees, business associates or the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe of this fact. Moreover, key stakeholders did not participate in the 
appointment of non-executive and independent directors or of governance committees 






(f) Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis 
ENG top management failed to safeguard the deposits received from CDH and the 
investing public.  The interests of the customers were therefore not satisfied.  The 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority was deprived of a source of revenue following liquidation. 
Employees and management’s interests of job security and other benefits connected with 
employment were treated with disrespect.  
 
Thus, the interests of most stakeholders were not satisfied.  Below is a tabulated summary 
of the position of ENG on 31 December 2003, using the BICEPS Model  
 
Table 4.2.20 Summary of the Position of ENG Asset Management (Private) Limited 




31 December 2003 
 Business strategy – Analysis F’6’ 
 Internal Control Systems – Analysis F’6’ 
 Corporate Governance – Analysis F’6’ 
 Ethics in Business – Analysis F’6’ 
 Participation of all Stakeholders - Analysis F’6’ 
 Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis F’6’ 
















4.2.6    First National Building Society 
 
Background 
First National Building Society (FNBS) was registered and licensed as a building society 
in Zimbabwe on 10 June 1996.The main business of FNBS in terms of the Zimbabwe 
banking regulations (2000) was the raising and maintenance of a fund from which to grant 
loans, to customers and others, on security of a mortgage or hypothecation, with or without 




The shareholding structure of FNBS on 31 January 2002 is as shown in the table below: 
 







Zimnat Life Assurance Company 4.40% 49 614 844 
Lesal & Strongline Investments (Private) Limited 89.74% 1 011 917 292 
ZIMRE Holdings Limited 2.74% 26 386 076 
Mining Industry Pension Fund 1.76% 19 845 938 
ZESA Pension Fund 1.17% 13 193 038 
Parity Ventures 0.59% 6 652 899 
   
 100% 1 127 610 087 
 
 
         Source: First National Building Society Liquidator’s Report (2006)Office of the Master of 
High Court, p.3 
 
From the table it is clear that Lesal Investments (Private) Limited (registered under 
number CR199/96) and Strongline Investments (Private) Limited (registered under number 
CR199/97) were the major shareholders, with 89.74%. Analysis of Lesal and Strongline 
records showed that these companies were owned by the Managing Director and the 
Finance Director of FNBS, Messrs Ruturi and Musona respectively.  The Reserve Bank 
and the Registrar of Banks failed to anticipate the risk of issuing a banking license to a 





The Directors of FNBS, before the Society was placed under curatorship, were as follows:                                                                                   
 
Table 4.2.22: FNBS Directors placed under curatorship 
 
Name Residential address Position  




S Rutiri  80 Folyjon Crescent, Glenlorne, Harare Managing Director  
& Chief Executive  
N B Musona 72 Harare Drive, Northwood,  
Mount Pleasant, Harare 
Finance Director 
C Mwaturura 4 Elston Road, Chisipite, Harare Non-executive  
Director 





Source: Due Diligence Review Report prepared on FNBS by AMG Global- Chartered 
Accountants (2004), p.4 
 
According to basic corporate governance principles non-executive directors must be 
independent of the executive directors and the major shareholders.  The non-executive 
chairman of FNBS Mahachi, was also a director of Platinum Asset Managers (Private) 
Limited, which was placed under liquidation on 7 April 2004, while Mwaturura the non-
executive director of FNBS, was also a non-executive Chairman of Century Financial 
Holdings Limited (CFHL) which collapsed in 2004, following the liquidation of its 
subsidiary, Century House, on 20 January 2004. 
 
The researcher maintains that non–executive directors of a banking institution should be 
appointed by a commission or committee of stakeholders completely independent of the 
major shareholders and executive directors.  Details of the function of such an independent 
commission will be recommended in the final chapter.  On 7 February 2003 the Reserve 
Bank placed FNBS under curatorship, as provided by section 55 of the Zimbabwe Banking 
Act (Chapter 24:20) because it was technically insolvent.  The curatorship period was 
repeatedly extended until 27 February 2004 when the Reserve bank of Zimbabwe filed a 







Qualitative Analysis of FNBS - BICEPS Model 
(a)    Business Strategy Analysis 
FNBS raised most of its revenue from project development mortgages.  Thus property 
development advances constituted approximately 60% of the society’s mortgage portfolio 
on 31 December 2002. This concentration exposed the society to significant credit risk, as 
shown table 4.2.23 below: 
 













Pentanville Investments  784 649 540 000 244 649 
Fireside Investments 254 191 - 254 191 
Goal Line Investments 109 681 165 000 (55 319) 





























Table 4.2.24: FNBS Financial Statement  










12 months  
ended  
30 June  
2002 
$000 
12 months  
ended  
30 June  
2001 
$000 
Interest income  
Interest expense (see note 
5.4.2) 
2 632 469 




1 626 273 
(1 027 189) 
963 921 
(793 195) 
Net interest income 










Total income for the period 941 643  1 227 420 357 385 
Operating expenses (see note 
5.4.3) 
(7 939 657)  (339 799) (95 171) 
Profit before written-offs 
Other – write offs 
(6 998 014) 








Net (loss)/ profit for the 
period 
(8 138 814) 
 
 $887 621 $262 214 
 
Source: FNBS - Due Diligence Review Report prepared by AMG Global (Chartered 
Accountants), (2004), pp. 7-12 
 
Contrary to the core business of the institution, of raising and maintaining a fund from 
which loans could be granted, the top management failed to identify sustainable and key 
profit drivers.  As a result, it could not increase its market share or profitability, and was 
unable to promote business growth. 
 
(b) Internal Control Systems Analysis 
Bank reconciliations for the General Administration and Money Market Administration 
Accounts, which were the most important bank accounts, were not prepared for the period 
July 2001 to May 2002.  It is astonishing to learn that these reconciliations were only 
prepared for the year-end audit of June 2002, and that, after June they were not prepared 
monthly.  The latest available reconciliations for the two accounts were for 30 September 
and 30 November 2002 [FNBS Due Diligence Review Report prepared by AMG Global 







Failure to produce reconciliations regularly was a fundamental lack of internal control 
systems for a banking institution, and this created a environment conducive to the 
perpetration and concealment of fraudulent activities, errors and irregularities, at the 
expense of all stakeholders. Cash and bank balances on 31 December 2002 consisted of 
the following: 
 
Table 4.2.25: FNBS Cash and Bank Balances 
 







Zimbank current account 9 958 447.05 - 9 958 447.05 
Zimbank salaries 
account 
(3 333 115.37) - (3 333 115.37) 
Zimbank stop orders 19 120 078.87 - 19 120 078.87 
Zimbank treasury 116 747 346.13 - 116 747 346.13 
CBZ-DDO account 2 392 739.86 2 710 408.56  (317 668.70) 
CBZ-General admin (140 428 418.22) 83 600 505.77 (224 028 923.99) 
CBZ Salaries 5 728 360.70 3 070 890.98 2 657 469.72 
Money Market admin 1 305 549 714.39 125 643 790.68 1 179 905 923.71 
Century Bank 1 684.04 1 422.10 261.94 
CBZ FNAM Account 1 500 000.00 - 1 500 000.00 
Cash on hand 26 666 500.00 26 666 500.00 
 
- 
Total  1 343 903 337.45  241 693 518.09 1 102 209 819.36
 
Explanatory note: The ‘difference’ column shows the unreconciled balances for 
the various bank accounts on 31 December 2002 and do not necessarily equate to 
the misstatements in these bank balances. 
 
 
Source: FNBS - Due Diligence Review Report prepared by AMG Global (Chartered 
Accountants), (2004) p.8 
 
Bank reconciliations prepared for these accounts were never reviewed by an independent 
senior official, which reflects an ineffective internal control system. Thus the 
reconciliations had material errors and inconsistencies which could easily have been 
observed by an independent audit official.  There was ineffective segregation of duties, as 
the Financial Director could initiate, authorise and process journal vouchers, for which he 
alone had explanations. 
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According to the audit report dated 31 December 2002, prepared by KPMG (chartered 
accountants) in Harare, there were many journal vouchers being posted as reconciling 
items relating to miss-posts between the individual bank accounts: “Cash and bank 
balances constitute approximately 19% of the society’s assets. It is therefore imperative 
that bank reconciliations are prepared urgently for December 2002, and reconciling items 
cleared, in a bid to establish the accuracy of these balances.  Based on the nature of the 
reconciling items on the reconciliations reviewed, we are of the view that the bank and 
cash ledger balance of Zim$1.3billion on 31 December 2002 may be materially misstated”. 
 
In Zimbabwe, the First National Building Society top management also failed to introduce 
effective, watertight internal control systems or to safeguard the business assets, including 
the depositors’ funds.  All this led to the institution being placed under liquidation on 24 
March 2004, at the expense of all stakeholders, including those employees who lost their 
jobs. 
 
(c) Corporate Governance Analysis 
The institution’s corporate governance structures were flawed, in that it failed to establish 
effective governance committees. Such committees should normally be chaired by 
independent and competent professionals.  The majority of members of governance 
committees should be non-executive, and independent of the executive directors and the 
majority shareholders.  These majority shareholders lacked the credibility, financial or 
material resources to re-capitalise the business.   
 
FNBS clearly lacked the checks and balances for directors and managers to operate in the 
best interests of all stakeholders, to optimise returns, or to minimize risk and the abuse of 
power by the executive directors and majority shareholders.  Ineffective corporate 









(d) Ethics in Business Analysis 
Musona, the Financial Director of First National Building Society (FNBS), with control 
over public funds, used a substantial amount of those funds for his own benefit.  
According to an affidavit dated 3 February 2003, hastily prepared by lawyers of FNBS, 
Musona did not deny having used these funds, though he was not sufficiently truthful and 
straightforward to reveal to the stakeholders the amounts he took.  Nor was he sufficiently 
open to reveal the assets he had acquired with those funds. 
 
The Liquidator wrote (2006): “Given the dishonest behaviour of the respondent (Musona) 
in misusing the funds, and further given the fact that the respondent has to make a full and 
candid disclosure to the Applicant (FNBS), there is a real risk that the respondent will 
dispose of assets or hide the same, in order to avoid such assets being found and utilized to 
repay the amounts owed to the applicant.   
 
Accordingly, in order to protect the interests of the Applicant (FNBS) and other creditors, 
it is critical that a provisional order be granted as a matter of urgency in order to allow the 
Provisional Trustees appointed by the Master of High Court of Zimbabwe, to take 
immediate control of the Respondent’s estate (Musona) and protect the interest of 
depositors”. 
 
FNBS management failed to formulate or implement basic corporate business ethics 
principles in the fight against fraud.  In addition, the management failed to develop and 
implement a code of ethical conduct.  In most cases, the Financial Director (Musona) used 
public funds to satisfy his personal needs, which conduct was clearly unethical. 
 
(e) Participation of All Stakeholders Analysis 
Most of the stakeholders, such as the investing public, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the 
major creditors and employees, were never consulted in the strategic decision-making 
process.  Nor did key stakeholders participate in the appointment of non-executive and 
independent directors, or governance committees, such as Audit and Risk Management, 
Assets and Liabilities or Business Development committees.   
 
It is apparent that participation of all stakeholders in strategic decision-making can be used 
to minimize financial risk and liquidation of viable banking institutions. 
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f)       Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis 
FNBS management, including the, non-executive directors failed to safeguard the assets of 
the banking institution and the deposits of the investing public.  The interests of the 
customers were therefore not satisfied.  The Zimbabwe Revenue Authority was deprived 
of a source of revenue following liquidation.  Employees, and management’s interests of 
job security and other benefits connected with employment were treated with disrespect.  
Clearly, the interests of most stakeholders were not satisfied.  Below is a tabulated 
summary of the position of First National Building Society on 31 March 2004, using the 
BICEPS Model. 
 
Table 4.2.26 Summary of the Position of First National Building Society on 31 March 




31 March 2004 
 Business Strategy – Analysis F ‘6’ 
 Internal Control Systems – Analysis F ‘6’ 
 Corporate Governance – Analysis F ‘6’ 
 Ethics In Business – Analysis F ‘6’ 
 Participation of All Stakeholders - Analysis F ‘6’ 
 Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis F ‘6’ 














4.3     QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS RESTRUCTURED 
DURING THE 2003/2006 BANKING CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE. 
 
4.3.1  National Discount House Limited 
Background 
National Discount House Limited operates in the discount house market, engaging in 
services such as Bankers’ Acceptances, Corporate Bonds and Bills, Government Treasury 
Bills, Time Deposit Accounts, Interest Rates Agreements, Negotiable Certificates of 
Deposit, Promissory Notes and Commercial Paper. It is the flagship and founder institution 
from which the NDH Holdings Limited brand has grown over the last nine years.  The 
institution is registered as a discount house under the Zimbabwe Banking Act (Chapter 
24:20) and has been in operation since January 1995.  
 
The group structure of NDH Holdings Limited is as follows: 
 
Figure 4.3.1 NDHGROUP STRUCTURE 
 
 






NDH Board of 
Directors 
NDH Equities NDH Discount House 
Assebrow’s 





However, because of the exceptions of the Monetary Policy statement announced by the 
Reserve Bank Governor before the banking crisis that “current financial services 
challenges at that time and the contagion suffered following the collapse of ENG Asset 
Management (Private) Limited and the substantial exposures to Elan Suisse, cumulatively 
reduced the capital base, resulting in the institution becoming undercapitalized according 
to the new capital guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) towards end 
of December 2003”.  
 
The researcher maintains that the RBZ should ensure that all shareholders of banking 
institutions have the capacity and credibility to recapitalize when required.  This was not 
the case before the 2003/2006 banking crisis and changed only with the First Quarter 
Monetary Policy statement issued by the RBZ on 30 April 2008.  
 
 Under item 5.21 of the new policy on Corporate Governance Practices the RBZ noted 
with concern the level of non-compliance by some banking institutions, including wilful 
avoidance of vetting of shareholders and other accountable officers.  The RBZ issued a 
monetary policy to the issue stating that, “with immediate effect, all shareholders with 
holdings of 5% and above are required to be formally vetted by the RBZ. All banking 
institutions shall, … ensure compliance with this requirement in respect of existing and 
prospective shareholders who have not been formally vetted by the RBZ”. 
 
While this is sound monetary policy, it must be noted that the vetting should be carried out 
by independent firms of chartered accountants, forensic auditors or management 
consultants, in close consultation with the RBZ.  An Independent Stakeholders’ 
Commission or Committee of a particular banking institution should be responsible for 
appointing independent firms to carry out the task.  The researcher considers that at 
present, the Reserve bank of Zimbabwe lacks the capacity, flexibility and depth required to 
carry out this task at regional, national and international levels.  Before the National 
Discount House Limited (NDH) was reconstructed exposures and the resultant write-offs 
were caused by inadequate internal control systems/risk management policies and 




NDH was probably the first banking institution in Zimbabwe to implement a market-based 
corporate reconstruction approach or voluntary restructuring in response to the banking 
crisis.  According to the NDH Annual Reports the board of directors approached the 
Reserve Bank in March 2004 with a “robust voluntary restructuring strategic plan”.  The 
institution was not allowed to transact new business for 12 months in order to facilitate a 
smooth restructuring programme. 
 
National Discount House Limited before reconstruction 31 December 2003 
Following the collapse of several banking institutions during the banking crisis, amongst 
them the ENG Management and Century Discount House, NDH was exposed to these 
institutions, which resulted in its not being able to pay depositors, thereby failing to meet 
its obligations. It became apparent that the management should have carried out a detailed 
due diligence exercise on both CDH and ENG before making huge deposits on behalf of 
the investing public. The problems which affected NDH following the collapse of ENG, 
and the large write-offs in respect of exposures to Elan Suisse, hastened the need to 
formulate alternative strategic survival measures including medium to long term plans. 
 
Before restructuring, the business of NDH was characterized by aggressive buying and 
selling of securities; a huge client base, at times supported by political connections, high 
risk-taking at times without regard to sound banking practices, and no proper due diligence 
on counterparties. 
 
The institution was well-connected politically, and as a result would secure deals which 
under normal circumstances it would not get.  The conduct of the management was, 
therefore, unethical.  The short-term benefits from political connections were never 
translated into a sustainable and unique competitive advantage. 
 
At the time of the banking crisis the institution operated without effective corporate 
governance or Board Committees such as Audit, Asset/Liability Remuneration, 
Information Technology, Risk & Compliance, Business Development and Ethical 
Conduct.  The majority of the institutional shareholders were directly connected with the 
Government, with limited capacity to re-capitalize the business of the institution.  Also, the 
majority of the non-executive directors were not completely independent of the executive 
directors.  Some of them clearly lacked banking expertise and experience. 
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ALTMAN Z-Score Model for National Discount House Limited, 31 December 2003   
Based on the financial statements of NDH for the year ended 31 December 2003. 
 
Z = 1.2X1 +1.4X2 +3.3X3   +0.6X4 +1.0X5  
Z – Score: 0.46 
Where: 
X1  = is the percentage of working capital to total assets  = 0.01 
X2  = is the percentage of retained earnings to total assets = (-0.13) 
X3  = is the percentage of earnings before interest plus taxes to total assets = (-0.23) 
X4   = is the percentage of equity to total liabilities = (-0.09) 
X5 = is the percentage of sales to total assets = 0.26 
 
In terms of the interpretation of scores detailed above, the score of 0.46. is far below 1.81, 
itself reflecting problems. The institution posted losses for the year 2003, which, after 
making the necessary provisions, resulted in negative equity.  The losses were the result of 
ineffective internal control systems and the uncontrolled exposure to ENG Asset 
Management, which resulted in the institution borrowing expensive money 
(Zim$20billion) from the Reserve Bank to minimize liquidity problems.  Unfortunately, 
this resulted in high-interest expenses, which further eroded the institution’s revenue. All 
this resulted in the clear indication of significant credit problems represented by the Z-
value of 0.46. 
 
With negative equity, a negative funding gap and diminished market confidence, the 
institution’s deposit base became highly volatile.  It can be concluded that the management 
took an effective strategic decision in embarking on market-based restructuring in order to 
avoid immediate liquidation as the company was undercapitalized. 
 
          National Discount House Limited after restructuring, 31 December 2006 
The institution was capitalized in two ways: first, by the conversion of debts (depositors’ 
funds) into equity through a scheme, approved by the High Court as provided for by the 
Zimbabwe Companies Act (Chapter 24:03); and second, by the injection of fresh capital 
by a consortium of individuals and institutions. 
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While the shareholders of both National Discount House and National Discount House 
Holdings, now made up of a diverse section of top Zimbabwean businesses, large 
corporate and “high net worth”. It can be deduced that most shareholders are still 
connected to the government, through departments such as the National Social Security 
Authority, CBZ Holdings Limited, ZABG Holdings Limited, the Ministries of Labour and 
Social Welfare, Climax Investments (Private) Limited, Netone and Central Mechanical 
Equipment Department Equipment (CMED).  
 
The Government shareholders resistant to diluting their shares in order to accommodate a 
strategic partner with international banking expertise and with the level of foreign currency 
and capital required.  This may affect the long-term operational effectiveness of the 
institution in the current economic, social and political environment. 
 
It is however pleasing to note that, following restructuring the institution, it was engaged 
in aggressive buying and selling of securities, though now with closely-supervised risk-
management, watertight internal control systems and synergistic deals with the equity 
division. All this gives a sustainable competitive advantage, growing client base, all with 
proper due diligence in line with the RBZ guiding principles and regulations, and the 
Know Your Customer (KYC) concept. The risk and compliance functions were in place by 
end of 2006 to ensure that deals are done in accordance with regulating guidelines and 
limits. 
 
The key profit drivers of the institution were interest income from treasury bills, Bankers’ 
Acceptances and trading income from buying or selling of commercial paper and financial 
instruments by end of 2006.  The institution is also involved in trading in stocks on the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange.  However, while trading in stocks, the institution should 
ensure that they do not use public funds instead of their own financial resources, clearly 
distinguished from depositors’ funds. 
 
While the current non-executive directors were appointed by shareholders and depositors, 
such appointments should also take into account the views of other stakeholders, and non-




According to the NDH Annual Report/Financial Statements (2003), the following 
measures, absent before restructuring, were implemented during and after restructuring to 
ensure good corporate governance, internal control systems and risk management 
structures: 
o Reorganization and re-constitution of the board of directors.  This was done with a view to 
ensuring the representation of all stakeholders, thus ensuring transparency and broad 
representation. 
o Establishment of a Governance Risk Management Committee. This resulted in all 
governance committees being led by non-executive directors, thus ensuring the 
independence of management.  The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) also instituted a 
system whereby board members or senior mangers of a banking institution had to undergo 
vetting to determine whether they were fit and proper candidates lead a banking institution.  
Requirements, including tax clearance, police clearance, declaration of assets, declaration 
of directorship in other companies, professional integrity, banking experience, had to be 
met before RBZ approval. 
o Establishment of a Risk Management Department. 
o Establishment of a succession plan within the Group. 
o Prospective shareholders of the banking institution had to be scrutinized and approved by 
the RBZ to ensure integrity. 
 
Internal control systems were enhanced by the establishment of Risk Management and 
Compliance departments.  These ensured that limits on banking transactions (deals) were 
adhered to.  Procedure manuals and board policies were rewritten and approved by both 
the RBZ and the Board before implementation.  The policies thus approved included a 
general code of conduct for the institution as a whole and a specific one for dealers.  The 
code included business ethics. Principles and practice of stakeholder participation and 









         ALTMAN Z-score Model for National Discount House Limited,31 December 2006 
After restructuring, and based on the financial statements for the year ended 31 December 
2006, the Z-score was 3.8 
Z=1.2X1 +1.4X2 +3.3X3   +0.6X4 +1.0X5  
= 3.8. 
Where: 
             X1 = is the ratio of working capital to total assets = 0.78 
             X2  = is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets = 0.66 
             X3  = is the ratio of earnings before income tax to total Assets = 0.66 
             X4   = is the ratio of equity to total liabilities = 55.88 
             X5 = is the ratio of sales to total assets = 0.44 
 
With a score of 3 indicating a sound institution, the score of 3.8 indicated that NDH was 
sound after restructuring. The capital injection due to the conversion of depositors’ 
(“customer”) funds into equity resulted in the institution underwriting meaningful 
business, thereby increasing the retained profits from Zim$-25.4 million(retained loss) in 
2003 to a Zim$209 billion retained profit in 2006.  The shareholders’ funds also increased 
from Zim$ -10.1 million in 2003 to Zim$447 billion in 2006. 
 
According to the interview between the researcher and Mr G. Munjilo a Senior Manager of 
NDHL in 2007, following the completion of the restructuring, the interests of all 
stakeholders: customers (depositors), creditors, shareholders, employees, the public, the 




















The registration of CFX Bank took place on 26 October 2004, when Century Bank 
Zimbabwe Limited ceased to function as a commercial bank.  This necessitated the process 




When the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe established that CFX Bank was undercapitalised, it 
was placed under curatorship on 17 December 2004. 
 
Restructuring Approach 
 CFX adopted a combination of market-based solutions and government-based solutions. 
This mixed approach allows interested parties to use a combination of restructuring 
strategies depending on the needs of a bank at a particular point in time. 
 
Accordingly, the curator of CFX Bank (2004), formulated an effective banking strategy of 
restructuring the institution in the best interests of all stakeholders.  An alternative 
approach would have been to persuade external investors to continue to inject funds into 
the institution.  However, this task would have been very difficult, considering the urgency 
of the matter, as well as the social, economic and political turbulence in Zimbabwe.   
 
A second option was to apply for amalgamation with the Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group 
(ZABG),controlled by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe on behalf of the government.  (This 
institution has been challenged by at least three banking institutions in Zimbabwe because 







The researcher considers that monetary authorities should always guard against 
mismanagement of public resources during banking crises. In a banking crisis one of the 
most urgent decisions that monetary authorities must make is to determine which banks 
are viable and which are not.  The difficulty lies in distinguishing between illiquid and 
insolvent banks, given that many banks’ assets do not have a ready market value.  
Monetary authorities can therefore minimise use of taxpayers’ funds by the purchase of 
non-liquid assets from illiquid but viable banks at a profitable discount, instead of lending 
unlimited amounts non-viable and illiquid banks.  However, the main objective here is to 
minimize liquidation of viable banking institutions at the lowest possible cost.   
 
Sanction of the restructuring 
CFX Bank’s scheme of restructuring was approved by the High Court on 6 January 2006, 
as provided for by the Zimbabwe Companies Act (Chapter 24:03). 
 
CFX Bank before restructuring –December 2004. 
Financial state  
According to the CFX Annual Report/Financial Statements (2004) the investigations by 
the curator revealed the following: 
o “That there was a financial gap of Zim$63bn in the system, due mainly to manipulation of 
financial records in the bank’s computer system, Equation ® (‘Equation’ is the name of the 
computer banking system used at CFX Bank).  Financial statements automatically 
generated by the computer did not balance because of improper human interference”.  The 
researcher is convinced that the bank’s corporate governance structures, internal control 
systems and risk management systems were not effective, based on the overall 
performance of the institution before restructuring in December 2004. 
o “Further, there were differences between system-generated accounts and those presented 
as monthly management accounts, due mainly to manipulation of figures to reflect non-
existent profits”.  The researcher considers this conduct of the top management unethical 
and fraudulent. 
o “There was an accumulated loss of Zim$115bn on 31 October 2004.  This was a clear lack 
of effective business and corporate strategies, as the bank operated without a sustainable 
and unique competitive advantage”. 
o “The bank’s liabilities exceeded the assets by Zim$171bn on 31 December 2004.  The 
bank was thus technically insolvent”. 
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o “Throughout the year interest paid exceeded interest received”.  As a result the difference 
between income earned from interest and the cost of borrowing indicated on undesirable 
financial position during the year ended 31 December 2004. 
 
Top 20 shareholding of CFX Financial Services before restructuring, December 2004 
CFX Bank, CFX Merchant Bank and CFX Asset Management Company are wholly-
owned subsidiaries of CFX Financial Services.  The holding company, CFX Financial 
Services, is the listed entity on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange.  Listed below are the top 
20 shareholders of CFX Financial Services on 31 December 2004. 
 
Table 4.3.1 Top 20 shareholders of CFX Financial Services on 31 December 2004 
Short name Number Country Shares Percent 
1 MALONEY 52285389 ZW 377,334,312 25.00% 
2 CENTURY 52285386 ZW 150,933,724 10.00% 
3 WOLPERT 52285020 ZW 122,544,908 8.12% 
4 NETLINE 52284960 ZW 88,000,000 5.83% 
5 CAMPHILL 52271571 ZW 86,357,328 5.72% 
6 EBC 52285392 ZW 75,466,862 5.00% 
7 CHIKWANGWARI 52285905 ZW 66,033,504 4.37% 
8 GWATIRINGA 52285401 ZW 58,486,818 3.87% 
9 BROWN 52285899 ZW 35,236,854 2.33% 
10 LOADED 52285311 ZW 32,000,000 2.12% 
11 CAMPHILL 52284441 ZW 28,652,254 1.90% 
12 BUTLER 52285404 ZW 27,010,713 1.79% 
13 CHADWICK 52285407 ZW 18,866,716 1.25% 
14 MAZAMBANI 5228539
5 
ZW 17,147,505 1.14% 
15 KERRICK 52285896 ZW 16,016,622 1.06% 
16 REALTIME 52269903 ZW 14,034,680 0.93% 
17 OAK 52286235 ZW 13,912,629 0.92% 
18 CURTIS 52285911 ZW 13,573,223 0.90% 
19 HAYES 52285902  ZW 13,573,223 0.90% 
20 MUZEMBE 1051259  ZW 13,206,701 0.88% 
 
 Source: CFX Annual Report/Financial Statements (2004),Available at: 
www.cfxbank.com 
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Most of the top 20 shareholders of CFX Financial Services lacked the capacity or 
credibility to re-capitalise CFX Bank.  For example, Maloney was an individual, and at the 
same time an executive director of CFX Merchant Bank with 25% shareholding.  Century 
Holdings was directly responsible for the liquidation of one of its subsidiaries, Century 
Discount House, on 20 January 2004. 
 
Altman Z-score Model for CFX Bank on 30 September 2004 
 
Based on CFX Bank’s financial statements for the year ended 30 September 2004, the       
Z-Score was -0.98. This is unsound for a banking institution. 
 
 Z= 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 + 0.6x4 + 1.0X5 
 = -0.98 
 Where  
 X1 is the percentage of working capital to total assets  =   (-0.6) 
 X2 is the percentage of retained earnings to total assets  =   (-0.5) 
 X3 is the percentage of earnings before income tax to total assets =     0.08 
 X4 is the percentage of equity total liabilities    = (-0.36) 
 X5 is the percentage of sales to total assets    =      0.4 
          ZW$ 
 Working Capital                (-183 595) 
 Earnings Before Income Tax         25 849 
 Total Assets         306 215 
 Equity                 (-170 315) 
 Sales         128 627 
 Total Liabilities       476 530 
 
The Z-score of -0.98 indicates serious problems, and, indeed, by the end of September 
2004 the bank was technically insolvent.  When it was placed under curatorship on 17 
December 2004, the bank had a negative funding gap and a negative equity.  This was a 
result of the high interest cost, which had exceeded the amount of interest received, 
resulting in a negative net interest income.  By the end of September 2005 the bank had an 
accumulated loss Zim$163 bn. 
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The Z-score of -0.98 indicated significant liquidity difficulties, due largely to the following 
factors: 
o Undercapitalization of the business. 
o Nonperforming insider loans.  For example, CFX Bank was exposed to CFX Asset 
Management (Private) to the extent of Zim$14bn.  This was in addition to the loans 
advanced to top management. 
o Huge investment of financial resources in non-performing and non-liquid banking assets.     
 
CFX Bank after restructuring 31 December 2006 
The CFX Bank debts consist largely deposits from the customers, were converted into 
equity.  The operations of CFX Merchant Bank another subsidiary of the holding 
company, CFX Financial Services were combined to form a single entity to operate under 
one banking license of CFX Bank.  The plan was cost effective in that a single banking 
institution was authorised to render both services of the merchant bank and commercial 
bank with a single license issued to CFX Bank. 
 
The plan prevented imminent liquidation of CFX Bank and at the same time it was 
removed from the administration of a curator.  As a result all stakeholders and especially 
customers became shareholders of banking institutions listed on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange.  Stakeholders participated in the strategic decision making process by being 
represented at the top management level of the holding company, CFX Financial Services 
Limited. 
 
The curator concluded in 2006 by underlining that “in the absence of interested strategic 
investors, and given the above factors of the turnaround strategy, it was strongly believed 
that this was the best restructuring approach with a view to avoiding the liquidation of a 
viable banking institution.  Extension of the curatorship, or exploring other alternatives, 
would have resulted in further losses for depositors’ investments due to the prevailing 
hyper-inflationary pressures”.  It is also pleasing to note that most stakeholders were given 
the opportunity to participate in the strategic decision-making process throughout the 






Before the operations of the holding company were reorganized, the subsidiaries operated 
with three licenses as follows: 
 
Table 4.3.2 Licences 
Institution Licence 
CFX Bank  Commercial Banking 
CFX Merchant  Bank  Merchant banking 
CFX Asset Management  Asset Management 
 Source: CFX Annual Report/ Financial Statements (2004), Available at: www.cfxbank.com 
 
Following the bank restructuring, the operations of CFX Bank and CFX Merchant were 
combined into a single entity, CFX Bank under once commercial license. 
 
Shareholding Structure  
CFX Financial Services Limited was then finally structured as depicted in the following 
figure 4.3.2 below: 
 
Figure 4.3.2 Stage 1 – Conversion of deposits and cash injection.  
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Figure 4.3.3 Stage 2 – Exchange of new bank shares for CFX FS shares 
All converted shares in CFXB under the arrangement were swapped for shares in the 
holding company, CFXFS, the listed entity on the ZSE. 
 
Source: CFX Bank Annual Report/ Financial Statements (2004), Available at: 
www.cfxbank.com  
 
It can be concluded from the curator’s (2004) report that while the shareholding structure 
is more diverse, the major shareholders are essentially the Allied Financial Services (AFS), 
a special-purpose vehicle owned by the government (24%) and the depositors (59%).  
 
The researcher maintain that a “strategic partner”, together with other credible institutional 
investors with local, regional and international banking expertise, and the level of foreign 
currency and capital required by CFX are still required.  This would help CFX to achieve a 
strong capital base and to set up effective corporate governance structures for the future.  
In other words, CFX should undergo a second stage of restructuring, characterised by a 
market-based system and effective application of the criteria for regular corporate 
restructuring.  The government should also disinvest and allow local or regional credible 











CFX Bank Limited 
100% 
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Altman Z-score Model for CFX Bank 31 December 2007 
Based on CFX Bank financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2007, the Z-
Score was 0.65. 
 
Z= 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 +0.6x4 +1.0x5 
   = 0.65 
Where 
X1 is the percentage of working capital to total assets    = (-0.19) 
X2  is the percentage of retained earnings to total assets  = 0.015 
X3 is the percentage of earnings before income tax to total assets  =0.03 
X4 is the percentage of equity to total liabilities   = 1.01 
X5 is the ratio of sales to total assets     = 0.15 
          Zim$ 
 Working Capital         (-2 261 483) 
 Earnings Before Income Tax              362 814 
 Retained Earnings               175 752 
 Total Assets           11 575 037 
 Equity              5 824 331 
 Sales              1 740 011 
 Total Liabilities           5 750 706 
 
This score of 0.65 indicates a still unsound condition.  While the institution showed a 
significant improvement from -0.98 in September 2004 to 0.65 by 31 December 2007, the 
Z-score was still below the cut-off 1.81 percentage. It is, however, important to note that 
the restructuring programme was not an overnight event, as it involved re-branding and 
restoration of market confidence, which had adversely affected indigenous banks 







On 31 December 2006 the CFX incurred a net loss after tax of Zim$258 million, and this 
severely affected its equity position.  Deferred taxation as a result of the revaluation of 
assets resulted in a negative working capital position of Zim$2.2bn.  As already mentioned 
in (d) above, following the 2006 restructuring, CFX Bank should undergo a second stage 
of restructuring, and pave the way for credible local, regional or international investors to 
takeover its shares. 
 
 
4.3.3 Trust Banking Corporation Limited (Trust Bank) 
 
Background 
Trust Banking Corporation commenced its operations in January 1996 as a merchant bank, 
and converted its licence to a commercial bank in 2000.[Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(2006), Reflections on: what went wrong at Trust and Royal Banks]. 
 
According to prior on-site examinations by Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe over the years, 
Trust Bank experienced a number of deficiencies in asset quality, liquidity and internal 
control systems, among other factors. 
 
Independent Investigations 
In December 2003 the RBZ instituted an independent investigation of Trust Bank as 
provided for by the provisions of the Zimbabwe Banking Act.  The investigation 
confirmed a liquidity gap of Zim$100 billion on 12 December 2003, against the bank’s 
understated liquidity gap of Zim$70 billion.  The disparity indicated that the bank was 
misrepresenting the gravity of the problem in order to continue accessing the RBZ as 
lender of last resort facilities, under the pretext that the problems were of a temporary 
nature. 
 
The researcher considers that when Trust Banking Corporation having commenced its 
operations as a merchant bank, converted its licence to a commercial bank in 2000, the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the Registrar of Banks failed to carry out a detailed 





The authorities should have declined to register the bank or issue a banking licence on the 
basis that: 
 
         The major shareholders (Trust Holdings Limited) lacked the capacity and credibility to re-
capitalize operations in the best interest of all stakeholders. 
o The executive directors of Trust Bank had direct and full control of Trust Holdings 
Limited, the holding company of Trust Bank. 
o The majority of the management lacked banking expertise, integrity, competence and the 
necessary qualifications to run a banking institution administering depositors’ funds. 
o Top management lacked the ability to establish effective corporate governance structures 
in the best interests of all stakeholders. 
 
Trust Banking Corporation Limited before restructuring in December 2003. 
According to the curator in (2004),“the investigation confirmed material non-performing 
insider loans granted without formal loan agreements and proper due diligence.  Examples 
were: TMB Nominees - Zim$23.8 billion; Trust Holdings Limited -Zim$6.8 billion and 
other insiders Zim$17.6 billion”. 
In (2004) the curator also revealed that, “the liquidity gap was compounded by massive 
withdrawals, speculation-restricted maturity rollers and insignificant deposits.  As a result, 
the bank was compelled to attract new depositors at interest rates of up to 850% per 
annum, while other banks were paying 500% for the same products.  Some of the risk-
averse depositors were demanding security because of the bank’s increased corporate 
image of risk”. 
 
As part of a strategy for minimizing liquidation of viable banking institutions in future, it 
is apparent that the curator should have initiated both criminal and civil proceedings 
against the management of Trust Bank, based on the gravity of the evidence. 
 
The researcher maintains that this section should also apply to the Zimbabwe Banking Act, 
and should give curators sufficient authority to carry out their responsibilities, in the best 





Altman Z-score Model for Trust Banking Corporation Limited on 31 December 2003 
According to Trust Banking Corporation Limited, annual report and financial statements 
for the year ended 31 December 2003, the Z-Score was -0.55. 
Z= 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 +3.3x3 +0.6x4 +1.0x5 
  = - 0.55 
Where 
X1 is the percentage of working capital to total assets    = (-0.0156) 
X2 is the percentage of retained earnings to total assets  =    0.0238 
X3 is the percentage of earnings before income tax to total assets =    0.1419 
X4 is the percentage of equity to total liabilities   =    0.0072 
X5 is the percentage of sales to total assets    =        0.39 
 
             Zim$ 
 Working Capital              (752 696) 
 Earnings Before Income Tax       23 940 858 
 Retained Earnings             9 686 525 
 Total Assets                  557 936 462 
 Equity                6 406 178 
 Sales                   219 250 333 
 Total Liabilities                 551 530 314 
 
With a cut-off at 1.81, Trust Bank’s score of -0.55 clearly indicates a sign of corporate 
failure. Specifically, it indicated significant financial distress and viability difficulties, as 
evidenced by the lack of working capital, reduction in retained earnings and the fact that 
operations were largely financed from creditor loans instead of shareholders’ equity. 
 
The score of -0.55 also indicates a state of insolvency, because of a balance sheet showing 
a liquidity gap of Zim$100 billion on 31 December 2003.  As a result of the negative 
impact of the liquidity crunch, Trust Bank had no choice but to seek a bail-out from the 





With its bad corporate image, the bank’s deposit base became highly volatile due to 
diminished market confidence, thus causing an unanticipated deposit run.  This became a 
vicious circle, as the deposit run resulted in dwindling retained earnings, and eventual 
liquidity crunch. 
 
Banking Restructuring Approach 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, on behalf of the Government, initiated a centralized 
approach.  The insolvent, non-viable Trust Bank Limited remained afloat through support 
from the RBZ.  The officers from the RBZ were tasked to examine the financial records, 
with sufficient authority to set aside any decisions made by the executive.  According to 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, this corrective action was necessary in order to minimize 
financial risk in the best interest of all stakeholders[Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2006) 
Reflections on: what went wrong at Trust and Royal Banks]. 
 
The researcher maintains that this method was not necessarily effective in preventing 
detrimental consequences, because deposit runs were anticipated by the public. In addition, 
the decision to carry out a bailout was made informally, without effort on the part of the 
management. It was important to ensure that the rescue strategy was formulated through a 
transparent process, and with objective judgment on the bank’s viability. 
 
Transfer of Bank Assets into Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group (ZABG) 
According to Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe report of 3 May 2006, the bank’s outstanding 
Troubled Bank Fund (TBF) loans were converted to equity.  In addition, deposits and 
sundry creditors above Zim$5 million were also converted to equity.  After conversion, 
founding shareholders’ shares were written off against accumulated loss, with the result 
that they had no further interest after the conversion of TBF loans and other liabilities into 
shares in ZABG. 
 
Court Action by Trust Bank 
Trust Holdings, the sole shareholder, lodged an application in 2004 to the High Court 
seeking to interdict the amalgamation of the bank into ZABG, on the grounds that the 
Reserve Bank and the curator were not empowered by law to do so.  The application was 
dismissed with costs in March 2005, by the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. 
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A further appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on 5 September 2005, on the 
grounds that Trust Holdings should have appealed to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
against the curator’s decision to transfer or sell the assets.  Trust Bank argued that the 
curator had no authority to transfer all the assets of the institution to ZABG.  “The sale of 
the assets and liabilities was not preceded by any consultation with, or participation of, all 
stakeholders”.  Trust Bank further argued that the assets were not subjected to an 
independent and professional valuation.  According to the argument, the curator dissuaded 
a potential partner, NedBank of South Africa, from participation.  Further, “the curator 
was at fault because he had wrongly overstated the liabilities of Trust Bank, and had 
adopted a hostile attitude. He had prejudged the matter in that, before any investigation, he 
had decided that the Bank should be placed in the care of ZABG”. 
 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe’s View 
The Supreme Court shared the view that the curator had had no authority to sell or transfer 
the assets of a banking institution, and that they had therefore acted unlawfully in entering 
into the agreement with ZABG. Accordingly, the sale and transfer of assets of the banks to 
ZABG were declared null and void, and of no force or effect [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(2006) Troubled Banking Institutions Monetary Policy Review Statement]. 
 
The Supreme Court, however, also ruled that Trust Holdings had no power to file the court 
application because it had not obtained the authority of the curator.  Instead, Trust 
Holdings should have appealed to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, as provided for by the 
provisions of Section 55 (4) of the Zimbabwe Banking Act, before approaching the courts.  
The Court underlined the fact that “the sale that had taken place with the approval of the 
RBZ would not necessarily mean that the RBZ could not have objectively determined such 
an appeal”.  It concluded by saying that “in the event of an adverse decision being given 
by the RBZ, it could be challenged in the High Court of Zimbabwe”. 
 
The researcher considers that the legal banking framework in Zimbabwe needs to be 
reviewed in order to ensure that a workout strategy is formulated and implemented through 
a transparent process, with an objective judgment on the viability of banks.  Instead of 
appealing to the RBZ against a curator appointed and remunerated by the RBZ, an 
Independent Banking Commission should be established to act as an arbitrator, and to 
promote effective public governance in the best interests of all the stakeholders.   
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In addition, a curator should be appointed and supervised by such an independent banking 
commission, and remunerated from statutory contributions drawn from the banking 
industry over time, in close consultation with the RBZ. 
 
Second Stage of Bank Restructuring 
Following the (2006) restructuring, the researcher also maintain that the Zimbabwe Allied 
Banking Group should go through a second stage of restructuring.  This should be 
characterized by a market-based approach, involving the appointment of an arbitrator to 
address the differences between parties, and facilitate participation of all stakeholders in 
the strategic decision-making process.  The government should disinvest, and allow 
partnership between indigenous credible bankers and international strategic partners to 
take over, in close consultation with all interested parties.  The institution should also go 
through the process of change of name, re-branding, merger or acquisition, and promote 
effective corporate governance.  Such measures would allow the matters between Trust 
Holdings, Royal Bank, other banking institutions on the one hand, and the RBZ on the 
other, to be resolved without prolonged litigation, in the best interests of all stakeholders. 
 
On 17 July 2008 the Zimbabwe Financial Gazette (p C4) published a notice by the 
Reserve Bank dated 30 June 2008:“Take note that the RBZ hereby extends the period of 
curatorship for Royal Bank Zimbabwe Limited and Trust Bank Corporation Limited until 
all litigation has been finalised.  The litigation relates to claims lodged with the High Court 
and appeals lodged with the Administrative Court by the shareholders and certain creditors 
of Royal Bank Zimbabwe Limited and Trust Holdings Limited, against the RBZ, curators 
and against the Registrar of Banking Institutions’ intention to cancel the registration of the 
said banking institutions.  Both matters remain pending in the High Court and in the 
Administrative Court.  Further, take note that the RBZ has extended the appointment of the 
curators to 31 December 2008”. 
 
It can be concluded that the monetary authorities, on behalf of the government, should 






4.4    FINANCIALLY SOUND BANKING INSTITUTIONS DURING 2003/2006 
ZIMBABWE BANKING CRISIS 
 
The following is a sample of financially sound banking institutions that survived the 
2003/2006 banking crisis. 
 
4.4.1 Central African Building Society 
Background 
According to P. Cameron, General Manager Finance (2006) Central African Building 
Society (CABS) was registered as Central African Building Society Limited under the 
Companies Ordinances on 6 July 1949.  Under the Building Societies Act (1951) it was 
registered under certificate no 2 as a Building Society.  This followed turbulence in 
Congo-Zaire during the early 1960s which resulted in the exodus of white Belgians from 
that country to the then Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe.   
 
There was little confidence in the future of building societies in Southern Rhodesia, and 
this, together with a credit crunch prevailing at the time, led to large-scale repossessions of 
mortgaged properties. Numerous building societies existed, and were forced to 
amalgamate.  CABS amalgamated with the then Old Mutual Building Society and the 
Bulawayo and National Building Society to become Old Mutual Building Society, stated 
P. Cameroon. 
 
On 21 October 1961 two major events took place.  First, the Certificates of Registration of 
Bulawayo and National Building Society and of Central Africa Building Society were 
cancelled.  Second, Old Mutual Building Society changed its name to Central African 
Building Society, and was issued with a Certificate of Registration as provided for by 
Section 70 (5) of the Southern Rhodesia Building Societies Act, of 1951. 
 
According to the Central Africa Building Society (2006) Annual Report/Financial 
Statements the main business activities of CABS have been the raising and maintenance of 
a fund from which loans may be granted to: 
o Members and others on security of a mortgage or hypothecation with or without other 
approved collateral security; 
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o Members on security of pledge of their permanent shares in the society; and 
o Depositors on security of pledge of their fixed deposits in the society; and, generally, the 
carrying on and transaction of all such business as is provided for by the Building 
Societies Act.  
 
Qualitative Analysis using the BICEPS Model May 2003/June 2006 
(a) Business Strategy – Analysis 
According to the financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2004, the key profit 
drivers for CABS were fixed deposit interest income (sixty-one percent), advances interest 
income (twenty percent) and treasury bills interest income (eleven percent).  CABS has a 
‘footprint’ network system all over Zimbabwe, and enjoys support from its major 
shareholder Old Mutual, an international financial institution with foreign exchange and a 
strong capital base.  By end of 2007, CABS was undoubtedly the largest building society 
in Zimbabwe. 
 
CABS posted a net surplus of Zim$53 million for the year ended 30 June 2004, and 
retained earnings of Zim$49.3 million.  For the year ended 30 June 2006 the institution 
posted another surplus this time of Zim$4.2 trillion dollars, while most others, such as 
First National Building Society and Intermarket Building Society, incurred losses.  
 
According to P. Cameron the General Manager Finance (2006) the business strategy was 
formulated from the following strategic factors: 
o Continually seeking improved products to outmanoeuvre competitors. 
o Top management strongly believes that institutions that encourage effective strategic 
management generally outperform those that know nothing about it. 
o The institution scans the international, external and internal environments by monitoring, 
evaluating, and disseminating relevant information to all key members of staff, via e-mail. 
o Innovation, flexibility and responsiveness are important key success factors.  In addition, 
key strategic factors include return on equity and asset growth above the inflation rate.  
Operating costs and cost/income ratios are kept well below the inflation rate. 
o Top management strongly believes that business strategy in concept is not enough.  
Strategy, according to the General Manager: Finance and Treasury, must be understood, 
formulated, accepted and implemented by all members of staff, through participation in the 
strategic decision-making process. 
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o CABS dominates its chosen market sector (niche) of fixed deposits, mortgage services and 
investments, but is, however, mindful of threats from other banking institutions. 
o Top management remains committed to its marketing principle of satisfying customers’ 
needs more effectively than the competition. 
o In May 2006 the researcher requested and received the following documents from CABS 
management for study and analysis: 
 Copies of the institution’s business and corporate strategies covering the period 
2003/2006. 
 Correspondence, documents and minutes relating to strategic management covering the 
period 2003/2006. 
The institution’s strategy management efforts resulted in increased sales and market share, 
increase in business growth and general stakeholder satisfaction through “diversification of 
products and focus on electronic delivery”.    This was confirmed during the interview (9 
May 2006) with the General Manager: Finance and Treasury, P.N Cameron, who joined 
CABS in 1972. 
 
(b) Internal Control Systems - Analysis 
The Audit Committee, Risk Management and Assets and Liabilities Committees were 
established in 1996, eight years before the 2003/2006 banking crisis.  The chairpersons of 
these committees are independent non-executive directors, and not the chairperson of the 
board of directors. The organisational and reporting structure of the internal audit function 
is independent of the everyday management internal control process, as the Internal Audit 
report directly to the Audit Committee. 
 
The major shareholder, Old Mutual, was responsible for the appointment, remuneration, 
performance appraisal, transfer and dismissal of the head of internal audit. The researcher 
maintains that this function should be carried out by an independent Stakeholders’ 
Committee, in order to protect the interests of other stakeholders, including customers, 
creditors, employees, the government and the public in general. 
o CABS’ internal audit department has an audit charter, a standard audit plan, audit manual, 
a standard audit programme and internal control questionnaires.  The audit plan is 
formulated in consultation with External Audit to prevent any duplication of effort. 
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o With regard to compliance with institution’s policies of observing all procedures, rules, 
guidelines, directives, laws, and regulations - as well as detection of fraud, errors, omissions 
and any other irregularities, Cameron (2006) confirmed that “internal audit ensures that 
operations are conducted in terms of established procedures and statutory requirements”.  In 
addition, internal auditors are also guided by the International Auditing Guideline on Audit 
Sampling. 
o CABS internal audit reports cover the following items: An executive summary of the 
institution; period covered by the audit; the scope and objectives of the audit; the magnitude 
and significance of problems; recommended solutions or preventive actions; auditees’ 
comments on the issues with recommendations, and remedial measures taken or proposed to 
address audit issues; management’s achievements noted during the internal audit; and an 
overall conclusion. 
o The General Manager: Finance and Treasury confirmed that “the critical operational areas 
which entail significant risks to the operations and the financial condition of CABS include 
credit operations, treasury operations and information systems, and not derivatives and 
investments in Debt and Equity Securities”.  
o Securities held in the Treasury Bills investment (and not trading securities) account for a 
considerable proportion of the institution’s assets.  Apparently there are no inferior-quality 
securities that may adversely impact on CABS’s financial position.  The internal auditors are 
well-trained, and conversant with the institution’s investment strategy, the risk inherent in 
investment, policies and procedures, accounting and financial reporting, and legal and 
regulatory requirements. 
o CABS has a robust, watertight internal control framework tailored to the specific 
circumstances of the business, which are viewed by the top management as part of daily 
operational activities. “With the situation in Zimbabwe, where over seventy per cent of 
revenue is generated by dealing and investment securities, this requires watertight internal 
control and special emphasis from audit.  The Executive Management Committee has the 







o According to the General Manager: Finance and Treasury, the following internal controls are 
being implemented by CABS: 
 Dealing limits, which are closely monitored. 
 Computer-generated exception reports. 
 Limits of authority for every individual and department. 
 Exposure limits for each department. 
 Fixed Asset Register, maintained and updated monthly. 
 Top management are regularly required to declare interests in other institutions. 
 
In addition, the following objective and internal controls were used by CABS with regard 
to cash received; cheques received by post and delivery, and Real Time Gross Settlement 
(RTGS) deposits, said Cameron. 
 
Table 4.4.1  Objectives and internal controls used by CABS 
 




Internal Control Measures 





o RTGS deposits. 
 
a) To ensure that all cash delivered, 
cheques received by post and 
RTGS depositors are accounted 
for and accurately recorded in 
the relevant books of account. 
b) To ensure all such receipts are 
promptly and intactly deposited 
in the client’s or company’s 
bank account 
 
o Mail register cheques are 
deposited and receipt sent to 
client.  RTGS deposits are 
immediately deposited on 
receipt  
o These are checked against the 
RTGS notification. 
o Deeds notes and the Society’s 
official receipts are despatched 
to clients for all deposits made.  
 
 
o Cameron mentioned that the type of fraud most likely to occur through the bank accounts is 
the generation of fictitious CABS cheques which are used by fraudsters to make payments.  
“Security features on CABS cheques are publicized frequently, but attempts to commit 
fraud continue from time to time.  CABS top management therefore carry out daily bank 
reconciliations to minimize and isolate these cases”. 
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The directors nonetheless delegate internal control systems to management, and are 
generally satisfied with receiving reports on control issues and the status of corrective 
actions. The researcher maintains that directors must not delegate internal control systems 
to management.  They should take responsibility themselves and be themselves 
accountable to all stakeholders.  Internal control measures and risk-management guidelines 
should therefore be reviewed and implemented regularly. 
 
CABS top management is convinced that the benefits from the institution’s internal control 
measures have far exceeded the cost of establishing and implementing internal control 
systems.  It can be concluded that this is a sound measure of effective application of risk-
management and internal control systems. 
 
The researcher received the following from top management for research: 
 A sample of internal control reports 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2006. 
 Samples of Internal Audit Committee minutes 1 May 2004 to 30 June 2006. 
 Audit Charter and Plan. 
 Audit Manual and Programme. 
 Internal control questionnaires. 
 Authority to attend and observe relevant meetings between 1 January 2004 and December 
2006. 
 
The researcher maintain that the management of CABS has established effective financial 
and non-financial systems of controls. These have enabled them to carry on the business of 
the institution in an orderly and efficient manner, ensure adherence to management 
policies, safeguard the assets and secure, as far as possible, the completeness and accuracy 
of the records before, during and after the 2003/2006 banking crisis. 
 
(c )     Corporate Governance - Analysis 
o According to P. Cameron, General Manager Finance (2006),CABS has twelve members 
on the Board of Directors, ten of whom are non-executive directors, designated “A-Class 
Shareholder (Old Mutual)”. The major shareholder is responsible for identifying 
appropriate professionals who are specialists in their field of endeavour, and required to 
provide meaningful input to the banking situation.   
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o The researcher maintain that, while the major shareholder is expected to play a strategic 
role, participation of other stakeholders such as customers, employees, creditors, the 
government and the public should be taken seriously when appointing directors, and 
especially non-executive directors. 
 
o The ALCO Committee drives the most appropriate strategy for the Society in terms of the 
mix of assets and liabilities; determines the appropriate level of liquidity and ensures that 
agreed wholesale funding limits are not exceeded. It also ensures that the appropriate 
structure of the balance sheet in terms of funding mix, capital adequacy and risk-
management policy should have more non-executive than executive members.  
 
o The chairperson should also be a non-executive member, totally independent of executive 
members.  For example, according to the annual reports and financial statements for the 
year ended 30 June 2006 (p. 11) the committee failed to convene even a single meeting 
during the course of the year which is not a good corporate governance practice.  The 
chairperson of the committee was also the Managing Director, K.Terry, according to 
Annual Report (p 2).  CABS losses included more than Zim$100 billion to a fraudster, a 
certain ‘C. Ndlovu’, said Cameron. 
 
o According to the General Manager: Finance and Treasury, “the board tries to ensure that 
shareholder expectations are attained, while at the same time operating within the legal 
framework and complying with all statutory requirements.  In order to achieve shareholder 
satisfaction, support from clients is needed, and to achieve this motivated and efficient 
staff is required.  Supply and service agreements are also entered into with all suppliers of 
goods and services to ensure efficient and effective business operations” (personal 
conversation).  The researcher maintain that while it is critical to satisfy the needs of the 
‘A’ class shareholder (Old Mutual), the interests of other stakeholders should also be 








 As a means of formulating and implementing business and corporate strategies the 
executive management have an annual retreat where the objectives for the coming year are 
agreed on.  These are reviewed monthly and presented to the Board for approval.  “Board 
members are expected always to act in the best interests of the society”, according to 
Cameron.  Board members also ensure that the executive management acts responsibly in 
terms of parameters set by the board. The board sets limits, rules and regulations, and 
ensures that depositors’ funds are held safely and profitably. 
 
o The researcher considers that in order to satisfy the needs of all stakeholders, 
representatives of stakeholders should participate in strategic decision-making process. 
 
There is conclusive evidence that CABS has effective corporate governance practices with 
respect to all its statutory obligations, especially the provisions of sections 140, 176 and 
186 of the Zimbabwean Companies Act (Chapter 24:03) and provisions of sections 18 (2) 
19 and 20 of the Zimbabwe Banking Act (Chapter 24:20).  For example, “The Board 
receives monthly, half-yearly and annual financial statements.  Audit is currently 
conducted by external auditors KPMG (Chartered Accountants), Group Internal Audit and 
Internal Audit, said Cameron. The auditors report directly to the Audit Committee, who 
oversee production of the interim and final results.  The Board is directly responsible for 
these functions”, Cameron said.  The institution’s non-executive directors come from a 
business background, and fully understand the environment in which CABS operates and 
makes money. 
 
o On 30 September 2004 the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe responded to the collapse of more 
than a dozen banking institutions by issuing Guideline Number 01-2004/BSD, entitled 
Sound Corporate Governance Requirements.  To ensure that directors are constantly held 
accountable “the shareholder is responsible for the appointment of the Board of Directors.  
This ensures that the directors are accountable, and responsible for the efficient and 
effective governance of CABS.  Executive directors have no say in the appointment of 
directors.  Directors are required to hold only 50 shares each and the percentage holding is 
less than .01%. CABS reports board attendance to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, and 
eleven of the twelve members show over 75% attendance.  Board members are paid a set 
fee, and all committee work is paid on attendance.   
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CABS was of the view that the Guideline has transformed the institution with regard to 
management systems and risk-management.  “Before the Guideline, CABS was operating 
in terms of guidelines set by the parent company (Old Mutual PLC).  These have been 
aligned to that of the Reserve Bank.  Risk management has been enhanced and 
management systems improved as a result.  This is particularly true of reconciliations”, 
said Cameron. 
 
o CABS used the “Engaged Board” model.  Thus, the Board provides insight, advice and 
support to the Managing Director and the management team.  It also seeks out sufficient 
financial expertise from the banking sector to add value to decisions.  It appears that the 
purpose is to ensure that boards are not squeezed into rigid boxes, said Cameron. 
 
o CABS’s main social and environmental responsibilities include making large donations to 
sports bodies and charitable organisations.  It has also reduced charges and minimum 
balance requirements for the elderly (pensioners), and has produced a product with minimal 
charges for the mass “unbanked” market.  
o The researcher feels that CABS might do well to consider social responsibilities such as 
supporting more popular sports in the country, making contributions towards educational 
and medical utilities, collection of refuse in high-density areas and assist water supply 
utilities, as well as growing trees and other plants across the country. 
 
The researcher was authorized by CABS management to collect the following documents 
for research: 
 Annual reports and financial statements 2004/2006. 
 Board and committee minutes 2004/2006. 
 Attend and observe some board/committee meetings. 
 Interview customers, suppliers of goods and services, employees, shareholders, the 
government and non-executive directors about its operations. 
In the researcher’s opinion, while there was room for improvement, corporate governance 






(d) Ethics in Business - Analysis 
o CABS has a Code of Business Ethics.  It ensures that executive directors satisfy their 
personal interests, while remaining concerned about the interests of all other stakeholders. 
“People with defective moral upbringing and unethical behaviour have been restrained 
from tarnishing the image of the institution through anonymous tip-offs, which carry 
rewards” said Cameron on whistle-blowing.  In addition, people who operate outside the 
norms are disciplined in terms of the Code of Conduct.   
 
o CABS management regards the Association of Building Societies as a united body, 
representing the interests of societies to the regulatory authority and various government 
institutions.  In this way CABS is given the opportunity to attend to the interests even of 
its competitors.  Notwithstanding the competitive nature of the banking sector, CABS 
feels it can afford to be concerned about the interests of its competitors without 
necessarily jeopardizing its own chances of survival in the market. 
 
o CABS regards business ethics as prerequisite for sustained success, and, indeed, for 
excellence in business.  In other words, management strongly believes that it is possible 
to be both ethical and successful in business.  According to the General Manager Finance 
and Treasury: “Yes, ethics are essential, and without them the business will not be 
successful”. 
 
In order to ensure that everyone in the institution acts with integrity, CABS has taken steps 
such as including ethics guiding regulations in performance management contracts, 
recruitment policy documents, monthly appraisals processes and the performance-based 
remuneration system.  CABS has, over the years, used business ethics principles and 
guidelines to minimize fraud.“The culture developed over the years has continually 
minimized fraud.  People are aware that any fraudulent activity is pursued with vigour, and 
reports are made to the Zimbabwe Police for prosecution”, Cameron stated.  
 
o CABS has also cultivated an ethical culture over the past five years through the adoption and 
institutionalisation of a code of ethics.  The organisational culture has aligned the code of 
ethics to disciplinary procedures in order to gain the status of a living document.  The 
Board has therefore developed, implemented and institutionalised ethical performance 
based on its code of business ethics. 
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The researcher was authorised by management to obtain the following documents for 
research: 
 Copy of the Code of Ethics developed, revised, implemented, reported on and 
institutionalised from the year 2002 to 2006. 
 Correspondence and minutes relating to the institution’s disciplinary procedures from the 
year 2002 to 2006. 
 
The researcher feels that the top management should go further, and report ethical 
performance and benefits (if any) in the annual report and financial statements, something 
not done in 2003/2006.  Management should also communicate monthly reports, obtain 
feedback and then prepare reports for effective implementation.  CABS management 
should also establish a Business Ethics Committee. 
 
(e) Stakeholder Participation – Analysis 
Stakeholder participation should ensure that the direct and indirect interests of all 
stakeholders, including non-shareholders, are protected in normal operations and also in 
the event of collapse.  From the minutes record of CABS, management and shareholders 
have fully participated in all strategic decision-making process.   
 
The government has participated to some extent through the supervisory role of the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the Association of Building Societies, operating as a 
united body in making representations to the regulatory authorities and several government 
institutions.  There is, however, no conclusive evidence of the participation of the 
customers, creditors and the employees or their representatives. 
 
In the Risk Committee minutes of the sixth Audit Committee meeting (25 July 2005), 
paragraph 6 (b) concerns raised in the reports were: “No formal documented procedures 
for risk-management reporting.  No risk-management workshops were conducted with 
low-level staff.  Job description of a risk manager did not include the prerequisite 
qualification.  Some requirements by the RBZ have not been implemented and/or attended 




The views of both customers and employees should be taken into account when 
formulating and implementing business or corporate strategies. This is necessary for the 
purpose of improving the image of the institution and also for increasing market share and 
the value of business. 
 
(f) Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis  
The researcher maintains that the effectiveness of corporate governance structures of an 
institution should also be measured by the degree of satisfaction by all stakeholders. The 
following are the views of a selection of CABS customers (reported verbatim): 
 
Table 4.4.2 Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis of a Participant (Tinashe Denhere), 
March 2007 
Tinashe Denhere  - has been banking with CABS, First Street Branch , Harare, for the past 7 years 
Question Answer 
o For how long have you been banking 
with CABS? 
o 7 years 
 
o What do you think about these long 
queues, especially during pay days? 
o At CABS we do not talk of long queues during pay days.  Its 
every day, it is so boring and painful. 
o What do you think are the causes? 
 
o The tellers are very slow when serving people.  My main worry 
is I need to know the reason why CABS and Beverley cannot 
be able to go and collect their money straight from the Reserve 
Bank.  I have got two days coming here and I am told there is 
no cash but you would find some people who bank with other 
banks getting their money every day. WHY? The Governor of 
the Reserve Bank should address this to us if possible. 
o Are you happy with the services at 
CABS? 
 
o Honestly speaking not happy and I think the Government 
should monitor the situation at CABS.  It seems as if they are 
always on “GO SLOW” such that we will hate the Government. 
o Why are you not opening accounts 
with other banks? 
o These days you will be wasting your time because you will find 
long queues everywhere and I can not meet the requirements 
for these other banks.  Amount needed to open the account. 
o What do you think is the solution of 
these long queues? 
o CABS should go and get their money from RBZ straight not 
getting it from other banks. 
o They should look very carefully on the issue of always saying 
‘WE ARE OFF LINE, NO ELECTRICITY AND NO CASH’.  
I don’t know where did they got these three statements.  You 
have to expect one of these three statements when ever you 
reach at CABS. 
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Table 4.4.3Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis of a Participant (Shame Musengi) 
March, 2007 
Shame Musengi - has been banking with CABS, Jason Moyo Branch , Harare, for the past 9 years  
Question Answer 
o How long have you been banking with 
CABS? 
o Since 1999, which is now almost 9 years. 
 
o What do you thing about these long queues 
at CABS especially during pay days? 
o Why talking of pay days? Come here on the first day of 
next month and you will agree with me that you experience 
long queues every day at CABS. 
 




o Why do you say so? o If you want money here, then you should have a relative 
who works here.  All these people have been told there is 
no cash here, but a friend of mine who is here, got the 
money because his brother works here.  I am talking to him 
if he can also take my withdrawal slip and give it to his 
brother may be I will get cash today but now the problem 
is, he will need to be paid. 
o Are you happy with the services at CABS?  o No.  Maybe after this discussion I will be happy.  May you 
please help me, please! 
o Why are you not opening accounts with 
other banks like Kingdom, FBC or CFX? 
o The reason why I am sticking to CABS is because they 
have many branches around the country.  As you can see I 
am a soldier we move around the country so if I change 
this bank I will suffer when I travel outside Harare.  What I 
can do may be is to change from CABS to POSB because 
they also have many branches outside Harare, but I know 
you do agree with me that POSB and CABS are like 
brothers.  They do the same, very long queues everyday. 
o Is there any solution to these issues? 
 
o Every teller should work with a policeman or a soldier 
behind.  Honestly speaking you will not see these people 
spending hours outside.  Time is money my brother. 










Table 4.4.4 Stakeholder Satisfaction Analysis of a Participant (C. Kambawa), March 
2007 
 
C. Kambawa – has been banking with CABS, Chitungwiza Branch, for the past 22 years.  
Question Answer 
o How long have you been banking with 
CABS? 
o 22 years 
 
o What do you think about long queues 
especially during pay days? 
o As you can see I have been here since 04.00 am, 
Zimbabwe time and there is no hope that I will get the 
money today.  I have been coming here for the past four 
days and I managed to withdraw cash only yesterday 
and today I am just praying and may be I will win.  
These long queues are boring. 
o What do you think are the causes of these 
long queues? 
o Mismanagement of CABS.  
 
o Why do you say so? o Come and see why I am saying this?  They should be 
five tellers saving these thousands of people outside but 
as you can see only one teller is saving people and do 
you think he will be able to save all these people?  If 
you get in those back doors you should find them sitting 
inside there.  “Very, very poor management”. 
 
o Are you happy with the services at cabs? o How can I be happy with this?  I am even very angry 
with these people.  I am looking for the manager.  I 
need money today. 
o Why are you not opening accounts with 
these other banks like Kingdom or CBZ? 
o I really want to do that but for me to open the account I 
need to have cash.  I even tried to open with FBC and I 
was told some shocking amounts.  They need THIRTY 
TRILLION for me to open the account, yet here I am 
waiting to withdraw three trillion.  How many days can 
I take to raise THIRTY TRILLION?  I have got a 
family to feed.  The situation is just dangerous.  May be 
you may help me, what can I do? 
o What do you think must be done to solve 
these problems of long queues? 
o You know the answer.  May be you want me to get 






The researcher considers that CABS, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the government 
should be requested to attend to the following as a matter of urgency: 
o With the large number of customers, the Directors of CABS should engage the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe and ensure that they receive sufficient cash timeously and with 
sufficient support. ATMs should always work effectively, preferably 24 hours a day, and 
with sufficient cash.   
CABS should also train their branch managers and staff, and ensure that they satisfy 
customers’ needs better than the competition.  In addition, the branch managers and staff 
of CABS should be motivated and encouraged to observe basic business ethics principles.  
Information technology should also be improved in line with socio-economic pressures in 
Zimbabwe and allow customers to use VISA –electronic systems, for example, to make 
purchases from most retail shops.  They should do bench-marking and see how Standard 
Chartered Zimbabwe Limited Bank VISA –electronic systems is doing it.  Directors of 
CABS should also take responsibility for easing the suffering of their customers by 
deploying a sufficient number of efficient tellers around the country.  Customers should be 
allowed to withdraw all their cash at once. 
o The RBZ should also institute close supervision, including independent investigations, and 
also present monetary policies, in order to minimize the suffering of customers and the 
public.   
The Government should play a role too, for example, by allowing customers to withdraw 
sufficient cash from retail shops. It should also implement fundamental changes on matters 
of political, social and economic reforms. 
 
It can be concluded that CABS should not only satisfy the needs of shareholders, top 
management, creditors and the government, but should also take the views of customers 
and non-managerial staff seriously.  These stakeholders will play a major role in the 
success of CABS well into the future.  Below is a tabulated summary of the position of 








Table 4.4.5 Summary of the Position of Central African Building Society, 30 June 
2006. 
 
BICEPS Component Composite Rating 
o Business Strategy – Analysis 
o Internal Control Systems – Analysis 
o Corporate Governance – Analysis 
o Ethics In Business – Analysis 
o Participation Of All Stakeholders – Analysis 







Overall Composite Rating B2 
 
This composite rating of CABS shows a satisfactory position, with effective corporate 
governance structures. 
 
Qualitative Analysis using the Altman Z-Score Model. 
 Z= 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 + 0.6x4 + 1.0X5 
The following table represents computations for the years ended 31 December 2004 and 
31 December 2006 respectively, based on the annual reports and financial statements for 
CABS. 
 
Table 4.4.6 Computations for the years ended 31 December 2004 and 31 December 
2006 
Ratio Details Model 
Coefficient  
31 December 2004 31 December 2006 
Ratio Score Ratio Score 
o Net Working Capital/Total Assets 
o Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
o Earnings Before Income Tax/Total Assets 
o Shareholder’s Equity/Total Liabilities 



































Balance Sheet Items/Income Statement Items 31 December 2004 31 December 2006 
 
o Net Working Capital 
o Earnings Before Income Tax 
o Retained Earnings 
o Total Assets 
o Equity 
o Sales 
o Total Liabilities 
Zim$ 000’s 
17 720 028 
53 318 901 
49 318 901 
267 981 777 
92 363 376 
147 356 510 
175 618 401 
Zim$ million 
588 851 
4 196 460 
4 196 460 
17 337 203 
6 897 911 
10 326 315 
10 439 292  
 
The sound shareholders’ equity/liabilities ratio strengthened the institution’s balance sheet, 
with the total shareholders’ equity increasing from Zim$ 14.8 million in June 2003 to 
Zim$92.3 million in June 2004.  The significant contributing factor was doubtless sound 
corporate governance structures compared with banking institutions placed under 
liquidation and the ‘A’ Class Shareholder, Old Mutual.  This assisted in boosting market 
confidence during the period that saw the collapse of more than twenty indigenous banks, 
said Cameron. 
 
The institution’s operations continued to improve, with the Altman–Z Value improving 
from 1.8 (June 2004) to 2.2 (June 2006), a level well beyond financial distress.  This was 
likewise attributed to sound corporate governance structures and a credible major 
shareholder, Old Mutual. The institution recorded a growth in assets and equity after 
recording a net surplus of Zim$4.2 trillion in 2006.  There was no volatility in terms of 











(c) Qualitative Analysis using Risk-Based Supervision Policy Framework Guideline 
Number 2-2006/BSD, (Reserve Bank) 
On 28 February 2007 the Reserve Bank awarded a 2 (satisfactory) off-site rating, based on 
information available to the examiners on 31 December 2006. The following table shows 
the selected key indicators used.   
 
Table 4.4.7.  Central Africa Building Society Selected Key Indicators December 2006 
KEY RATIOS Dec 2005 June 2006 Sept 2006 Dec 2006 Ind. Ave 
MEASURES OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
Equity to assets  28.97% 43.70% 42.02% 69.50% 49.06% 
Tier 1 ratio 34.54% 40.70% 46.99% 41.02% 40.00% 
Capital adequacy ratio 54.80% 73.57% 66.31% 81.94% 77.85% 
Net capital base  $1.48 b $8.08 bn 11.87 bn $69.38 bn $24.89 bn 
MEASURES OF ASSET QUALITY 


















































MEASURES OF EARNINGS 
Return on assets (ROA) 13.08% 23.81% 13.46% 31.23% 26.66% 
Return on equity (ROE) 45.15% 54.48% 32.02% 44.65% 55.33% 
Net Interest Margin 17.66% 27.47% 20.17% 31.41% 34.77% 
Cost/Income 26.14% 58.19% 59.27% 27.41% 51.18% 
Cost of deposits 30.86% 53.70% 27.30% 26.01% 31.05% 
Yield on advances 45.27% 72.73% 45.63% 58.62% 51.62% 
Net profit/loss $471.48 m $4.39 bn $3.79 bn $31.11 bn $11.67 bn 
LIQUIDITY AND FUNDS MANAGEMENT 
Total deposits $3.027 tn $8.52 bn $14.35bn $28.54 bn $12.67 bn 
Prudential liquidity ratio 83.78% 86.44% 95.52% 85.22% 130.28% 
Total deposits/total assets 59.24% 46.05% 50.86% 27.60% 37.54% 
Total loans/total deposits 15.03% 15.24% 11.46% 14.82% 17.76% 
CUMMULATIVE GAP 
0-30 Days ($1.607bn) ($4.52 bn) ($5.28b) (19.30 bn) ($32.48bn) 
0-90 Days ($24.34bn) (2.63 bn) ($5.12b) ($18.40bn) ($29.75bn) 
0-360 Days $11.92 bn ($2.16 bn) (3.17 bn) ($7.35 bn) $2.91 bn 
INTEREST RATE SENSITIVITY RATIO 
3 months 123.60% 72.43% 59.10% 27.48% 53.87% 
6 months 126.49% 74.11% 65.85% 34.34% 109.65% 
12 months 323.59% 77.38% 71.20% 64.54.% 136.44% 






The RBZ was, however, concerned that “the society has not yet fully complied with the 
corrective order issued on 1 December 2005, in respect of appointment of additional 
directors to the board, and strengthening of risk-management systems”. The Reserve Bank 
grading of 2 (satisfactory) owed much to three parameters. In market share and ranking the 
society commanded pole position in terms of asset base (60.18%); advances (49.16%) and 
deposit base (56.30%). 
 
According to Reserve Bank, (2006) Offsite Quarterly Report, based on the assessment of 
CAMELS factors and stress testing, the results are summarized as follows: 
o Capital Adequacy was rated 1(strong).  CABS was adequately capitalised with a capital 
base of Zim$69.38 billion, and capital adequacy ratio of 81.94%.  The growth in the capital 
position is attributable to retained earnings of Zim$32.13 billion and revaluation reserves of 
Zim$34.73 billion, recorded during the period under review.  Both earnings and 
shareholders provided adequate support to its actual and projected capital requirements. 
o Asset Quality was rated 1(strong).  The exposure to credit risk declined, as evidenced by 
the fall in the ratio of adversely classified loans to total loans from 10.1% (30 September 
2006) to 3.4% (31 December).  Although the loan book increased from Zim$1.62 billion to 
Zim$4.22 billion over the quarter, it constituted only 4.10% of the society’s total assets of 
Zim$103 billion on 31 December 2006. 
o Management was rated 2 (satisfactory).  The society has taken too long to comply fully 
with the corrective order of 1 December 2005 in respect of appointment of additional 
directors to the board and the strengthening of risk management systems.  This reflects 
alack of responsiveness to issues raised by regulatory authorities.  Management has, 
however, maintained the society in a sound condition in a difficult macroeconomic 
environment. 
o Earnings were rated 1 (strong).  The society recorded a net surplus of Zim$32.08 billion in 
the six months ended 31 December 2006, compared to Zim$471.48 million in the 
comparable period in 2005.  Income from investments and securities accounted for 88.43% 
of total income, followed by mortgages, which contributed 11.07%.  CABS’s income mix 
reflects the operating environment with prohibitive lending rates, which resulted in reduced 
activity in mortgage business.  The institution’s cost to income ratio of 27.41% was below 
the industry average of 51.18%.  This low ratio was attributed mainly to the significant 
increase in income [Reserve Bank (2006) Offsite Quarterly Report]. 
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o Liquidity and Funds Management was rated 1(strong).  Funding risk was low, as 
evidenced by a 100% increase in the deposit base from Zim$14.35 billion to Zim$28.54 
billion over the quarter ended 31 December 2006. 
 
o The society had negative mismatches in the 0-30, 0-90 and 0-360 time bands.  However, it 
had sufficient liquid assets in the form of Treasury Bills to enable it to meet its obligations 
as they fell due.  Its place in the Old Mutual Group gave it a strong fall-back position in the 
event of a liquidity crunch.                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
o Sensitivity to Market Risk was rated 2(satisfactory).  CABS liability-sensitive book, as 
reflected by interest sensitivity ratios of 27.48%, 34.34% and 64.54% in the 3,6 and 12 
months, respectively, exposed it to high market risk in an environment of rising interest 
rates.  However, stress tests results indicate that a 100% increase in interest rates would 
have resulted in the institution’s capital adequacy level declining to 48.61% from 81.94%, 
other things being equal.    
 
It can be concluded that while the results of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe were based on 
off-site examination, the researcher agrees with the findings, as they correspond to 

















4.4.2    Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
 
Background 
Stanbic Bank was registered in 1989;a ‘family member’ of the Standard Bank Group, 
Africa’s largest banking operation.  The Group operations in Africa are, as then, managed 
through African Banking Group (ABG), based in Johannesburg, South Africa.  The oldest 
ABG operations are Standard Bank Namibia, established in 1915, and Standard Bank 
Swaziland, founded in 1988.  With the acquisition of the ANZ Grind lays Banking in 1992 
with its operations network in eight countries, the Group began expanding into Sub-
Saharan Africa, including Zimbabwe, said A. Tsimba the Head, Legal and Corporate 
Governance. 
 
Besides Zimbabwe, in 2006 Stanbic operated in17 African countries including South 
Africa. The bank offers retail and commercial banking services, treasuring operations and 
all forms of trade financing.  With the support of Corporate and Institutional Banking and 
Standard Bank, London, corporate clients in Africa have access to project finance, 
privatisation, structured lending and the channelling of aid and concessionary lending to 
Africa. 
 
The Standard Bank is committed to a single-brand strategy, the only exception being the 
use of the Stanbic Bank brand in certain of its African operations, where it is legally 
required to clearly differentiate itself from the UK-based Standard Chartered Bank PLC. 
 
Qualitative Analysis – using BICEPS Model,1 January 2004 / 31December 2006 
Business Strategy – Analysis 
The key profit drivers of Stanbic Bank have been, and remain, income from interest fees, 
commission income and trading income.  Based on historical cost figures, the institution 
achieved a satisfactory profit after tax of Zim$232 million, a 673% increase from the 
Zim$30 million achieved in 2003, when several indigenous banks were experiencing 
profitability difficulties.  Interest income grew by 633%, although driven by the high 





This was largely because of inflationary pressures, where average inflation for the year 
was 381%, and the Zimbabwe dollar depreciated from Zim$824 to the US dollar in 
December 2003 to Zim$5 800.In order to avoid being outmanoeuvred by aggressive 
competitors, corporate and business strategies are formulated at least annually, until socio-
economic stability returns. 
 
The key strategic factors of Stanbic include “serving our customers, being pro-active, 
working as a team, respecting each other and serving our people”. According to the 
Company Secretary of Stanbic, business strategy is not enough when it comes to leading.  
“There should be a balance between business strategy and being able to lead your 
subordinates effectively to achieve the strategy”, in order to achieve the main objectives of 
the institution. 
 
In 2007 Stanbic management recognised that it was dominating the chosen market 
segment within the banking industry.  However, it aims also to enter and specialise in 
other areas that generate income, considering that there is merit in diversifying the bank’s 
business. 
 
Ethics in Business – Analysis 
According to the Head, Legal and Corporate Governance, A.Tsimba the executive 
directors are effectively serving their personal interests, while also caring about those of 
other stakeholders.  This is largely because there is a structured balance between the 
serving of the business, stakeholders and personal interests. 
 
The bank has a code of business ethics.  People with defective moral upbringing and 
unethical behaviour have been restrained from tarnishing the image of the institution.  
“The Bank has recently rolled out new vision and values which everyone is expected to be 
abide by.  To date these have been well-accepted and followed”, says Tsimba.  In addition, 
the bank rewards staff for ethical behaviour.  Stanbic also believes in ensuring long-term 
sustainability by harmonising the needs of all stakeholders, in particular, by being relevant 
to the societies in which they operate. Tsimba shares the view of others that it is possible 




She mentioned the bank’s values of “upholding the highest levels of integrity” noting that 
it “is one of the new values recently rolled out across the Group”.  The institution has 
consistently produced guidelines for business ethics principles, and minimises fraud by 
ensuring that all staff abide by them. 
 
The bank has also cultivated an ethical culture through the adoption of a code of ethics.  
For example, in 2004 it adopted the Corporate Governance Guidelines and the Banking 
Code of Ethics issued by the Reserve Bank, and in 2005 it produced a new issue of vision 
and values, said Tsimba. 
 
These measures are highly commendable particularly in contrast to other banking 
institutions placed under liquidation during the 20032006 banking crisis.  In addition, top 
management should report on ethical performance and benefits (if any) in its annual 
reports.  They should also establish a Business Ethics Committee. 
 
Internal Control Systems – Analysis 
The Corporate Audit Committee was established in 1999, four years before the 2003/2006 
banking crisis.  The chairperson is an independent non-executive director.  The Chairman 
of the Board of Directors is not part of the Corporate Audit Committee.  The institutional 
and reporting structure of the internal audit function is completely independent of the 
everyday management internal control process. 
 
The Internal Audit Department plays a significant role in ensuring that the bank’s policies 
and procedures are followed.  It is also involved in the prevention, detection and 
investigation of fraud and other irregularities.  The Internal Auditors are also guided by the 
International Auditing Guideline on Audit Sampling. 
 
The main items covered by the internal audit reports include an executive summary; period 
covered; the scope and objectives; the significance of problems; causes of these problems; 
recommended solutions or preventive actions; auditors’ comments on the issues and 
recommendations, and remedial measures taken or proposed to address the audit issues; 
management’s achievements noted during the internal audit; and overall conclusion. 
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The management believes that credit and treasury operations, derivatives, investment in 
debt and equity securities and information systems are critical operational areas, which 
entail significant risks. These have the potential for adverse impact on operations and 
financial condition.  It can be deduced that, with investment and trading securities making 
up a relatively minor proportion of the bank’s assets, management should not allow 
derivatives and investments in debt and equity securities to operate at significant risks; 
they are not supposed to be part of their core business. 
 
Stanbic internal auditors are well conversant with investment strategy, the risk inherent in 
investment, policies and procedures, accounting and financial reporting and legal and 
regulatory requirements.  The institution has a robust, watertight internal control 
framework. These are tailored to the specific aspects of the business considered by the top 
management as part of daily operational activities.  They are reviewed frequently to ensure 
they remain updated and in keeping with market trends.  The head of Risk-Management 
responsible for establishing internal control systems in close consultation with all 
departments, and ensuring that they are observed, said Tsimba. 
 
The following are the objectives and internal control measures with respect to cash 
received, cheques received (delivery and by post), and Real Time Gross Settlement 
(RTGS) deposits, said Tsimba. 
 
Table 4.4.8. Objectives and internal control measures 
Area of Business Objectives Internal Control Measures  
o Cash received. 
 
o Cheques received by 
post and delivered. 
 
o RTGS deposits. 
 
a. To ensure that all cash delivered, 
cheques received by post and 
RTGS depositors are accounted 
for and accurately recorded in the 
relevant books of account. 
b.To ensure all such receipts are 
promptly and intactly deposited in 
the clients’ or company’s bank 
account. 
o Procedures and manuals are 
in place for handling cash 
deposits, cheques received 
and RTGS deposits. 
o They are also constantly 
checked by the Risk Control 





Aisha Tsimba, head of Legal and Corporate Governance, considered that money-
laundering on dormant accounts and abuse of the institution’s accounts by staff members 
(usually authorised signatories) are the types of fraud most likely to occur.  These areas of 
potential risk are assessed regularly and corrective action taken. 
 
The directors are satisfied with delegating internal control systems to management, and 
also with receiving reports on control issues with the status of corrective actions: “They 
are certainly kept updated on major and critical issues”. The researcher maintains that the 
Board of Directors ought not to delegate these functions entirely.  Instead, they should take 
full responsibility, and be accountable to all stakeholders.  Internal control measures and 
risk-management guidelines should therefore be continually reviewed and implemented 
under the direct guidance of the Board, said Tsimba. 
 
Stanbic management has shown, from retained earnings in 2003 and 2006 that the 
observable benefits from the institution’s internal control measures have far exceeded the 
cost of establishing and implementing them, surely a good measure of effective application 
of risk-management strategies and internal control systems. 
 
The researcher is satisfied the management of Stanbic Bank has established an effective 
financial and non-financial system of controls and risk-management strategies. As a result, 
business is carried on in an orderly and efficient manner, in adherence to management 
policies; safeguarding of assets and completeness and accuracy of the records. This applies 
to the periods before, during and following the 2003/2006 banking crisis.  
 
Corporate Governance – Analysis 
On 8 May 2006 Aisha Tsimba, mentioned above as Head of Legal and Corporate 
Governance, confirmed that the institution had twelve directors, ten of whom were non-
executive.  These are identified and engaged “through the Board Appointment and 
Nominations Committee.  This would be applicable to all directors”.  Prospective 
directors’ names, qualifications and details are forwarded to the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe for approval.  The Board of Directors approves appointments, subject to all 




The researcher maintains that the executive directors should not be responsible for 
nominating and appointing non-executive directors.  The latter should be independent, as 
they are expected to ‘police’ the executive directors.  While major shareholders are 
expected to play an important role in the appointment of executive directors, the 
appointment of non-executive directors needs wide consultation with representatives of 
other stakeholders: customers, creditors, employees, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and 
members of the public.  This could be achieved by the establishment of the Stakeholders 
Commission, recognized by the Zimbabwe Banking Act (Chapter 24:20). 
 
The Board of Directors has ultimate responsibility for risk management, which includes 
evaluating key risk areas and ensuring that processes for risk management and systems of 
internal control are implemented.   To assist in this the Board has appointed a number of 
risk committees, which include the Audit, Credit and the Risk Management Committees.  
The other governance committees include Loans Review, Asset and Liability, the Human 
Resources and the Executive Committees.  These committees are composed largely of 
non-executive directors, and are chaired by non-executive directors. 
 
It is commendable that the Board takes ultimate responsibility for risk management and 
systems of internal control. However, the appointment of various committee members 
should take into account the views of other stakeholders to ensure high levels of integrity, 
competence and independence.  All stakeholders should also participate in the formulation 
and implementation of strategic decisions made by the various committees.  
 
The Board of Directors has aligned the goals of the institution with those of all 
stakeholders “by participating in budget, strategy issues, without taking an executive role 
in these” said (Tsimba).  In order to formulate business and corporate strategies, individual 
units propose strategies which are considered by the Executive Committee.  They are then 
discussed in various committees, and finally tabled at the Board Meetings for final 
approval.  Where the interests of major shareholders conflict with those of the institution, 





The researcher maintains that while the board members may delegate some responsibilities 
to management and governance committees, they should not delegate statutory obligations, 
such as the provisions of sections 140, 176 and 186 of the Zimbabwe Companies Act 
(Chapter 24:03).  However, it is pleasing to note that all non-executive directors are aware 
of the economic, social and political environment, and understand well how the 
organisation makes money.  This is attributable to a detailed induction programme for new 
directors.  Performance is measured by their effectiveness and stakeholder satisfaction. 
 
The board engagement in influencing management decisions and overall direction is 
determined by the “Engaged Board” model.  “Thus, board members provide insight, 
advice and support to the Managing Director and management team.  It also seeks industry 
and banking expertise to add value to decisions, said Tsimba. 
 
Each member of the Board of Directors is required to sign a terms of reference and 
performance contract, and is thus held accountable for efficient and effective governance.  
The bank has complied with most of the provisions of the Zimbabwe Banking Act 
(Chapter 24:20), especially current sections of 18 (2), 19, 19(1) and (b) and 20. 
 
These measures are carried out by the company secretary, who ensures that required 
regulatory approvals are sought, and that directors do not contravene any provisions of the 
Act.  Keeping updated records of directors’ shareholding and other directorships has also 
assisted significantly. 
 
In order to ensure that every board member, especially non-executive directors, attend at 
least seventy-five per cent of the board meetings, meeting dates are agreed upon and 
confirmed by all members at least ten working days before the meeting.  In addition, the 
company secretary ensures that every director is not over-committed in other areas which 







According to Tsimba, the Guideline on “Sound Corporate Governance Requirements” has 
improved the institution’s management systems.  The Guideline has also increased 
profitability, value of business, return on investments and stakeholder satisfaction.  
“However, being part of an international group, Stanbic subscribed to international 
corporate governance standards and recommendations, e.g., King’s Report, before the 
issuance of the Guideline”. 
 
Although not giving practical examples, the management insists that “the institution is 
very involved in social and environmental responsibilities.  This is regularly reported at 
board level.  “We believe in giving back to the community” (Tsimba). 
 
The researcher maintains that Stanbic Bank directors should, ideally, also consider 
supporting most popular sporting activities in Zimbabwe, making contributions towards 
educational and medical utilities, collection of refuse in high-density areas and assist in 
water supply utilities, as well as growing and maintaining trees or vegetation across the 
country. 
 
Stakeholder Participation – Analysis 
Stakeholder participation seeks to ensure that the direct and indirect interests all 
stakeholders, including non-shareholders, are protected, in normal operations or in the 
event of collapse. From data collected from the management, top management, 
shareholders, and, to a lesser extent, the government (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe), it is 
clear that stakeholders have participated in all strategic decision-making process. 
There is, however, no conclusive evidence that non-managerial staff, customers and 
creditors have participated.  The researcher considers that this is necessary for the purpose 









The views expressed in the table below expressed the majority of the non-managerial staff 
interviewed by the researcher at various branches:  
Table 4.4.9 Stakeholder Participation – Analysis of a Participant, April 2007 
Question Answer 
o State the name of your institution o Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
o What is your position within the institution? o Team Leader Customer Service 
o For how long have you been with the institution? o Eight years 
o Is it necessary for you to participate in the formulation 
of your institution’s business strategies or planning 
process? 
o Yes 
o If the answer is Yes, please explain why it is 
necessary, and how this can be done. 
o It is necessary because I am in contact with 
customers on a daily basis.  This gives me an 
idea of what they really want. I understand 
customers’ needs thus I can make suggestions to 
retail business units on how we can improve our 
services depending on customers’ needs. 
o How many times (if any) have you participated in the 
formulation of business strategies of your 
organisation? 
o None. 
o State  your personal and essential needs. o Transport 
o Food  
o Housing 
o Clothing  
o Study 
o Has your institution assisted you in satisfying any of 
your personal and essential needs? 
o Yes, by giving me allowances for transport and 
food.  Stanbic also avails loans for me to be able 
to meet my needs.  They have given me house 
loans, car loan and study loans. 
o In your opinion, do you think your institution is 
satisfying the needs or interests of all stakeholders, 
namely shareholders, suppliers of goods and services, 
the government (ZIMRA or RBZ), customers, 
employees, management and the public in general? 
o Yes, to a large extent, since it has been making 
substantial profits, adhering to stipulated 
regulations, providing a variety of products, 
paying the employees and availing loans to them 
and giving back to the community through 
donations etc. 
o Explain how your institution would benefit from 
satisfying the needs of all stakeholders in question  
above. 
o Stanbic benefits in that more investments are 
channelled into the bank, more customers open 
accounts, staff members develop more and more 
and a great reputation is developed in the 
community, which gives it a good name. 
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While the majority of non-managerial staff were generally happy as far as personal needs 
and training are concerned, they feel that there has not been meaningful participation in the 
formulation of the business strategies of the institution. 
 
Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis 
As mentioned above, the degree of satisfaction of all stakeholders must be considered as 
an index of the effectiveness of the corporate governance structures of an institution. The 
following are the views of some stakeholders: 
 
Table 4.4.10 Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis of a Participant (Venticent Goto) 
April 2007 
Venticent Goto has been banking with Stanbic, Masasa Branch , for 6 years 
Question Answer 
o How long have you been banking with 
Stanbic Bank? 
o Six years 
o What do you think about these long 
queues, especially during paydays? 
o Stanbic Bank used to be a very good bank but these days if 
you want to be served fast then you should go to their very 
good branches, such as Westgate and Belgravia.  I don’t 
know; may be it is because that is where you find many white 
people.  I tell you these branches are just good.  Man. If you 
are in a hurry, do not go to the Nelson Mandela branch.  They 
are very slow and I am very anxious to know why. 
o What do you think are the causes? o I think its poor management in some branches.  All tellers 
should work, but you find that of all the six tellers who should 
be working, only two will be serving these hundreds of people 
on the queue.  Where are the other four? 
o Are you happy with the services at 
Stanbic Bank? 
o I am not happy at all.  These people should work. 
o Why are you not opening accounts with 
other banks?  
o I am just hoping that with good management Stanbic will be 
like what it used to be.  Again at times it is better than other 
banks.  May be if they fail I will try N.M.B. bank - not all 







Table 4.4.11 Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis of a participant (Brian 
Munyangadzi) April 2007 
Brian Munyangadzi has been banking with Stanbic, Park Lane Branch ,  Harare, for  nearly 5 
years 
Question Answer 
o How long have you been banking 
with Stanbic Bank?  
o Nearly five years now. 
o What do you think about these long 
queues, especially during paydays? 
o These days with the situation in Zimbabwe you get 
queues everywhere.  Its not paydays only.  Every day 
is now payday in Zimbabwe.  Long queues are 
everywhere and every day. 
o What do you think are the causes? o The situation in Zimbabwe man.  You know the 
situation. 
o Are you happy with the services at 
Stanbic Bank? 
o I am not happy at all but otherwise it is not their fault.  
Only at Nelson Mandela Branch where the manager is 
supposed to tell the tellers to be fast.  That branch is 
just so slow. 
o Why are you not opening accounts 
with other banks? 
o Man I have told you that you get queues everywhere 
and at any bank and may be at NMB is where you 
cannot get a queue.  As long as the bank is here in 
Zimbabwe then you should expect these long queues. 
o What do you think are the solutions 
to these long queues? 
o At the moment I do not have the answer to that but 
may you please come and see me after the talks 













Table 4.4.12 Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis of a Participant (Stamble Gumbo) 
April 2007 
Stamble Gumbo has been banking with Stanbic, Nelson Mandela Branch, Harare, for 12 
years. 
Question Answer 
o How long have you been banking with 
Stanbic Bank? 
o  Twelve years now. 
o What do you think about long queues, 
especially during paydays? 
o I think the Governor of Reserve Bank should 
answer when it comes to paydays. Everyone 
should take his or her salary once.  For 
example, most of us are paid salaries which are 
less than 600 dollars (revalued), but for me to 
get that I must go to the bank two times which 
is two days. 
o What do you think are the causes? o The withdrawal limits.  The Governor should 
increase it to at least 1000 dollars (revalued), 
you will not see these long queues.  People do 
not have money. 
o Are you happy with services at Stanbic 
Bank? 
o I am happy with Stanbic although they have to 
tell their tellers to be fast at times. 
 
The researcher is satisfied that Stanbic is doing fairly well in satisfying most of the 
interests of all its stakeholders. There is however room for improvement on payment of 
cash to customers.  They should, however, ensure that the ATMs are always operating 
effectively, preferably 24 hours a day, and with sufficient cash. The bank should also train 
branch managers and staff, especially of the Nelson Mandela Branch, to ensure that they 
satisfy customers’ needs better than the competition.  Information technology should also 
be improved, in line with socio-economic pressures, and all customers ought to be able to 
use credit cards to make purchases from most shops.  They should also do benchmarking, 
and see how Standard Chartered Zimbabwe, Limited, a member of the group, is managing 
payment of cash.  Stanbic should also do more on matters of social and environmental 





The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe should also devise monetary policies designed to 
minimize the unnecessary suffering of members of the public.  For example, with the high 
inflation, they should be allowed to withdraw their salaries in a single operation.  Cash 
withdrawal limits should be reviewed weekly.  The Government should increase its 
effectiveness, and implement the fundamental changes mentioned above. 
 
         Below is a tabulated summary of the position of Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Limited -31 
December 2006. 
 
Table 4.4.13 Summary of the Position of Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Limited, 31 
December 2006 
BICEPS Component Composite Rating 
o Business Strategy – Analysis “A1” 
o Internal Control Systems – Analysis “A1” 
o Corporate Governance – Analysis “B2” 
o Ethics In Business – Analysis “B2” 
o Participation Of All Stakeholders – Analysis “B2” 
o Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis “A1” 
Overall Composite Rating “B2” 
 
The composite rating of the bank showed a satisfactory position, and indicated the 














Qualitative Analysis – using the Altman Z-Score model for Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe 
Limited 
Z= 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 + 0.6x4 + 1.0X5 
   = 1.15 
 
The following table represents computations for the years ended 31 December 2004 and 
31 December 2006 respectively, based on Stanbic annual reports and financial statements. 
 
Table 4.4.14 Computations for the years ended 31 December 2004 and 31 December 
2006 
Ratio Details Model 
Coefficient  
31 December 2004 31 December 2006 
Ratio Score Ratio Score 
o Net working capital/total assets 
o Retained earnings/total assets 
o Earnings before tax/total assets 
o Shareholder equity/total liabilities 































Altman Z – Score Model =   1.15  1.93 
 
KEY: 
Balance Sheet /Income Statement Items 31 December 2004 31 December 2006 
 
o Net working capital 
o Earnings before tax 
o Retained earnings 
o Total assets 
o Equity 
o Sales 





2 140 287 
221 841 
662 334 
1 918 446 
Zim$ 000’s 
18 199 789 
35 512 092 
22 675 239 
132 322 313 
33 823 038 
57 466 803 
98 499 275  
 
Stanbic Bank’s relatively low Z-Score Model score of 1.15 on 31 December 2004 was 
largely attributable to weak Net Working Capital/Total Assets, Sales/Total Assets and 
Shareholder Equity/Total Liabilities ratios. 
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Stanbic Bank’s business operations, however, improved, with the Altman–Z Value 
improving from 1.15 (December 2004) to 1.93 (December 2006), under very difficult 
political and socio-economic conditions.  The bank’s relative success was largely 
attributed to effective management, sound corporate governance structures and efficient 
supervision by the Banking Licensing Supervision and Surveillance Division of the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe after the 2003/2006 banking crisis, especially the effective 
implementation of the Guideline.  Stanbic Bank also, being a member of Standard Bank 
Group, assisted in improving its capital base and its corporate image in the eyes of the 
investing public. 
 
Qualitative Analysis using Risk-Based Supervision Policy Framework Guideline 
Number 2-2006/BSD, (Reserve Bank) 
The Reserve Bank conducted its last on-site examination, using the risk-based supervision 
methodology, on 31 December 2005, and awarded an overall composite rating of 1 
(strong). Results from the CAMELS rating scale are summarised below: 
 
Table 4.4.15 Results from the CAMELS rating scale 

























Composite Rating Notes 
o 1 Strong sound in every respect. 
o 2 Satisfactory fundamentally sound. 
o 3 Fair  some degree of supervisory practices or conditions 
o 4 Weak unsafe and unsound practices or conditions. 
o 5 Critical extremely unsafe and unsound practices or conditions; a critically 
deficient performance; often contain inadequate risk management 
practices relative to the institution’s size, complexity and risk profile; 
and are of the greatest supervisory concern. 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe conducted its last on-site examination in 2005.  Based on 
assessment of CAMELS factors and stress testing, the results are summarized below: 
 
Capital Adequacy was rated 1 (strong).  The institution was adequately capitalised, with 
shareholders’ funds increasing from Zim$220 377 in 2004 to Zim$ 1 762 842 in 2005. 
Asset Quality was rated 1 (strong). While the loans and advances to customers increased 
from Zim$252 540 in 2004 to Zim$626 807 in 2006, 74% of total assets were in the form 
of cash and cash equivalents, and high-quality financial instruments.  There was no 
exposure to credit risk. 
Management was rated 1 (strong).  The level and quality of oversight and support of all 
activities by the Board of Directors, management, and, more importantly, effective 
corporate governance structures such as Risk Management, Audit, Credit, Loans Review, 
Asset and Liability and Human Resources Committees were all rated strong. 
Earnings were rated 1 (strong).  Total sales increased from Zim$640 924 in 2004 to 
Zim$3 214 812 in 2005.  Profit before tax also increased from Zim$341 634 in 2004 to 
Zim$ 2 206 185 in 2005, indicating a high level of earnings, including trends and stability. 
Liquidity was rated 1 (strong).  Funding risk was low, as evidenced by the increase in 
cash and cash equivalents of162%, and of high-quality financial instruments of 222%.  It 






Sensitivity to market risk was rated 2 (satisfactory).  The sensitivity of the bank’s 
earnings and the economic value of capital to adverse changes in interest and foreign 
exchange rates, commodity and equity prices was sound.  It can be concluded that the 
institution fell short of a strong composite rating (1) because of the prevailing socio-
economic and political instability, including an ultra-high inflation rate. 
 
The results, as indicated by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe on-site examination, using 
risk-based supervision methodology, Tudor House Consultants BICEPS model and the 
Altman Z-Score model used by the researcher, have all shown similar patterns of results, 

























4.4.3    Kingdom Bank Zimbabwe Limited  
 
Background 
The Discount Company of Zimbabwe Holdings (DCZH), listed on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange (ZSE), was merged with Kingdom Bank Limited in 2000, and changed its name 
to Kingdom Holdings Limited.  In the same year the acceptance house licence was 
converted to that of a commercial bank [Kingdom Bank Zimbabwe Limited, Annual 
Report/Financial Statements, 2002].This development saw the launch of Kingdom Bank 
Zimbabwe Limited in 2001, when the first branch was opened. In 2002 the group 
introduced leasing and micro-finance services to cater for the needs of its wide clientele in 
the banking sector. 
The group featured in the top ten quoted companies of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange in 
2001, and was voted the top company on market capitalisation.   
The group structure of Kingdom Holdings Limited is shown below: 
 

















Source: Kingdom Bank Zimbabwe Limited, Annual Report/Financial Statements (2002), 






















Qualitative Analysis – using the BICEPS Model - 1 January 2004 to 31 December 
2006. 
 
Business Strategy – Analysis 
o According to 31 December 2004 financial statements, interest income (50%), commission 
income (30%) and gains from dealing in foreign currencies (20%) were key profit drivers 
for Kingdom Bank.  Foreign currency dealings involving international settlement of 
transactions on behalf of customers complied with Exchange Control Regulations, but 
were risky and unsustainable because payments “could be misdirected or delayed, raising 
the possibility of a claim against the bank”, as the bank’s external auditor warned.   
o By the end of 2006 foreign currency dealings were greatly diminished.  The bank incurred 
a loss before taxation of Zim$30 372 in 2004.  Thanks to effective implementation of 
business and corporate strategies from 2005 and world-class supervision by the Reserve 
Bank from September 2004, the institution posted a profit before tax of Zim$21 116 940 
000 in 2006.  
 
o In order to avoid being outmanoeuvred by aggressive competitors or newcomers, the 
bank’s corporate and business strategies were reviewed continuously.  Top management 
strongly believes that institutions that engage in effective strategic management generally 
outperform those that do not.  Strategic management efforts, such as high-quality 
information technology, marketing strategies and service delivery to customers have 
resulted in improved market share (sales), business value and, most importantly, 
sustainable stakeholder satisfaction. 
 
o Top management also believes that business strategy is not enough to ensure leadership in 
the field.  Legal Corporate Executive, F. Mafunga said: “Other factors, such as leadership 
innovation, vision, social responsibility, ethical conduct and sound business practices are 
also factors to be considered”. The researcher considers that a business strategy is 
ineffective unless it is understood and accepted by most stakeholders.  In addition, all 
stakeholders must be consulted in the formulation and effective implementation of 





It can be concluded that most banks operate in a competitive environment.  With many 
sources of competitive advantage available, each bank needs to determine its own route to 
specialisation, and then to understand its rationale, underlying economics, business ethics 
and the key strategic success factors. 
 
In this regard, Kingdom Bank dominated the chosen niche market within the banking 
sector. Non-generic services offered include the following: 
 Point-of-sale, ATMs, electronic banking via internet and cellphone. 
 Foreign exchange, including foreign currency accounts and travellers’ cheques. 
 American Express Charge Cards (for foreign currency account holders). 
 Unit Trusts for the relatively small investors. 
 Consultancy services with regard to exchange control, floatations, management buy-out 
arrangements, restructuring and underwriting. 
 
Internal Control Systems – Analysis 
o Kingdom Bank’s Audit Committee was established in 2000, four years before the banking 
crisis.  The institution’s reporting structure of the internal audit function is independent of 
the day-to-day executive management internal process, said Mafunga. 
The Audit Committee is responsible for the appointment, remuneration, performance 
appraisal, transfer and dismissal of the Head of Internal Audit.  The Internal Audit 
Department has an audit charter, a standard audit plan, audit manual, a standard audit 
programme, and internal control questionnaires. 
 
The main duties and responsibilities of the Internal Audit Department in its monitoring of 
the institution’s policies, procedures, rules, guidelines, directives, laws and regulation, and 
also detection of fraud, errors, omissions or any other irregularities is, in the words of        
F. Mafunga: “to perform an independent review and appraisal of the institution’s business 
activities and functions as a service to Management and the Board of Directors”.  Mafunga 
is the bank’s Legal Corporate Executive. He notes that the institution’s internal auditors 





Items covered in reports include an executive summary; period covered; scope and 
objectives; significance and magnitude of the issues; the causes of issues and 
recommended solutions or preventive actions. They also cover auditors’ comments on the 
issues and proposed recommendations, and remedial measures, taken or proposed; 
management’s achievements noted during the internal audit; and, finally, an overall 
conclusion. 
 
Mafunga noted that: “treasury operations and information systems are critical operational 
areas, which entail significant risks that may have an adverse impact on the operations and 
financial condition of Kingdom Bank”.  Management holds this view, and yet, by contrast, 
believes that credit operations, derivatives and investments in debt and equity securities do 
not entail similar risks. 
 
The researcher agrees with Kingdom management in this view.  Banks should not use 
depositors’ funds to invest in debt and equity securities.  Derivatives outside the bank’s 
core business should also be avoided.  Credit operations should not be allowed to entail 
significant risks, as this can be managed through watertight internal control systems and 
effective risk-management strategies.   
 
Investment and trading securities (such as public shares) should not account for too great a 
proportion of a bank’s assets.  They should invest in government bonds, which are secure, 
and avoid investments of inferior quality. 
 
Kingdom Bank’s internal auditors are conversant with the institution’s investment 
strategy; the risk inherent in investment; policies and procedures; accounting and financial 
reporting, and legal and regulatory requirements.  The Board of Directors has the 
responsibility of establishing and implementing internal control systems.  
 
The fundamental internal controls include controls of credit and treasury operations, 
minimizing and control of derivatives, continuous review of investments and information 





The objectives and internal control measures with respect to cash received, cheques posted 
or delivered, and real time gross settlement deposits are tabulated below: 
 
Table 4.4.16 Objectives and Internal Control Measures                 
Area Of Business Objectives Internal Control Measures 
o Cash received. 
o Cheques received by 
post or delivered. 
o RTGS deposits. 
 
a. To ensure that all cash 
delivered, cheques received 
by post and RTGS 
depositors are accounted 
for and accurately recorded 
in the relevant books of 
account. 
b. To ensure all such receipts 
are promptly and deposited 
intact in the clients’ or the 
company’s bank accounts. 
o Dual system of checking 
that entries are correct 
o End-of-day 
reconciliations. 
o Spot checks. 
o Written instructions from 
client. 
o Confirmation of 
transactions with 
correspondent banks. 
Source: Kingdom Bank Zimbabwe Limited, (2002) Annual Report/Financial Statements 
 
o According to F. Mafunga the Legal Corporate Executive the following are the most 
common types of potential fraud: 
 Employees falsifying documents. 
 Fraudulent movement of funds into wrong accounts. 
 Short-term use of clients’ funds for unlawful gain. 
 Connivance between employees and external parties to commit fraud. 
 
The board of directors is, however, quite prepared to delegate internal control systems to 
management, and are generally satisfied with receiving reports on control issues and the 
status of corrective actions. The researcher maintains, however, that directors ought not to 
delegate internal control systems to management.  They should take responsibility, and be 
accountable to all stakeholders.  Internal control measures and risk management guidelines 




Mafunga stated that “Fraud prevented due to the internal control measures has exceeded 
the cost of establishing and implementing them”. 
 
Corporate Governance – Analysis 
o In September 2006 F. Mafunga confirmed that Kingdom Bank had 12 directors, made up 
of 2 executive and 10 non-executive directors.  “The chairman is appointed by other 
directors, following the normal appointment of the Board of Directors”. The researcher 
maintains that the chairman of the Board of Directors managing depositors’ funds should 
not be appointed by other directors, especially executive directors.  The candidate should 
also be a non-executive director, and is generally expected to ’police’ executive directors.  
The appointment of the chairman should, therefore, be made by the shareholders, in close 
consultation with other stakeholders. 
 
o According to the management, non-executive directors of the bank are recommended for 
appointment by shareholders, other directors and clients.  The remuneration committee 
then considers their remuneration, after which recommendations are made to the Board. In 
considering appointment and remuneration the Board may interview the candidate before 
giving its approval.  In addition, the appointment has to be approved by the Reserve Bank.  
A police clearance, tax clearance and an affidavit to the effect that the candidate has not 
been convicted of a criminal offence, is not insolvent or has not been a director of a failed 
bank, is also required. 
 
The  appointment, finally, has to be reviewed by the shareholders at the annual general 
meeting.  The researcher maintains that non-executive directors should never be appointed 
by executive directors.  While major shareholders are expected to play a major role in the 
appointment of all directors, they need to be more careful when appointing non-executive 
directors and the non-executive chairman.  Close consultations should take place between 







o Kingdom Bank has six governance committees:  The Audit and Finance committee had 
four non-executive directors.  The Remuneration Committee is composed of one executive 
and four non-executive directors.  The Risk Management Committee is composed of one 
executive and three non-executive directors.  The Credit Review Committee has one 
executive and three non-executive directors.  The Executive Committee has two executive 
and four non-executive directors.  Finally, the Credit Approval Committee has one 
executive and three non-executive directors. 
 
The researcher considers that these committees should include other stakeholders such as 
employees and customers also, in order to have a holistic understanding of the business 
and, more importantly, to satisfy the needs of all stakeholders. 
 
While the Board of Directors is responsible for the formulation of the overall business and 
corporate strategies, which are then implemented by management, the views of all 
stakeholders should be taken into consideration, from the formulation of strategic 
decisions to their implementation. However, it is pleasing to note that where the interests 
of shareholders conflict with those of the institution, the interests of the institution are 
considered above the others. 
 
o Kingdom Bank uses the “Engaged Board” model, which provides insight, advice and 
support to the Managing Director and the management team.  It also seeks financial 
expertise from the banking sector to add value to decisions.   
 
In practice, boards should be flexible across the scale, their level of engagement changing 
with issues and circumstances.   
While the Guideline (Number 01-2004/BSD entitled Sound Corporate Governance 
Requirements, issued by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (30 September 2004) in response 
to the collapse of more than a dozen banks has proved highly effective, most of the banks 
have acknowledged that it has transformed their management systems for the better, 






According to Mafunga, “the guideline has had no noticeable effect, as the institution had 
largely complied with its provisions prior to the issuance of the guidelines.  Some Board 
members represent the interests of shareholders on the Board of Directors. Shareholders 
also raise matters at the annual general meeting”. He also indicated that at least five 
managers represent 10% direct or indirect shareholding, while at least five directors 
represent 70% direct or indirect shareholding.  It can be concluded that this shareholding 
structure is not consistent with the Guideline. 
 
A shareholding of 80% should not be controlled by managers and directors, either directly 
or indirectly. The researcher maintains that this figure ought to be no more than 10%.  Top 
management should seriously consider selling their shares to institutional investors with 
the capacity and credibility to recapitalise the business when required, and to other local, 
regional or international strategic partners. 
 
o Kingdom Bank’s main social and environmental responsibilities include helping orphans 
suffering from AIDS, and contributing to the fight against AIDS.  It takes students on 
attachment to help them gain experience.  It has also participated in the construction of 
schools in rural areas, in order to bring education to those who could not otherwise receive 
it. 
 
Ethics in Business – Analysis  
o Kingdom Bank has a code of business ethics.  Executive directors have served their 
personal interests, while also caring for the interests of other stakeholders. People with 
defective moral upbringing and unethical behaviour have been restrained from tarnishing 
the image of the institution by being asked to leave, while the reward for good ethical 
behaviour is that such people remain with the institution for an indefinite period. 
 
In order to ensure integrity throughout the company, Kingdom Bank has cultivated an 
ethical culture in the five years before the banking crisis through the application of a code 
of ethics. This code has been linked to disciplinary procedures, in order to gain the status 
of a living document. The Board of Directors has carefully fostered the code of business 
ethics throughout the institution. 
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o It is apparent that the directors should report ethical performance and benefits (if any) in 
the annual reports and financial statements. This was not done in the statements of 
2003/2006.  They should also issue monthly reports, obtain feedback from these, and then 
prepare reports for effective implementation.  The bank should also establish a Business 
Ethics Committee. 
 
Stakeholder Participation – Analysis 
Stakeholder participation should ensure that the interests, direct and indirect, of all 
stakeholders, including non-shareholders, are protected, in normal operations or in the 
event of collapse. The data, suggests that management and shareholders have fully 
participated in all strategic decision-making processes.  The government has participated 
to some extent, through the supervisory role of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.  There is, 
however, no conclusive evidence of the participation of other stakeholders, such as 
customers, non-managerial employees or creditors. Bank tellers, for example, have direct 
contact with customers.  The views both of customers and employees should therefore be 
taken into consideration when formulating and implementing business and corporate 
strategies.  This is indeed necessary for improving the corporate image and increasing 
market and business growth. 
 
Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis 
The effectiveness of corporate governance structures of an institution should be 














The following are views of some Kingdom Bank stakeholders - customers: 
 
Table 4.4.17 Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis of a Participant (D. Matandirotya), 
May 2007 
D. Matandirotya  - has been banking with Kingdom,  Chitungwiza Branch, for three-and–a-half years 
Question Answer 
o How long have you been 
banking with Kingdom Bank? 
o If not mistaken, three-and-a-half years. 
o What do you think about long 
queues, especially during 
paydays? 
o I am surprised to hear these words (during paydays) Long queues are 
not there during pay days only.  These days its paydays every day.  
Honestly speaking unless if you are banking with NMB Bank like you 
guys wearing black suits, you have money, unlike me.  I can not even 
afford to go with my only one suit to dry cleaner. 
o What do you think are the 
causes? 
o  The Reserve Bank. 
o Why do you say so? o Look at my bank statement, chief.  How much is it?  Its almost ten 
thousand dollars (ZW$10 000).  Now tell me, how many days can I 
take to withdraw it with the current cash limit withdrawal of ZW$500?  
I need at least twenty days. Meaning I do not have to miss a single day 
because if I miss then I will get next salary before finishing my last 
salary.  So the maximum withdrawal is very low at the moment.  At 
least five thousand dollars ($5 000) per day will do.  Chief, I tell you, 
you will not find any long queues because people do not have money.  
The current maximum withdrawal is just the problem. 
o Are you happy with the services 
at Kingdom? 
o  I am not happy.  What these people have to do is to make sure all the 
tellers are at their positions before 08.00 hours.  You will find that at 
08.00 hours only three or four tellers will be serving people, yet there 
are three or four counters without tellers.  The bank manager should 
monitor the tellers and tell them to be fast and also tell them no calls 
accepted during working hours. 
o Why are you not opening 
accounts with other banks? 
o The situation is just the same and you would find sometimes Kingdom 
with small queues.  Unless doing it for the sake of withdrawing money 
at two banks per day.  But where would I get the cash to open the 
account.  They need cash almost four thousand yet I get five hundred 
dollars per day - a father of four.  Boss, it pains me and otherwise I 





Table 4.4.18 Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis of a Participant (Ronald Ncube), May 
2007 
 
Ronald Ncube - has been banking with Kingdom, First Street Branch, for four years 
Question Answer 
o How long have you 
been banking with 
Kingdom Bank? 
o It is now four years 
o What do you think 
about long queues, 
especially during 
paydays? 
o I am now used to these long queues. You will get long queues 
everywhere, man.  In Zimbabwe it is not something that can surprise.  
At Kingdom Bank sometimes the queues will be better because their 
ATMs are always working. 
o What do you think 
are the causes? 
o I think it is because of shortage of paper to print more notes.  If they 
print more notes at the Reserve Bank then that means they will raise 
the withdrawal limits and you would find that many people will be 
going to bank only once per month.  People do not have money, 
Chief.  It is only that the withdrawal limit per day is too low.  A 
person with two thousand dollars in his/her account will have to go to 
the bank four times.  Now if the withdrawal limits will be two 
thousand dollars you would take it once and forget about going to the 
bank, especially people like me. 
o Are you happy with 
the services at 
Kingdom Bank? 
o I used to be happy, but now I am not happy at all.  They are very slow 
when serving people, especially during the afternoon. 
 
o Why are you not 
opening accounts 
with other banks like 
CBZ, Stanbic and 
FBC? 
o It is all the same these days.  I even wanted to try and open with 
Stanbic Bank.  The aim was if I open two accounts I will be able to 
withdraw five hundred dollar at Kingdom Bank and five hundred 
dollars at Stanbic Bank per day, but I failed because I had no cash to 
open that account.  It is so painful.  Boss I tell you I am suffering, yet 










Table 4.4.19 Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis of a Participant (James Banda), May 
2007 
James Banda - has been banking with Kingdom, S. Machel Branch, for three years 
Question Answer 
o How long have you been 
banking with Kingdom? 
o It is now three years. 
o What do you think about long 
queues, especially during 
paydays? 
o It is not during paydays, boss.  It is every day except on Sunday only. 
o What do you think are the 
causes of queues? 
o I do not want to say much because if I tell you the truth you will 
flash an Identity Card to me.  You look like a Central Intelligence 
Organisation man.  You will arrest me soon after this discussion 
o What do you think is the 
solution? 
o I think the talks between the three presidents of major political 
parties in Zimbabwe.  Come to me after the talks boss. ` 
o Are you happy with the 
services at Kingdom Bank? 
o I am happy because it is not their problem.  What else can they do?  
They get the instructions from Reserve Bank, and I think you also 
know where Reserve Bank gets their instructions.  Boss, come to me 
after the talks of these political parties. 
o Given a chance, would you 
want to open some accounts 
with other banks like Stanbic, 
CBZ and FBC? 
o May be after the political talks.  Right now will not because it is all 




The researcher maintains that the Kingdom Bank top management, the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe and the Government should attend to the following without unnecessary delays: 
 
o All banking institutions in Zimbabwe, should engage the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to 
ensure that withdrawal limits are in line with the current inflationary pressures in 
Zimbabwe.  ATMs should always work effectively, 24 hours a day, and with enough cash. 
Branch managers and staff should be trained regularly to ensure that they satisfy 
customers’ needs better than the competitors.  The information technology should be 
improved in order to allow customers to use VISA-electronic systems, and make purchases 




They should also do bench-marking with institutions such as National Merchant Bank 
Zimbabwe Limited (NMB) and Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Limited to determine 
how they are satisfying needs of their customers.   
 
o The Reserve Bank should make available sufficient cash to allow members of the public to 
withdraw all their salaries at once, considering the shortages of goods and services in the 
country.  The institution should also seek assistance from the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and from continental banks in Africa.  More importantly, they should 
adopt monetary policies designed to minimize the suffering to the banking public. 
 
o Below is a tabulated summary of the position of Kingdom Bank on 31 December 2006, 
using the THC- BICEPS model. 
 
Table 4.4.20 Summary of the Position of Kingdom Bank on 31 December 2006 using 
the THC- BICEPS Model 
 
BICEPS Component Composite Rating 
o Business Strategy – Analysis B2 
o Internal Control Systems – Analysis B2” 
o Corporate Governance – Analysis B3 
o Ethics In Business – Analysis B3  
o Participation Of All Stakeholders – Analysis B2 
o Stakeholder Satisfaction – Analysis B3 
Overall Composite Rating B2 
 
The composite rating of Kingdom Bank showed a satisfactory position, and indicated 
acceptable corporate governance structures.  There is room for improvement, however, on 







Qualitative Analysis, using the Altman Z-Score Model, for Kingdom Bank Zimbabwe 
Limited 
Altman Z-score = 1.2x1 + 1.4x2 + 3.3x3 + 0.6x4 + 1.0X5 
 
The following table represents computations for years ended 31 December 2004 and           
31 December 2006, based on Kingdom Bank annual reports and financial statements. 
 
Table 4.4.21 Computations for years ended 31 December 2004 and 31 December 2006 
Ratio Details Model 
Coefficient  
31 December 2004 31 December 2006 
Ratio Score Ratio Score 
o Net working capital/total assets 
o Retained earnings/total assets 
o Earnings before tax/total assets 
o Shareholder’s equity/total liabilities 































Altman Z–Score Model :   0.38  2.19 
 
KEY: 
Balance Sheet /Income Statement Items 31 December 2004 31 December 2006 
 
o Net working capital 
o Earnings before tax 
o Retained earnings 
o Total assets 
o Equity 
o Sales 










10 430 457 
21 116 940 
13 620 160 
64 538 353 
14 380 126 
28 871 113 
50 158 227  
 
Kingdom Bank Zimbabwe Limited scored 0.38 on 31 December 2004. However, the Z-





The good financial performance strengthened the institution’s financial position, with the 
net working capital increasing from $-29 670 million in 2004 to Zim$10 430 457 000 in 
2006; earnings before tax increased from Zim$-30 372 million in 2004 to Zim$21 116 940 
000 in 2006; retained earnings also increased from Zim$-21 863 million in 2004 to ZW$13 
620 160 000 in 2006, while shareholders, equity increased from Zim$1 870 million in 
2004 to Zim$ 14 380 126 000 in 2006 [Kingdom Bank Zimbabwe Limited, (2003) Annual 
Report/Financial Statements]. 
 
The significant contributing factor was undoubtedly the implementation of effective 
corporate and business strategies from 2005, careful supervision by the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, especially from September 2004, acceptable corporate governance structures 
and financial support from credible shareholders, One such was Econet Wireless, a 
Zimbabwean company with offices in South Africa, Nigeria and UK. This helped in 
boosting market confidence during the crisis that saw the collapse of more than twenty 
indigenous banks. 
 
Qualitative Analysis – using the Risk-Based Supervision Policy Framework, Reserve 
Bank – Bank Licensing, Supervisions and Surveillance Guideline Number 2-
2006/BSD 
 
According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe “the last on-site examination of Kingdom 
Bank Limited was carried out on 31 December 2006, and it assessed the overall conditions 
of the bank to be satisfactory”.   
 
The CAMELS ratings are summarised in the following table: 
Table 4.4.22 CAMELS ratings summary 













Overall Composite Rating 2 
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According to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the following is a summary of the results of 
the last on site examination conducted in December 2006, based on Assessment of 
CAMELS Factors and Stress Testing: 
o Capital Adequacy was rated 1 (strong).  The institution was adequately capitalised, with 
shareholders’ funds increasing from Zim$146 152 000 in 2005 to Zim$14 380 126 000 in 
2006. 
o Asset Quality was rated 1 (strong).  While customers’ indebtedness for acceptances 
increased from Zim$ 85 746 000 in 2005 to Zim$1 055 507 000 in 2006, 92% of total 
assets were in the form of balances at bank and cash; financial assets; securities and 
advances.  There was no exposure to credit risk. 
o Management was rated 3 (fair).  The level and quality of oversight and support of all 
institution’s activities by the Board of Directors, management and corporate governance 
structures such as Audit and Finance, Remuneration, Risk Management, Credit Review, 
Executive and Credit Approval Committees was fair. 
o Earnings was rated 1 (strong).  Total sales increased from Zim$759 635 000 in 2005 to 
Zim$28 871 113 000 in 2006.Profit before tax also increased from Zim$77 265 000 in 
2005 to Zim$21 116 940 000 in 2006, thus indicating a high level of earnings, including 
trends and stability. 
o Liquidity was rated 3 (fair). Funding risk was moderate, with a ratio of 1.2:1.  A ratio of 
2:1 would be preferable.  Nevertheless, the institution had just sufficient liquid assets to 
meet its obligations as they fell due. The bank should establish an Assets/Liabilities 
Committee, and take corrective measures to improve its liquidity levels. 
o Sensitivity to market risk was rated 3 (fair).  The sensitivity of the bank’s earnings, and 
the economic value of capital to adverse changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, 
commodity prices, or equity prices was moderate. 
 
The bank should focus on core business, unique but sustainable operations, in line with 
banking regulations.  The researcher is, however, convinced that the sensitivity to market 






The researcher is pleased to note that the findings, as indicated by the Reserve Bank on-
site examination, using Risk-Based Supervision methodology, THC –BICEPS Model and 
the Altman Z-Score Model have shown similar results and complemented each other. 
 
The aspects of shareholding structure, recapitalization, corporate governance structures, 
recruitment and effectiveness of top management, stakeholder participation in strategic 
decision-making and business ethics should be reviewed and overhauled. The institution 
should engage the services of non-executive directors who are totally independent of major 
shareholders and executive directors.  Non-executive directors are expected to ‘police’ the 
executive directors and management in the best interests of the bank. 
 
4.5 RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (RAS) – RISK MATRIX 
The researcher interviewed L. Mataruka, the Divisional Chief of Bank Licensing, 
Supervision and Surveillance of the Reserve Bankon11 September 2008. He was informed 
that all banks in Zimbabwe were now required to make a full disclosure of the results of 
the on-site risk-based examination by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.  This was to be 
published in the local newspapers, together with interim financial results or annual 
financial statements. These interim financial results and annual financial statements would 
be checked and approved by the Reserve Bank before publication.  The rationale was to 
ensure that members of the public, the government, business, and also investment, 
financial and stock analysts were well-informed about the financial position of banks.  
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe uses the Risk Assessment System (RAS) to provide a 
structured framework for measuring and assessing risk.  This is a method of identifying, 
evaluating, documenting, and communicating the assessment of the quantity of risk, the 
quality of risk-management, and the direction of risk at each bank.  It takes both a current 








While the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe applies the RAS to banks, the banks themselves are 
not required to adopt a similar process. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe examiners are, 
however, expected to discuss RAS assessments with bank management, in order to reach a 
common understanding of the risk profile of the institution, upon which regulatory 
activities will be based. According to L. Mataruka, for each risk category bank examiners 
make the following assessments: 
 
o Quantity of risk – refers to the level of risk, characterized as low, moderate, or high. 
o Quality of risk management - refers to how effectively risks are identified, measured, 
controlled and monitored by management, and is characterised as strong, acceptable, or 
weak. 
o Overall Composite risk – refers to a summary judgement on the level of supervisory 
concern by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.  It is characterised as low, moderate, or high. 
o Direction of risk – refers to the probable change in a bank’s risk profile over the next 12 
months, and is characterised as decreasing, stable, or increasing. 
o Credit Risk is the current and prospective risk to earnings to capital ratio, arising from the 
fact that a debtor may default on payments.   
o Liquidity Risk is the present and prospective risk to earnings ratio, arising from a bank’s 
ability to meet its obligations when they fall due.   
o Interest Rate Risk is the risk of losses due to unfavourable changes in interest rates.   
o Foreign Exchange Risk - foreign exchange risk is the current or prospective risk to 
earnings and capital arising from negative movements in foreign exchange rates. 
o Operational Risk is the direct or indirect loss arising from ineffective internal control 
systems, incompetent staff, or external events such as unpredictable catastrophes.   
o Legal and Compliance Risk is the current and prospective risk to earnings or capital 
arising from violations of statutory provisions of the law and banking regulations.   
o Strategic Risk arises from the fact that the top management of a bank might fail to 
formulate business and corporate strategies, resulting in a decrease in earnings or capital.   
o Reputation Risk is the risk of negative public opinion or perception, leading to a loss of 
confidence and/or severance of business relationships, such as happened to most 





While the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s Guideline on the Risk Assessment System – Risk 
Matrix was issued in 2006, it is not clear why its implementation began only during the 
first six months of 2008. The researcher maintains that while the Guideline is consistent 
with international standards, and also that it can satisfy the interests of all stakeholders, its 
implementation needs to be improved, so that members of the public can benefit from it.  
Recommendations will be made in the final chapter.  The following are some of the banks 
which implemented the risk based Supervision Policy Framework during the six months of 
2008, by publishing results in the newspapers: 
 
4.5.1  Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group (ZABG) 
On 18 September 2008 the Financial Gazette published Zimbabwe Allied Banks Group’s 
half-year financial results for the six month ended 30 June 2008. This was based on the 
Risk Based Supervision Policy Framework. 
 
Table 4.5.1 Summary of CAMELS Ratings of 30 June 2008 
Capital Adequacy 3 Fair 
Asset Quality 2 Satisfactory 
Management 3 Fair 
Earnings 3 Fair 
Liquidity 3 Fair 
Sensitivity to Market Risk 3 Fair 
Composite Rating 3 Fair 
 Source: Financial Gazette, ZABG – Financial Results (2008), Available online at 
:www.fingaz.co.zw 
 














of overall  
composite Risk 
Credit Moderate Acceptable Moderate Increasing 
Liquidity Moderate Acceptable Moderate Stable 
Interest rate Moderate Weak High Stable 
Foreign Exchange Low Weak Moderate Stable 
Strategic High Acceptable High Stable 
Operational High Acceptable High Increasing 
Legal and Compliance Moderate Acceptable Moderate Stable 
Reputation Moderate Acceptable Moderate Increasing 
Overall Moderate Acceptable Moderate Stable 
Source: Financial Gazette, ZABG – Financial Results (2008), Available online at: 
www.fingaz.co.zw 
 228
Based on the CAMELS ratings,, the composite Rating on 30 June 2008 was 3 (fair). This 
exhibits some degree of supervisory concern in one or more of the component areas 
generally less capable of withstanding business fluctuations, and more vulnerable to 
outside influences. Based on the Risk Matrix, the overall composite risk was expected to 
be stable in the next 12 months from 1 July 2008.   However, credit risk, operational risk 
and reputation risk were shown to be increasing. 
 
The researcher maintains that Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group should go through a 
second stage of bank restructuring with the focus on re-capitalisation, shareholding 
structure, corporate governance structures and re-branding, in close consultation with all 
its stakeholders, and in the best interests of the institution.  The institution should be 
privatised, and should look for a regional or international strategic partner. 
 
4.5.2  Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Limited 
On 11 September 2008, the Financial Gazette published Standard Chartered Bank 
Zimbabwe’s half year financial results of 30 June 2008, based on Risk-Based Supervision 
Policy Framework: 
 
Table 4.5.3 CAMELS RATING 
Component ratings Latest rating   Key   
  31/12/05   1  Strong 
Capital Adequacy 1   2  Satisfactory 
Asset Quality 1   3  Fair 
Management 2   4  Weak 
Earnings 1   5  Critical 
Liquidity 1      
Sensitivity to Market Risk 1      








Table 4.5.4 Summary Risk Matrix 














Credit Low Acceptable Low Stable 
Liquidity Risk Low Acceptable Low Stable 
Interest Rate Moderate Strong Low Stable 
Foreign Exchange Low Strong Low Stable 
Strategic Risk Moderate Acceptable Low Stable 
Operational Risk Moderate Acceptable Moderate Stable 
Legal & 
Compliance Low Strong Low Stable 
Reputation Low Strong Low Stable 
Overall Low Strong Low Stable 
Source: Financial Gazette, Standard Chartered Bank – Financial Results (2008), Available 
online at: www.fingaz.co.zw 
 
 Based on the CAMELS ratings, the composite rating on 31 December 2005 was 1 
(Strong).  Standard Bank was “sound in every respect, was most capable of withstanding 
the unpredictable factors of business conditions, and was resistant to outside influences, 
such as economic instability in their trade area”.  As a result, the bank exhibited the 
strongest performance and risk management practices relative to its size, complexity, and 
risk profile. There was no cause for supervisory concern. 
 
Based on the Risk Matrix, the overall composite risk was expected to be stable in the next 
12 months from 1 July 2008.  Standard Bank is an international bank with credible and 
financially strong shareholders.  It should improve on management, and minimize, as far 
as possible, operational risk.  Some of the provisions of the Zimbabwe Indigenous Act 
(Chapter 24:20) should not be allowed to affect its operations and shareholding structure.  










4.5.3    Metropolitan Bank of Zimbabwe Limited 
On 5 September 2008 the Business Herald reported financial results of Metropolitan Bank 
for the six months ended 30 June 2008, using the Risk-Based Supervision Policy 
Framework – Guideline Number 2-2006/BSD: 
 
Table 4.5.5 Results of Metropolitan Bank for the six months ended 30 June 2008. 
 
March 2006 CAMELS* Ratings   Summary RAS Ratings  




Capital Adequacy 4  Overall Inherent Risk High 
Asset Quality 3  Overall Risk Management System Weak 
Management  4  Overall Composite Risk High 
Earnings 3  Direction of Overall Composite Risk Increasing 
Liquidity 3    
Sensitivity to Market Risk 4    
Composite Rating 4    
Source: Business Herald, Metropolitan Bank of Zimbabwe Limited, Financial Statements 
(2008), Available online at: www.herald.co.zw 
 
Table 4.5.6 Summary Risk Matrix 
Type of Risk 
Level of 





  Risk 
Management 
System Risk Composite Risk 
Credit  High Weak High Increasing 
Liquidity Moderate Weak High Increasing 
Interest Rate High Weak High Increasing 
Foreign Exchange Low  Weak Moderate Stable 
Strategic Risk High Weak High Increasing 
Operational Risk High Weak High Increasing 
Legal & 
Compliance High Weak High Increasing 
Reputation Moderate Weak Moderate Increasing 
Overall High Weak High Increasing 
 Source: Business Herald, Metropolitan Bank of Zimbabwe Limited, Financial Statements, 





Based on the CAMELS ratings, the composite rating on 31 March 2006 was 4 (Weak).The 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe reported in 2006 that, “Metropolitan Bank was generally unsafe, 
with unsound practices or conditions.  There were serious financial or managerial 
deficiencies that resulted in unsatisfactory performance.  The weaknesses and problems were 
not being satisfactorily addressed or resolved by the Board of Directors and management.  
Based on the Risk Matrix, the overall composite risk was expected to increase in the next 12 
months from 1 July 2008”.  The researcher maintains that Metropolitan Bank must as a 
matter of urgency sell its majority shareholding to another bank, such as Zimbabwe Allied 
Banking Group or Kingdom Bank, or to any other strategic partner, in close consultation 
with the RBZ, in order to minimize the risk of insolvency and non-viability.  The RBZ, for 
its part, should start taking corrective measures in order to forestall the otherwise inevitable 
collapse of the bank. 
 
4.5.4    Conclusions and Verification 
The researcher calls to mind the research problem shaping this study: The Minimisation of 
the Liquidation of Viable Banking Institutions in the Zimbabwe Banking Sector.  The 
collapse of more than twenty banks during the banking crisis occurred at terrible cost to 
many: taxpayers, employees, depositors, the government, some shareholders, suppliers of 
goods and services and the public in general. 
 
The initial ideas and hypotheses were that the liquidation of viable banks could be 
minimized by, first, the establishment of effective corporate governance structures; and, 
second, regular banking restructuring and good “public governance”. This should be in the 












4.5.5     Summarized Results 
The sample of banks was categorised in the three groups, based on the following factors:  
o First, six banks placed under liquidation during 2003/2006.  The main cause of liquidation 
was ineffective corporate governance structures and gross mismanagement.  The other 
factors which significantly contributed to the collapse of these banks were low levels of 
banking supervision by the Reserve Bank and undercapitalization (associated with 
corporate governance).  Liquidation of viable banks can therefore be minimized by the 
establishment of effective corporate governance structures.  It must be emphasised that the 
major problems which resulted in liquidation of most banks started one to eight years 
before the onset of the crisis. 
o The second category was in respect of three institutions restructured during the crisis.  
Again, ineffective corporate governance structures, undercapitalisation and low level of 
banking supervision were the major causes.  Other contributing factors were an outdated 
legal framework and ineffective ‘public governance’ in the form of monetary and fiscal 
policies by the government, as well as social, economic and political instability. 
o The third category comprises the six financially sound banks.  These banks performed very 
well, considering the social, economic and political circumstances.  They maintained 
strong financial positions, largely because of sound corporate governance structures.   
 
In addition, they were adequately capitalized by credible international shareholders.  Other 
banks, such as African Banking Corporation and First Banking Corporation improved their 
financial positions by opening sister companies within the region as a way of minimizing 
the effects of the socio-economic and political conditions.  While most banks in this 
category performed very well, some of them, such as Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group 
(ZABG) and Metropolitan Bank, will certainly need to go through a second stage of bank 










The following table and pie-chart show, in percentage terms, the major factors which 
resulted in the collapse of most banks during the crisis.  The same factors contributed to 
financial distress and viability difficulties of other banks. Recommendations for dealing 
with the major causes are outlined in the final chapter. 
 
Table 4.5.7 Major factors which resulted in the collapse of most banks during the 
crisis 
 
Number Major causes of viability difficulties, financial distress and 




Ineffective Corporate Governance Structures (Gross 
Mismanagement) 
39 
2 Under–capitalisation 21 
3 Low Level of Banking Supervision (Reserve Bank ) 18 
4 Ineffective Public Governance (Monetary and Fiscal Policies, 
Social, Economic and Political Turbulence) 
12 
5 Lack of Regular Banking Restructuring  6 
6 Outdated Legal Framework (Certain Provisions of the 
Zimbabwe Banking Act, Ch24:20) 
4 





























4.5.6 Concluding Comments 
As depicted in the abovementioned pie-chart, figure 4.5.1, there is conclusive empirical 
evidence that Ineffective Corporate Structures (0.39), Undercapitalization (0.21), Low-
Level Banking Supervision (0.18), Ineffective Public Governance Policies (0.12), Lack of 
Banking Restructuring on Regular Basis (0.06) and Outdated Legal Framework (0.04) 
contributed significantly to the demise of more than 20 banking institutions in Zimbabwe.  
In majority of cases, liquidations do not discriminate viable institutions from the non-
viable, resulting in the inevitable demise of affected institutions.  The source of distress of 
many institutions is largely related to financing, which when resolved will significantly 
improve their prospects and viability [Rajandram, Workouts and Restructurings 2000]. 
 
The interpretation and summary discussions of the aforementioned results are highlighted 
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5.0   INTERPRETATION AND SUMMARY DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction  
The final stage of the narrative analysis is the important one of interpreting the research 
findings.  It is difficult to communicate raw data either to stakeholders, managers of an 
institution or other researchers.  Although the precise purpose of a particular analysis may 
differ, all analyses are ultimately concerned with explaining and understanding, which, in 
turn, may lead to the development of new concepts and theories [Lancaster, 2005]. 
 
It follows that the form and effectiveness of the analysis and interpretation, is crucial to 
developing recommendations and action programmes.  Effective data analysis, supported 
by the selection of appropriate analysis methods, is therefore essential. 
 
5.2 Interpretation of Field Research Analysis  
Between January 2004 and December 2006 more than twenty banking institutions in 
Zimbabwe collapsed.  The majority were placed under liquidation, while a few were 
placed under curatorship at the instance of the Reserve Bank. 
 
While the banking crisis itself began in January 2004 (when ENG Asset Management was 
placed under liquidation, 31 December 2003), the causes of the crisis began in the mid 
1990s, following the reformation of the banking sector, which resulted in many new 
participants entering the field, mostly indigenous entrepreneurs.  The government initiated 
the Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST1996-2000). 
While the concept was laudable, its implementation in the banking sector was not.  For 
example, there was the anomaly of the number of banking institutions mushrooming in the 
context of an exponentially shrinking economy, as shown by the country’s Gross Domestic 







According to the findings of the overall qualitative research, the major causes were first, 
ineffective corporate governance structures and gross mismanagement; second 
undercapitalization; third, low level of banking supervision (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe); 
fourth, ineffective public governance (fiscal and monetary policies, socio-economic and 
political turbulence); fifth, lack of regular banking restructuring, and sixth a number of 
outdated provisions of the Zimbabwe Banking Act (Chapter 24:20). 
 
5.2.1 Banking Institutions Placed Under Liquidation, 2003/2006 
The table below gives a sample of banking institutions placed under liquidation during the 
banking crisis. 
 
Table 5.1 Banking Institutions Placed Under Liquidation, 2003-2006 
No Name of Banking Institution Date of Liquidation 
1 ENG Asset Management (Private) Limited (ENG) 31 December 2003 
2 Century Discount House Limited (CDH) 20 January 2004 
3 Platinum Asset Management (Private) Limited (PAM) 7 April 2004 
4 Rapid Discount House Limited (RDH) 25 August 2004 
5 First National Building Society (FNBS) 13 April 2005 
6 Sagit Finance House Limited (SFin) 7 June 2006 
 
(a) ENG Asset Management (Private) Limited (ENG) collapsed because of gross 
mismanagement by two executive directors, Muponda and Watyoka. The company was 
technically insolvent by 31 October 2003.  These executive directors were also the 
individual majority shareholders.  They lacked both credibility and the required level of 
capital to recapitalise the banking operations.  Their corporate image was so poor that the 
institution could not attract local, regional or international investors.  Corporate 
governance structures were flawed, as evident in its failure to establish effective 
governance committees, such as Audit, Risk Management and Assets and Liabilities 
Committees.  The company was managed without independent non-executive directors, 
and the two executive directors lacked the integrity and competence required by the 




(b) Century Discount House Limited (CDH) executive directors likewise lacked integrity 
and competence.  For example, the directors and management became aware from 29 July 
2003 that trading with ENG Asset Management (Private) Limited (ENG) was risky.  
Astonishingly, they continued these transactions up to 31 December of that year.  The non-
executive directors and key members of the governance committees, such as 
Assets/Liabilities Committee (ALCO) were not independent of executive directors and 
majority shareholders.  CHL also lacked the capacity and credibility to re-capitalise the 
banking operations of CDH. 
 
(c) Platinum Asset Managers (Private) Limited and its holding company shared the same 
directors and shareholders.  No non-executive and independent directors, or internal or 
external auditors were appointed.  The institution operated without effective governance 
committees, such as an Assets/Liabilities Committee.  The Executive Directors generally 
lacked the integrity or competence to run an institution managing public funds.  The 
majority shareholder, Platinum Financial Holdings, needed to make sure that a banking 
license was obtained, and that they could re-capitalise the banking operations: instead they 
decided to steal the depositors’ funds. 
 
(d) According to the Liquidator of Rapid Discount House Limited, Maxwell Mubaiwa of 
Ernst & Young, “the institution collapsed mainly as a result of gross mismanagement.  The 
institution’s banking operations were not conducted with a high level of integrity or 
professional diligence”. At the date of liquidation the institution was operating with two 
executive directors, Mwaturura and Mugwara, with no independent non-executive 
directors. 
 
Like the others mentioned above, this banking institution failed to establish effective 
corporate governance structures, such as Audit and Risk Management Committees.  RDH 
was indirectly owned by a group of interrelated individuals without the financial resources 






(e) The Executive Directors of First National Building Society, Messrs Ruturi and Musova, 
also lacked the integrity or competence to manage a banking institution.  The majority 
shareholders, Legal Investments and Strong line Investments, were owned directly by the 
Executive Directors.  The institution’s corporate governance structures were flawed, and 
there were no effective governance committees.  
 
(f) Corporate governance structure deficiencies in Sagit Finance House Limited (SFin) were 
caused by the incestuous relationship with its major shareholder Sagit Financial Holdings 
(SFH), which compromised the operational independence of the institution’s Board of 
Directors and management.  SFH’s interference in SFin exposed the finance house to high 
liquidity risk as well as risking the security of the depositors’ funds.  Most members of the 
board of directors lacked professional integrity.  The board was also weak, passive and 
indecisive, and manifested the unprofessional tendency of leaving important policy 
decisions to senior management, absolving itself of business responsibility, including 
statutory responsibilities. 
 
There was no clear separation of the holding company and SFin management, and business 
deals were sealed by the holding company on behalf of SFin.  The institution also operated 
without effective governance committees, such as the Assets/Liabilities Committee. Most 
of the non-executive directors were not independent of the holding company, other 
shareholders or the executive directors. 
 
Undercapitalisation 
There is conclusive evidence that the business operations of ENG, CDH, PAM, RDH, 
FNBS and SFin were started without sufficient capital to run banking operations.  This 
was largely because the shareholders were groups of related individuals, without the 
capacity, credibility or financial resources to inject sufficient capital, as prescribed by 
banking regulations and guidelines.  Because of their poor corporate image, they failed to 
attract credible local, regional or international institutional strategic partners or investors. 
SFH, for example, experienced capitalisation difficulties from the very date of 




It recorded the lowest capital levels of all the banking institutions.  According to the 
Reserve Bank, SFin was one of the two institutions that failed to meet Zim$75 billion new 
capital requirements on 30 September 2005.  The institution was critically 
undercapitalized, with a negative capital base of Zim$93.1 billion. In addition, the 
shareholders were required to inject a minimum of Zim$853.6 billion by 30 September 
2006 in order to comply with the US dollar-linked minimum capital requirement of 
Zim$750 billion for finance houses. 
 
Century Discount House incurred a loss of Zim$31.9 billion, resulting in a negative 
equity position of Zim$31.7 billion during 2003.  There was no capital injection from the 
existing shareholders, resulting in the institution’s capital adequacy ratio deteriorating 
from an unsound position of 23% on 31 October 2003 to negative 65% on 31December 
2003; this compared to an average market performance of 29%.  
 
By the end of 2003 the company was technically insolvent, as 75% of its current assets 
were made up of Zim$44 billion, in the form of an unsecured loan to ENG Asset 
Management (Private) Limited, itself insolvent at the time. 
 
Low Level of Banking Supervision 
(a)   ENG Asset Management’s dealings with Century Discount House began in April 2003.  
The nature of the transactions was such that funds received from CDH customers or 
depositors would be invested with the unlicensed ENG, supposedly “for premium and 
higher-yielding investments”. The total amount invested by CDH with ENG, not recovered 
until its liquidation on 20 January 2004, totalled Zim$45 billion.  
 
It was obviously not in the best interests of stakeholders of either CDH or ENG to invest 
huge sums of public funds with an unlicenced institution, especially in view of the absence 
of effective corporate governance structures in either of them.  Supervision by the Reserve 
Bank was poor, and this contributed to the loss of funds by the investing public to ENG 





(b) On 1 April 2003 Century Holdings Limited concluded an agreement with ENG Asset 
Management for the disposal of the entire shareholding of CDH to ENG, at a price of 
Zim$1.55 billion.  This sale was not approved by the Reserve Bank until after CDH had 
been placed under liquidation. 
 
On several occasions between 14 April and 31 December 2003 the Executive Directors of 
CDH deposited Zim$44.7 billion of customers’ funds with ENG.  In most of these cases 
no security was requested.  This was in spite of the fact that no authority was obtained 
from CDH’s Asset/Liabilities Committee. This was in direct contravention of Banking 
Regulations.  Under section 39 of the Banking Regulations (2000), maximum exposure to 
ENG at any given time should have been Zim$400 million - 25% of CDH’s capital of 
Zim$1.6 billion.  
 
On 30 October 2003 the Managing Director of CDH created an off balance-sheet book in 
order to cater for ENG’s high appetite for cash.  As a result of misleading representations, 
false monthly returns, such as the ‘BK6’, were filed with the RBZ. The Reserve Bank 
apparently lacked the capacity and resources to examine this ‘BK6’ and take corrective 
action in time. 
 
There was a questionable delay in informing the RBZ about the scandal. The Chief 
Operating Officer, M. Nyamazana reported the financial distress and critical viability 
difficulties of CDH to the RBZ only on 30 December 2003.  On 2 January 2004 the RBZ 
officially closed CDH, and on 20 January 2004 the banking institution was placed under 
liquidation. 
 
(c) Sagit Financial Holdings (Private) Limited (SFH) initiated unsustainable funding 
structures, resulting in a loss of Zim$132.8 billion, thereby placing its operations in 
financial distress.  The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s clear guidelines to the banking sector 
on avoiding indulgence in non-banking transactions via associate institutions were totally 
ignored. The RBZ should have carried out a detailed examination of the relationships, 
capital base, reputation and credibility of shareholders of Sagit Finance House Limited, 
before issuing a banking license. 
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(d)   Platinum Asset Managers (Private) Limited operated without a banking license from 19 
February 2003 to its liquidation on 7 April 2004.  It is not clear why the Registrar of 
Banking and Financial Institutions or the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe failed to stop the 
institution from operating for almost 13 months without a banking license. 
 
(e) Rapid Discount House’s certificate of registration as a discount house was issued by the 
Registrar of Banks and Financial Institutions on 15 October 1997. Here again, the 
monetary authorities should have examined details of the capital base, integrity and 
credibility of the shareholders of both RDH and Rapid Financial Holdings before issuing 
the license. 
 
(f)  First National Building Society (FNBS) was registered and licensed as a building society 
on 10 June 1996, as provided for under section 7 of the Building Societies Act (Ch 24:02; 
certificate no. 5). Both the Reserve Bank and the Registrar of Banking and Financial 
Institutions failed to anticipate the operating risk of issuing a banking license to an 
institution with more than 89% of its shares indirectly controlled by two executive 
directors with a personal friendship.  
 
Lack of Regular Banking Restructuring  
In Zimbabwe regular banking restructuring has not been implemented, and autonomy 
within the banking sector should be guaranteed.  For the smooth operation of the system of 
regular banking restructuring, an effective banking supervision and day-to-day “credit 
health” checking should be more fully developed, and applied by banking institutions 
themselves, without government intervention.  This would ensure that the level of capital 
is always adequate, both in quantity and quality, in the best interests of all stakeholders. 
 
Ineffective Public Governance 
In July 2008 Zimbabwe had the highest yearly official inflation rate in the world, of 231 
million percent. The average inflation rate within the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) was about 15 percent. The government should undertake the 
following immediate and fundamental reforms to ensure that banking and corporate 
institutions remain focused on their core business, unlike the practice during - and after - 
the banking crisis. 
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(a) Reduction of the size of the government in terms of number of departments, ministries and 
labour.  This would assist in reducing government expenditure and levels of taxation.  
Funds should be channelled towards the manufacturing, farming and mining sectors, and 
help to create employment, which is estimated at over 80%. 
(b) Drafting of a new constitution, in line with SADC and international constitutional 
standards.  This will help in improving political leadership and democratic structures.   
Political power should be transferred from a few political leaders into the hands of the 
majority of Zimbabweans. 
(c) Introduction of an independent electoral system would give all Zimbabweans the opportunity 
to nominate leaders of their choice in a calm political environment.  It would also assist in 
attracting investments in Zimbabwe from institutional, individual and governmental 
foreign investors. 
(d) Introduction of an internationally-recognized human rights national charter and the rule of 
law would help the country in improving international relationships with most developed 
and developing countries, and the lifting of targeted economic sanctions, to the benefit of 
all Zimbabweans. 
(e) Obtaining foreign exchange support from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank 
and similar financial institutions in Africa.  This should help in improving the supply of 
goods and services, and reduction of the inflation rate to a level in line with most countries 
within the SADC. 
(f) A competitive and effective reform of the agricultural, mining, tourism, manufacturing and 
transport sectors would assist in the increased production of goods and services, creation 
of employment and generation of foreign exchange. 
(g) The return of most skilled professionals and specialised farmers would give Zimbabwe a 
competitive advantage in terms of human resources, and social and economic 
development. 
(h) Monetary and fiscal policies should be made effective, and be based on the principle of 
cost-and-benefit analysis.  Monetary authorities should focus on banking and financial 
regulations.  Procurement of agricultural machinery, equipment and inputs, for example, 
should be left to effective parastatals, and largely to the private sector.  The government 
should also make sure that the national revenue base for taxation is sufficient to cover 
government expenditure, in the best interests of the country.  
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These measures are necessary to keep the banking industry stable, viable and strong.  They 
would also help the banking sector in attracting additional capital from credible local, 
regional and international strategic partners.  It is envisaged that the above measures can 
also assist in attracting comparatively huge deposits and capital into the banking sector, 
thereby minimising liquidation of the viable banking institutions in Zimbabwe. 
 
Review of Certain Provisions of the Zimbabwe Banking Act (Chapter 24:20) 
In order to assist the monetary authorities to deal effectively with the banking crisis, 
insolvency, restructuring and supervision, it is necessary to review, and, where necessary, 
introduce changes to specific provisions of the Banking Act (Chapter 24:20). This 
regulates banking institutions, but not holding companies that are parent to them.   
 
For example, the Reserve Bank regulated Sagit Finance House, but not Sagit Financial 
Holdings. The Board of Directors of Sagit Financial Holdings took advantage of this, and 
conducted transactions without following ethical codes of conduct, knowing that they were 
not under the supervision of the Reserve Bank.  It is therefore necessary to review and 
introduce additional provisions and regulations to the Banking Act, for example, section 
45. 
 
It is also necessary to introduce new laws to provide for the establishment of a Bail-Out 
Statutory Fund, an Independent Stakeholder Banking Commission and Regular Banking 
Restructuring.  Details of these recommendations will be given in the final chapter. 
 
5.2.2 Banking Institutions Restructured  (2003/2006) 
The following is a sample of banking institutions restructured during the 2003/2006 
banking crisis. 
 
Table 5.2 Banking Institutions Restructured (2003/2006) 
No Name of Banking Institution Date 
7 National Discount House Limited March 2004 
8 CFX Bank Zimbabwe Limited 17 December 2004 
9 Trust Banking Corporation Limited 23 September 2004 
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Three corporate restructuring methodologies are used worldwide: centralised (government-
based) approach; market-based, or decentralised, approach, and the London, or mixed, 
approach. The Board of Directors of National Discount House used the market-based 
approach in restructuring itself. On the other hand, the curator of CFX Bank Zimbabwe 
used the London approach, while the curator of Trust Banking Corporation used the 
centralised approach. 
 
(a) Before National Discount House was restructured its viability had been adversely affected 
by mismanagement, ineffective corporate governance structures and under-capitalisation. 
Its business was characterised by aggressive buying and selling of securities; a huge 
clientele base, at times supported by political connections, high risk-taking, at times 
without regard to sound banking practices, and no proper diligence on counter parties.  At 
the time of the crisis NDH operated without effective corporate governance structures or 
governance committees, such as the Audit, Asset and Liability Committees. The majority 
of the institutional shareholders were directly connected with the Government, with 
limited capacity to re-capitalize.  Furthermore, most of the non-executive directors were 
not completely independent of the executive directors.  Most, too, lacked banking 
expertise and integrity. 
 
The restructuring process initiated by the top management was nonetheless successful, in 
that it prevented the institution from sliding into a state of insolvency.  
 
(b) CFX Bank was also affected by gross mismanagement, undercapitalisation and ineffective 
corporate governance structures.  According to a forensic report prepared by the curator, 
“There was a system financial gap of Zim$63 billion dollars, due mainly to manipulation 
of financial records in the bank’s computer system, (Equation  is the computer banking 
system used at CFX Bank).  This meant that the financial statements that were 
automatically generated by the computer system were not balancing, because of improper 






Forensic investigations carried out by Ernst & Young at the instance of the curator 
highlighted undercapitalisation as one of the major corporate factors that contributed to the 
demise of the bank.“The Bank was never adequately capitalised, and had always faced 
challenges related to its under-capitalisation”, stated the report. The restructuring strategy 
initiated by the curator was also successful, and prevented liquidation of a viable banking 
institution, in the best interests of all stakeholders. 
 
(c)  Trust Banking Corporation’s viability difficulties were caused largely by ineffective 
corporate governance structures, gross mismanagement, undercapitalisation and poor 
supervision by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 
 
In December 2003 the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe instituted an independent investigation, 
which confirmed a liquidity gap of Zim$100 billion on 12 December 2003, against the 
Bank’s stated liquidity gap of Zim$70 billion. 
 
Features of mismanagement included non-strategic rapid expansion of the bank with no 
effective internal control and risk management systems, and poor asset and liability 
management. This was manifested in the investment of short-term funds in non-liquid 
assets, such as real estate, immovable property and bricks, and the buying and selling of 
shares on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). These transactions where conducted 
through the major shareholder, Trust Holdings Limited, at a time when the bank was 
already experiencing financial distress. 
 
“The Bank was not focusing on its core business, and was therefore operating outside the 
confines of the Zimbabwe Banking Act and Regulations by engaging in non-banking 
activities through a wholly-owned special purpose vehicle known as TMB Nominees” 
according to a report prepared by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in 2003. 
 
While the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s efforts succeeded in avoiding immediate 
liquidation, the restructuring process has not been completely successful, in that it has 




On 17 July 2008 the Zimbabwe Financial Gazette (pC4) published a notice by the Reserve 
Bank dated 30 June 2008: “Take notice that the Reserve Bank hereby extends the period of 
curatorship for Trust Bank Corporation Limited and Royal Bank Zimbabwe Limited until 
all litigation has been finalised”. 
 
5.2.3 Financially Sound Banking Institutions During the Banking Crisis (2003/2006). 
The following is a sample of financially sound banking institutions during the crisis: 
 
Table 5.3 Financially Sound Banking Institutions During the Banking Crisis 
(2003/2006). 
No Name of Banking Institution Date 
10 Central African Building Society 1 January 2004 
11 Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Limited 1 January 2004 
12 Kingdom Bank Zimbabwe Limited 1 January 2004 
13 Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group 1 January 2004 
14 Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Limited 1 January 2004 
15 Metropolitan Bank of Zimbabwe Limited 1 January 2004 
 
It is commendable that most of these banking institutions, like several others, performed 
exceptionally well during the crisis, despite the worst socio-economic and political 
turbulence in living memory, reflected in an inflation rate of 231 million per cent (31 July 
2008), by far the highest in the world. 
 
The main factors which contributed to their sound performance were effective corporate 
governance structures, competent and high integrity management, credible institutional 










The researcher maintains that some of the banking institutions, such as Kingdom Bank, 
Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group and Metropolitan Bank should now go through a second 
stage of banking restructuring. This should be characterised by movement towards a 
market-based system.  The first-stage reforms introduced by the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe in December 2003 have contributed greatly to restoring confidence in 
Zimbabwe.  However, by 2006 the pace of reform had slowed, indicating the effects of the 
continuing socio-economic and political crisis. In addition, undercapitalisation, ineffective 
internal control and risk-management systems, and poor corporate governance, have 
continued to threaten the viability of some banking institutions. 
 
The global financial market experienced a critical financial crisis in 2008 especially in the 
US and most European countries.  In this situation it is advisable for the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe to launch a second round of reforms to address the difficulties and restore 
confidence.  The second stage of restructuring should be market-based, characterised by 
regular banking restructuring and, more importantly, sound corporate governance 
structures. 
 
o Stanbic Bank provided a model worthy of imitation. Its credible institutional shareholder, 
Standard Bank had assisted it in gaining a sustainable competitive advantage in areas of 
capitalization (capital adequacy).  Through the support of corporate and institutional 
banking by Standard Bank London, corporate clients in Africa had access to project 
finance, privatisation, structured lending and the channelling of aid and concessionary 
lending to Africa. 
 
Stanbic offered concessionary lending to corporate clients in Zimbabwe by Standard Bank 
London, for the purposes of project finance, privatisation and structured lending.  This 









Stanbic’s Board of Directors had ultimate responsibility for risk management, which 
included evaluating key risk areas, and ensuring that processes for risk management and 
systems of internal control were implemented effectively.  To assist in fulfilling this 
corporate responsibility, the board appointed governance committees, such as the 
Asset/Liability Committee.  These committees were composed largely of non-executive 
directors, who were completely independent of executive directors, and were also chaired 
by non-executive directors. These effective corporate governance structures, competent 
management, effective internal control systems and risk-management played a major role 
in the success of the bank. 
 
o According to the financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2004, key profit drivers 
for Central African Building Society (CABS) were interest on fixed-deposit (60%), 
interest on income advances (20%) and interest on treasury bills (11%).  CABS had a 
‘footprint’ network system all over Zimbabwe, and enjoyed the support of its major 
shareholder, Old Mutual, itself an international financial institution with foreign exchange 
and a sustainable capital base. 
 
CABS had seven governance committees, such as the Risk Management Committee.  All 
the committees were comprised largely of non-executive members, who were totally 
independent of the executive directors. 
 
o The non-executive directors of Kingdom Bank were recommended for appointment by 
shareholders, other directors and clients.  The remuneration committee then considered 
their remuneration, after which recommendations were made to the board.  The board then 
met to consider the recommendations, which included interviewing the proposed directors 
before approval.  In addition, the director concerned had to be approved by the Reserve 
Bank.  A police clearance, tax clearance and an affidavit to the effect that the candidate 
had not been convicted of a criminal offence, was not insolvent, or had not been a director 
of a failed banking institution was also required.  The appointment then had to be reviewed 
by the shareholders at the next annual general meeting. 
 
Kingdom Bank had six governance committees, such as the Audit and Finance Committee, 
with at least four non-executive directors and an executive director. 
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During the banking crisis the bank managed to raise additional capital from credible 
institutional shareholders, such as Econet Wireless, an indigenous mobile telephones 
institution with international offices in countries such as South Africa, Nigeria and the UK. 
 
By thus fulfilling the demands of good corporate governance and practice, these banking 
institutions survived the 2003/2006 banking crisis, despite the difficult socio-economic 
and political instability.   
 
5.2.4 Concluding Comments 
The summary is the most important part of the report.  It is its heart and core.  A true 
summary gives the high points of the entire body of the report [Cordwell, D. and Herbst, 
F. 2004].   
From the sample of banking institutions placed under liquidations during the 2003-2006 
banking crisis in Zimbabwe, the major causes were ineffective corporate governance 
structures, inadequate risk management systems and undercapitalisation.  It is however 
pleasing to note that from the sample of 3 banking institutions restructured, using both the 
marked-based solutions and government-based solutions, the strategies were effective and 
successful in the sense that it prevented the banking institutions from being placed under 
liquidation in 2006.   
While from a sample of 6 financially sound banking institutions during the 2003-2006 
banking crisis in Zimbabwe, like several others, survived mainly because of effective 
corporate governance structures, sound risk management systems and adequate 
recapitalisation.   
The majority of the banking institutions such as Kingdom Bank, National Discount House, 
Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group and Metropolitan Bank nevertheless required a second 
stage of bank restructuring and recapitalisation 2 years after the 2003/2006 banking crisis, 











6.1 CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONTRIBUTION 
6.1.1 Introduction 
The management of a banking crisis is highly complex, and inevitably attracts huge tax-
payers’ funds, either individual or general in its origins.  There is, however, a number of 
effective measures that can be implemented to deal with bank insolvency, such as regular 
restructuring; market-based solutions such as strategies for recapitalisation by 
shareholders, existing and potential investors; agreements with creditors or depositors and 
mergers and acquisitions. Besides these are government-based solutions, involving 
intervention; appointment of a curator; capitalisation with public resources. Liquidation of 
non-viable banking institutions is, of course, unavoidable.   
 
Experience also indicates that a sound and stable banking sector requires effective 
corporate governance structures by all banking institutions. This is because the 
implementation of effective corporate governance structures can minimize collapse of 
viable banking institutions, and hence the overall costs of a banking crisis can be reduced. 
 
In particular, there are elements present in all banking crises that exacerbate the costs of 
the problem: 
o Absence of adequate control measures (these vary with prevailing circumstances), and 
ineffective monetary and fiscal policies.  
o Lack of effective social, economic and political corrective action, poor banking 
supervision, regulatory forbearance and absence of timely solutions.   
o Clear preference for government-based solutions while overlooking the possibility of using 
private resources, and the low priority given to cost-effectiveness in the allocation of 
public resources.  
o Distortions brought about by the type of solutions chosen in terms of moral hazard, and a 






Practical solutions in dealing with future banking crises in Zimbabwe should address these 
shortcomings.  In general, this depends on an adequate regulatory and legal framework 
determining mandatory special measures, based on the origin and gravity of problems, 
and, concomitantly, a banking authority that has the will, autonomy and power to 
implement a firm and clear monetary policy.  
 
Considering that banking legislation cannot anticipate all possible situations, especially 
when the crises have systemic implications, it is also necessary to have an efficient, 
effective, independent stakeholders’ banking commission, instituted by an Act of 
Parliament. This commission, specialising in banking crises, should be endowed with 
representatives of all stakeholders, competent professionals and financial, human and 
material resources in order to operate.  
 
6.1.2 Conclusion 
In drawing conclusions the researcher notes that more than four years have passed since 
the 2003/2006 banking crisis in Zimbabwe.  The question at issue is whether the policies 
pursued by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe on behalf of the government have assisted in 
minimizing the liquidation of viable banking institutions.  The government’s delayed 
response was severely criticised, as was its excessive support for insolvent banks such as 
Barbican Bank, Royal Bank of Zimbabwe, and also the funding of ineffective parastatals 
and farming operations, all from taxpayers’ funds. 
 
It is however, pleasing to note that while the government concentrated on injecting large 
amounts of taxpayers’ funds into insolvent banks through the formation of the Zimbabwe 
Allied Banking Group (ZABG), an attempt was made to eliminate fundamental difficulties 
through the issuing of, for example, Guideline Number 01-2004/BSD on Corporate 
Governance and Guideline Number 2-2006/BSD on Risk-Based Supervision Policy 
Framework in September 2004 and June 2006 respectively. 
 
Regrettably, these measures allowed insolvent banking institutions to remain in the market 
and to continue to waste financial resources.  ZABG Bank restructuring became, in effect, 
a process of “bankruptcy suspension”.   
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A second stage of banking restructuring should be made to ensure that market-driven 
mechanisms for such restructuring take hold.  For this task restructuring intermediates 
such as the Non-Performing Asset Management Fund and Bank Bail-Out Statutory Fund 
should be further developed, using appropriate technocrats.  In addition, measures should 
be put in place for facilitating mergers and acquisitions, in both the domestic and 
international markets. 
 
The autonomy of banking institutions should also be guaranteed, especially for the smooth 
operation of the system for the regular restructuring of banks.  This should now be 
introduced in the second stage.  In addition, effective supervision by the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, and a monthly credit-risk checking system should be more fully developed by 
banks, without government intervention. 
 
It is imperative for the government to implement effective and fundamental social, 
economic and political reforms in close consultation with all stakeholders, in order to 
facilitate a speedy recovery of the Zimbabwe economy. It is also important to improve 
regional and international relationships with most developed and developing countries.  
Zimbabwe must also seek financial support from regional and international banking 
institutions, such as the World Bank. 
 
Banking Institutions operate in a complex and dynamic global financial market, in which 
restructuring should be a continuous process.  Practical, effective measures should be 
taken to overcome old methods and inefficiencies, and to create a smoothly-functioning 
system, while ensuring equitable burden-sharing in the global market economies. 
 
The banking system should be predictable, equitable, and transparent, and should protect 
and maximize value for the benefit of all stakeholders and the economy in general.  The 
resulting system should preserve capital and productive capacity, and also create 
employment.  At the end of 2008, the estimated rate of unemployment in Zimbabwe was 






Timely action will, without doubt, promote social welfare, sustainable economic 
development, and political stability both in Zimbabwe itself and the SADC.  More 
importantly, improving practical matters of corporate governance, the internal and external 
business environment, and establishing operational bank restructuring and insolvency 
corrective systems should not be delayed until the onset of another crisis. 
 
6.1.3 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are directly linked to the researcher’s findings and 
conclusions.  The objective here is to address the root causes of the difficulties, and not 
merely the symptoms, of the collapse of more than 20 banks during the 2003/2006 banking 
crisis.  The recommendations suggest realistic and achievable methodologies which can be 
used in order to minimize bank insolvency and its effects. 
 
In regard to qualitative techniques, the researcher distinguished between content and 
grounded techniques of analysis; discussed the key steps in analysing qualitative data; and 
introduced the intriguing techniques of semiotics for analysing interactions and processes 
in institutions.  Finally, the researcher highlighted the fact that the presentation and 
recommendations of the analysis of data need to be user-friendly, realistic and achievable 
in meeting the needs and requirements of all stakeholders. 
 
Mismanagement and corporate governance structures 
Most banks collapsed during the crisis largely because of gross mismanagement and 
ineffective corporate governance structures.  The establishment of an independent 
Zimbabwe Stakeholders Banking Supervisory Commission (ZSBSC) is recommended.   
 
This ZSBSC should be enacted through an Act of Parliament.  Transparency is at the core 
of effective corporate governance structures, as it allows all stakeholders to monitor top 
management, and to prevent executive directors and controlling shareholders from taking 







The ZSBSC should be empowered to undertake the following: 
o The reform of corporate governance structures within the banking sector focusing on, first, 
improving the transparency of bank managements; second, strengthening minority 
shareholders rights; third, increasing the responsibility of controlling shareholders and all 
stakeholders, and fourth, improving intra-group relationships. 
o Review all appointments and discharge of non-executive directors, independent external 
auditors, forensic auditors and investigators by banks, and take any necessary corrective 
action. 
o Scrutinising of current and potential shareholders of a bank. 
o Rigorous analysis of financial records and business operations. 
o Review all appointments and discharge of non-executive members and chairpersons of all 
governance committees, such as the Assets/Liabilities Committee (ALCO), and take 
corrective action as necessary. 
o Participate in the formulation and implementation of corporate governance policies and 
procedures within the banking sector. 
o Formulate restructuring strategies and methodologies to manage banking insolvency. 
o Appointment, supervision and remuneration of curators and liquidators of all banks, in 
close consultation with the office of the Master of High Court of Zimbabwe and the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 
o  Interpretation of banks’ financial results, and ensuring dissemination of information to all 
stakeholders namely shareholders, customers (depositors), creditors, the government, 
employees and members of the public. 
o Ensure participation of all stakeholders in the strategic decision-making process and, more 
importantly, measure the degree of satisfaction by stakeholders, and take any corrective 
action where deemed necessary. 
 
The members of the Zimbabwe Stakeholders Banking Supervisory Commission should be 
totally independent, and should also represent all the stakeholders.  More importantly, they 
should be professionals of high integrity, and must have sufficient material, human and 
financial resources to manage the commission.  Members of the commission appointed 
through an Act of parliament should not exceed more than five years in office.   
 
It is further recommended that representatives from both individual banks and the Reserve 
Bank should be part of the ZSBSC. 
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Capitalisation 
Undercapitalisation contributed significantly to the collapse of many banks during the 
crisis.  Capitalisation is the amount of money invested in an institution and the conversion 
of revenue reserves into capital reserves through, for example, a scrip issue.  These funds 
are critical for financing the operations of the bank and to ensure public confidence. 
 
The ZSBSC should regularly check the levels of capital adequacy. The examination of 
capital adequacy should also be carried out before a bank is issued with a banking license.  
Banks are required to maintain capital levels commensurate with their risk profiles and the 
strength of their top management.  The SBSC should evaluate capital adequacy based on 
the level and quality of capital and the overall financial position of a bank. The ZSBSC 
should also ensure effective implementation of the Basel III: A global regulatory 
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. 
 
Supervision and timely diagnosis of the problem 
o The liquidation of some banks was a result of a low level of bank supervision.  The SBSC 
should undertake realistic and timely diagnosis of any banking problems. 
o Through close supervision it is possible for the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to detect signs 
of future insolvency problems, using leading indicators such the Altman-Z Score model. 
o A practical way to get a perspective on the future is by examining the quality of the main 
processes in operation in the bank. 
o The effective way to guarantee timely detection of problem banks is by having a monetary 
policy of regular supervision.  
o Having identified potentially problem banks, it is necessary to evaluate in detail the 
problems, with special emphasis on the quality of loans and the sufficiency of capital 
reserves. 
o There should be total and full access to all information of the problem bank, with no 
information withheld from the supervisors. 
o Where lack of expertise occurs among the personnel working within the Reserve Bank, the 
supervisor should have the flexibility and resources to outsource work to technocrats from 
firms of management consultants, forensic auditors, chartered accountants and retired top 
bankers. 
o Adequate internal control and risk-management systems, particularly in the areas of loans 
classification reserves and interest accrual are essential for the quality of diagnosis                                      
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Public Governance 
The current social, economic and political crisis (with an official annual inflation rate of 
231 million per cent in 31 July 2008), has given rise to critical shortages of basic needs 
such as water, food, medical care, shelter, education and transport. This human catastrophe 
has a direct long-term bearing on the viability of the banking sector, as this will detract 
from attracting sustainable deposits.  The rate of unemployment is estimated at over 80%, 
causing the banks a huge loss of a potential deposit base.  It is therefore recommended that 
the government should, as a matter of urgency, improve public governance, and undertake 
fundamental political and economic reforms. These should include substantial reduction of 
the size of the government in terms of number of departments, ministries and labour; 
drafting of a new constitution in line with international constitutional standards; 
introduction of an independent electoral system and internationally-recognized human 
rights National Charter; a complete independent judiciary system and strict observance of 
the rules of law. Improvement in international relations with most developed and 
developing countries; obtaining foreign exchange support from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, an exhaustive reform of the agricultural, mining, tourism, 
manufacturing and transport sectors, and also the return of specialised farmers and skilled 
professionals to the country. 
 
Monetary and fiscal policies should be formulated and implemented, based on the 
principle of cost-and-benefit analysis.   
 
Banking Restructuring On a Regular Basis 
While some banks have performed very well under these very difficult conditions, most, 
such as ZABG and Metropolitan Bank, will need to go through a second stage of 
restructuring as a means of minimizing viability difficulties. It should be characterised by a 
market-based system.  The distinguishing feature of these reforms from those of the first 
stage introduced in December 2003 should be that the government should reduce its 
intervention, depending instead on market-driven mechanisms. 
 
The second stage of restructuring should be implemented in conjunction with a system for 
regular bank restructuring. Under this programme, banks should allow high credit-risk 
banks to restructure quickly. 
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The proposed ZSBSC should be empowered to assess business and corporate strategies of 
high credit-risk institutions, and classify them as viable or non-viable.  For institutions 
classified as viable and able to provide normal operations, the ZSBSC would assume full 
responsibility for providing financial support from a statutory Bail-Out Fund.  Banks 
experiencing a temporary liquidity problem would receive short-term loans, after signing 
an agreement promising to carry out self-restructuring.  Institutions facing structural 
liquidity problems, but able to recover, would gain loan adjustments, provided they agree 
to improve their management and corporate governance structures.  Institutions classified 
as non-viable should be liquidated by means of transparent exit procedures.  The ZSBSC 
should regularly monitor banks and determine whether their mechanisms are working 
properly. 
 
In order to co-manage financially-distressed banks by banking institutions or by the 
creditor banks themselves, a committee composed of financial institutions should be 
established.  This committee would select financially-distressed banks, and devise co-
management strategies, indicate expiration dates of loans, adjust loans or granting of new 
credit, and discuss management normalization procedures.  Banks which do not agree with 
decisions made by this committee can request to purchase loans.   
 
The system of regular restructuring has to be managed by financial institutions through a 
committee, but supervised or monitored by the ZSBSC.  Regular banking restructuring 
would help to renew capital adequacy and effectiveness of corporate governance structures 
(see figure 2.3, Chapter 2, p.  33).                                                                                                                           
 
Legal Framework and Banking Legislation 
o The Banking Act (Chapter 24:20) should have clear rules governing the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe’s role in restructuring, without adversely affecting market-based solutions or 
forced liquidation.  Intervention should be directed at cases where there are clearly 
difficulties due to mismanagement, ineffective corporate governance structures, and where 
capital is weak, though still positive. 
o Banking legislation should allow, in a flexible way, for the capitalisation or the absorption 
of the problem institution by another bank. 
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o In the same approach, private alternatives to intervention and/or forced liquidation need to 
be offered, allowing the major creditors of the bank to transform part of their deposits into 
capital, thus permitting the problem bank to continue in the market. 
o Similarly, to avoid distortions in the market incentives, the legislation should consider 
ways to facilitate forced liquidation, incorporating matters like the sale of group assets, 
allowing the bank to accept important discounts if there are offers of prepayment, and, if 
there are many simultaneous liquidations, allowing collective actions and defining a 
maximum term for the liquidation process. 
o It is desirable to have rules establishing the use of obligatory graduated corrective 
measures, culminating in mandatory closure. 
o Mandatory restructuring must not postpone action until the banks get the authority 
established through legislation. 
o Particular units, such as the capital/asset ratio should not be the only variable used by 
monetary authorities to prompt intervention in a bank.   
o This rules-based approach should be supplemented by giving more discretion to the 
monetary authorities under particular conditions of systemic risks. 
o The Bail-Out Fund should be established through legislation.  All financial institutions 
would be required to make contributions based on, say, 3% of their annual gross sales.  
The funds would be managed by a committee appointed by the Stakeholders Banking 
Supervisory Commission from time to time.  The government would also be required to 
make annual contributions through the annual fiscal budgets.  The International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and other such financial institutions in the region would be 
requested to donate funds from time to time, especially “seed money”. 
 
The funds would be used largely to purchase non-liquid and non-performing assets of 
viable but financially-distressed or insolvent banking or financial institutions during a 
crisis or a restructuring process. This would be expedited through the operation of a Non-
Performing Asset Management Fund (NAMF).  Depositors of a bank placed under 
liquidation should also benefit from such a fund in the event of any shortfall from the 
liquidation process.  In addition, depositors should be paid a market-based rate of interest 
up to the date of payment of their capital funds, rather than the date of liquidation of a 
banking institution.  
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The NAMF could re-sell non-liquid and non-performing assets to investors through 
acquisitions and mergers, or simple acquisitions, at a premium.  Use of taxpayers’ funds 
would be minimized. 
 
o The Banking Act (Chapter 20:24), which regulates banks, does not regulate holding 
institutions that are parent to banks.  Provisions should be made in the Act to allow the 
monetary authorities and the proposed SBSC to investigate, obtain unlimited information 
and, most importantly, to take corrective action in institutions that are parent to banks, 
where deemed necessary. 
 
o The Companies Act (Chapter 24:03 Section 318) provides that “any business of an 
institution which was being carried out recklessly or with gross negligence; or with intent 
to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose; the High Court of Zimbabwe may, on 
the application of the Master of the High Court, or Liquidator or Judicial Manager or any 
creditor of, or contributory to the institution, if it thinks its proper to do so, declare that any 
of the past or present directors of the institution or any other persons who were knowingly 
parties to the carrying on of the business in the manner or circumstances aforesaid, shall be 
personally responsible, without limitation of liability, for all or any or the debts or other 
liabilities of the institution as the court may direct.  
 
In addition, every director of the company, or other person who was knowingly a party to 
the carrying on of the business in manner aforesaid shall be guilty of an offence and liable 
to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or to both such fine and 
such imprisonment.”  The curators or administrators of banks, together with the Governor 
of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe would need similar powers. Taking into account that it 
may be virtually impossible for an insurance fund to quantify the expected cost of a 
banking crisis, it must be available to estimate losses, considering the resources necessary 
to implement in-depth solutions of problem institutions, where forced liquidation is viewed 






o The proposed Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill (Chapter 14:33), should 
not be allowed to affect adversely the shareholding structures of banks, as this may cause 
another crisis.  Local, regional and international strategic investors or partners must be 
allowed to control at least 51% of the issued shares, and must also be authorised to remit 
reasonable dividends to their countries in a future free-market Zimbabwe.  
 
One of the main reasons why banks have collapsed around the world, and specifically in 
Zimbabwe during the 2003/2006 banking crisis, was under-capitalization due to lack of 
credible and financially-sound institutional shareholders.           
 
6.1.4 Contribution 
More than 20 banks collapsed, largely because of ineffective corporate governance 
structures and undercapitalization.  There was also lack of regular banking restructuring. 
As a means of resolving the problems of mismanagement and ineffective corporate 
governance structures, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has adopted the internationally-
recognised CAMELS rating system for evaluating the performance and condition of banks.  
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe adopted Basel II and III: International framework for 
liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring. 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe also uses the Risk Assessment System (RAS) to provide a 
structured framework for measuring and assessing risk.  RAS is a method of identifying, 
evaluating, documenting and communicating assessment of the quality of risk, the quality 
of risk-management, and the direction of risk at each bank.  It takes both a current and a 
prospective view of the institution’s risk profile. 
 
The researcher is convinced that these methodologies, including models suggested by 
several authors or researchers, such as the Altman’s Z-Value model, have not measured 
and evaluated in sufficient detail the effectiveness of corporate governance structures.  He 
is also convinced that all stakeholders: shareholders, customers (depositors), employees, 
the government, business associates, creditors and the public (or their representatives) 
must be allowed to participate, or at least be consulted, in the strategic decision-making 
process. This applies especially to a bank or public company administering public funds.  
Again, this has not been measured or evaluated in detail by the methodologies and models 
mentioned above. 
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The other difficulty with these models is that they have not measured the real level of 
satisfaction of all stakeholders, or its link to sustainable business growth.  The 
effectiveness of corporate governance should be linked to increase in value of business 
through empirical research. 
 
Yet the effectiveness of corporate governance structures must necessarily be measured by 
the degree of satisfaction derived by all the stakeholders.  Banks must be aware of the fact 
that all stakeholders have different, and often conflicting, interests.  As a way of 
minimizing the liquidation of viable institutions, the directors and managements should 
make an effort to understand, and then at least attempt, to satisfy the needs of all 
stakeholders. 
 
Most banks placed under liquidation during the banking crisis failed completely to satisfy 
the needs of depositors (customers) and other stakeholders, such as the non-managerial 
staff. 
 
Accordingly, the researcher has made a contribution to the field by developing the Tudor 
House Consultants (THC) BICEPS model.   
The THC BICEPS model considers empirical research and qualitative analysis of 
corporate governance structures, fundamental analysis of external factors affecting 
banking institutions (such as the effects of monetary and fiscal policies and public 
governance (largely by the government)) and its effects on all stakeholders.  
 
Qualitative analysis of these components can be applied to any banking or corporate 
institution, regardless of size, business activities or internal/external factors affecting the 
business.           
 
The ratings are assigned to each of the six components, and then an overall, or composite, 
rating is assigned.  Ratings are on a scale of a numerical scale of 1 to 6 with respect to the 
effectiveness of corporate governance, level of stakeholder participation in strategic 
decision-making and the resultant stakeholder satisfaction.  1 is the highest rating, 
indicating the most effective practice.  This should result in a sustainable increase in 




Collecting all the required data, such as financial statements, minutes of various 
governance committees and participating in meetings in respect of some banks (e.g., 
Beverly Building Society, Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe and Standard Chartered Bank 
Zimbabwe) was difficult.  For example, the researcher wrote to Standard Chartered Bank 
Zimbabwe on 15 November 2006, and their response the following day was as follows: 
“… I regret to advise that we are not in position to participate in your research at this time.  
In the circumstances, we return herewith the documents and schedules sent to us.  We … 
wish you all the best in your research initiative”.  The reply was signed by Nilesh Trivedi, 
head of Legal and Compliance, Standard Chartered Bank.   
 
In spite of this, a fair sample of the entire banking sector of Zimbabwe covering the period 
1 January 2003 to 31 December 2006 was obtained in the end.  In addition, when all of the 
banks were directed by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to make a full disclosure of their 
financial results for on-site risk-based examination from January 2007, some useful 
information became available in the press, though with certain limitations.  In addition, 
some top management of particular banks were “not available” to take interviews. 
 
6.1.6 Areas For Future Research 
The collapse of viable banks represents an enormous challenge for the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe.  While there are various solutions to deal with a future crisis, such as market, 
government and ‘mixed’ restructuring approaches, they are very difficult to implement, 
especially when the crisis involves more than just individual cases.  Inevitably, managing 
the bank restructuring process generates huge costs, borne by the taxpayers, and typically 
results in distorting basic market rules and fuelling inflationary pressures. 
 
In Zimbabwe the collapse of banks was largely the result of corporate governance 
malpractice. Of further interest, therefore, would be to determine the most effective 
methodologies of implementing corporate governance; how to deal with the problem of 
public policy involved in regular bank restructuring; undercapitalisation; the main factors 
increasing the costs of banking crises in Zimbabwe (and also other countries), and the 
most effective methods of bank restructuring. The effectiveness of corporate governance 
structures in a company can be measured and linked to the increase in value of the 
business and stakeholder satisfaction, through empirical research. 
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6.17  Concluding Comments 
Finally, the market-based approach, and the complete autonomy of banks should be 
applied.  Essentially, for the smooth operation of the system of regular bank restructuring, 
effective supervision by the monetary authorities, and more importantly, adequate and 
regular risk management systems should be more fully developed and implemented, 
without government intervention. 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe initiated banking reforms in 2004 which not only resulted 
in building greater confidence in the banking sector among the depositing and investing 
public, but also assisted in the development of sound, viable and competitive banking 
institutions in Zimbabwe notwithstanding the socio-economic and political turbulence 
highlighted in chapter one.  The measures also prevented the collapse of the banking sector 
during the 2008 global financial crisis that witnessed the liquidation of some giant banking 
institutions such as the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in United States of America. 
 
The banking sector in Zimbabwe should however remain focused on introducing new 
products/services in order to meet the ever changing needs of the customers and promote 
the continued growth of the deposit base.  This can be achieved by regular bank 
restructuring, recapitalisation, and effective corporate governance structures. 
 
It is also essential for the Government of Zimbabwe to carryout effective fundamental 
socio-economic and political reforms as recommended in this chapter, in order to attract 
capital investment for both the banking and corporate sectors.  There is conclusive 
empirical evidence and the researcher is satisfied that the abovementioned measures when 
implemented effectively, can minimise the liquidation of viable institutions in the 
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